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ABSTRACT 
This research focuses on financial development and economic growth with a 
qualitative assessment of the Turkish case between 1982 and 1999. 
The effect of financial development on economic growth has been examined 
in numerous studies throughout the modern history of economics. The 
dissenters and advocates contest both the theme and the empirical evidence 
extensively. The debate, to a certain extent, however is still inconclusive and 
incomplete. In essence, the diversity of variables, time discrepancies, sui-
generis country structures, measurement, statistical and conceptual 
drawbacks and finally differences in the level of financial development of 
different countries initiate questionable generalisations. 
Within the confines of the abovementioned discussions, Turkey is a good 
example to examine with its liberalisation efforts in the 1980s and a number of 
crises in the 1990s, most recently in November 2000 and February 2001. 
This study attempts to investigate Turkey's political and financial structures in 
order to understand the liberalisation efforts and why they failed. 
The analysis will, therefore, include an examination of the historical 
development of the financial, banking and stock market sectors as well as an 
examination of the existence of the McKinnon-Shaw relationship. Findings of 
other empirical studies will be brought into the analysis in order to provide a 
full picture of the consequences of Turkey's financial liberalisation. Our 
assessment is that the Turkish experience of financial liberalisation has 
brought about some positive results in the financial sector but its impact in the 
real economic sectors do not justify the changes which have taken place over 
the last 20 years or so. 
KEYWORDS 
Financial development, Economic growth, Liberalisation, McKinnon-Shaw, 
Banking sector, Stock markets, Turkey, Turkish financial development. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Financial development affects economic growth. This robust statement is the 
subject matter of numerous studies throughout the modern history of 
economics. The dissenters and advocates contest both the theme and the 
empirical evidence extensively. The debate, to a certain extent, however is still 
inconclusive and incomplete. In essence, the diversity of variables, time 
discrepancies, sui-generis country structures, measurement, statistical and 
conceptual drawbacks and finally differences in the level of financial 
development of different countries initiate questionable generalisations. 
The majority of the studies support the argument that financial development is a 
source of growth1• Yet, causality still remains a questionable topid!. The 
1 See Beck et all (1999) and Levine et all (1999) for recent studies. Also see Levine (1997) for a summary of literature 
as well as King and Levine (1993a) for a cross country analysis. In addition, see Levine (2000), Gregorio and Guidottl 
(1992 and 1995) Berthelmy and Varoduakis (1996a). Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990). Stulz (2000) for the relatively 
positive effect of financial development on economic growth and see Demirguc-Kunt and Makslmovlc (1998) and Rajan 
and Zingales (1998) for the same kind of approach but in the Industry level. Moreover. see Atje and Jovanovic (1993). 
financial structuralists and repressionists on one side and the cautious 
development economists on the other all subscribe to different theories. Just as 
important, the empirical evidence and findings are not uniform. The debate 
boils down to whether financial development is important or not for an economy 
in terms of generating funds, re-allocating savings in the form of credit and 
facilitating risk management and information gathering. 
One of the most important studies in this area is the Financial Repression 
Analysis3 (FRA) of McKinnon and Shaw (1973) which is concerned with the 
contribution of financial liberalisation to the economic development process. 
The main hypothesis of this repressionist view is that higher interest rates would 
lead to increased saving levels and therefore, rapid growth and development. 
Shaw and McKinnon (1973> argue that sub-optimal interest rates in developing 
countries were the primary reason behind the high level of inappropriate capital 
investments .. 
On the other hand, Goldsmith (1969), as a structuralist, states that the 
correlation between financial development and economic growth reflects a two-
way causal relationship and that financial markets enhance growth by raising 
the efficiency of the investment (Pagano 1993:620). 
After studying country cases, Patrick (1966) and Cameron (1966) support the 
view that the organisation of a financial system is crucial to economic growth. 
Similarly Schumpeter (1911) argued that developed financial systems promote 
innovations and thus affect economic growth positively. 
All of the authors who accord with this particular view stress the role and 
importance of the financial system in economic growth4• All the aforementioned 
Bekaert and Harvey (1995), Bencivenga et al (1996), Demirguc-Kunt and Levlne (1996a and b), Demirguc-Kunt and 
Makslmovic (1996), Filer et al (1999), Levine and Zervos (1996 and 1998) and Levlne (1991 and 1996) for the positive 
effect of the development of the stock market on economic growth. 
2 Patrlck (1966) was the first to identify the causation. Later, Mci<Jnnon (1988:390) note that •atthough a higher rate of 
financial growth Is positively correlated with successful real growth, Patrick's problem remains unsolved: what is the 
cause? And what Is the effectr 
3 Financial repression Is defined by McKinnon (1984:3) as a s~uatlon In which the repressive effect of usury laws, bank, 
reserve requirements, credit controls and price Inflation Interact to reduce and distort the flow of domestic savings In 
McKinnon and Shaw (1973) analysis, a repressed financial market Is characterised as the one where government 
policies that distort the operation of capital markets. 
4 ValerianO and Llu (2001) summarizes the main reason why an efficient financial system is essential to an economy is 
that there are substantial information and transactions costs: 
Asymmetric information creates adverse selection and moral hazard, and high transactions costs Impose Inefficiencies. 
By specializing in collecting information, evaluating projects, sharing risks, and providing liquidity, an efficient financial 
system increases financial savings, and improves their allocations across investments. Consequently, financial 
scholars provide conceptual descriptions and empirical examples of how and 
when the financial system affects economic growth. Building on these seminal 
contributions, Gelb (1989), Ghani (1992), King and Levine (1993a, b) and De 
Gregorio and Guidotti (1992 and 1995) show that measures of banking 
development are strongly correlated with economic growth in a broad cross 
section of countries. According to this school of research, a well functioning 
financial system is critical for sustained economic growth. 
At the other extreme, some scholars of economic development take the 
opposite view and argue that financial development has little impact on 
economic growth and development. Dornbusch and Reynose (1989), Stern 
(1989), Lucas (1988), Meier and Seers (1984) and Robinson (1952) are typical 
of academics who accord with this school of thought. 
Unfortunately the theory is ambiguous on the real effects of financial 
liberalisation and the empirical findings are inconclusive. One approach in 
empirical studies has been cross-country regressions of "financial deepening" 
and average economic growth. However, the result of such studies have been 
mixed and the relationship between financial development and. real variables 
such as savings, investment and growth remains uncertain. Fry (1978), Jung 
(1986), Lanyi and Saracoglu (1993), King and Levine (1993a) and Levine 
(1997) have found positive relationships. Alternatively, Dornbusch and Reynoso 
(1989), for example, in a large sample of developing countries found no 
correlation between financial development (M2/GNP ratio) and average growth 
rates. Moreover, cross-country studies such as Khatkate (1988), Corsetti et al 
intermediation increases capital productivity, and promotes economic growth. We have Identified three main channels 
through which financial intermediaries and markets may affect economic growth. 
First, a developing financial sector makes room for Increasing saving rates. By using economies of scale and expertise, 
financial Intermediaries and markets are able to provide savers with a relatively higher yield, and therefore stimulate 
savings. A lot of literature has shown the role played by financial intermediaries and markets in increasing savings. For 
example, Mci<Jnnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) emphasize the role played by financial liberalization In Increasing savings 
and, hence, Investment. They claim that financial deepening Improves not only productivity of capital but also the saving 
rate and, therefore, Investment and growth. 
Second, by reducing Information and transactions costs, the financial intermediaries and markets perform the essential 
economic function of Increasing the funneling of funds from lenders to borrowers. For example, Gurley and Shaw (1955, 
1960 and 1967) stress the importance of financial Intermediation In channellng savings to Investment. Third, the 
financial sector Improves the allocation of resources. A recent line of research argues forcefully that financial 
development enhances growth by promoting an efficient allocation of investment through various mechanisms: (1) fund 
pooling, that Is, making large investment projects possible and lending cheaper; (2) risk diversification, that Is, reducing 
productiv~y and defau~ risks by holding diversified portfolios; (3) liquidity management, that is, providing llquld~y to 
investment projects; (4) screening, that Is, gathering and evaluating information on proJects to channel funds to the most 
profitable ones; (5) monitoring, that Is, disciplining borrowers' performance to make sure they fulfill their commitments. A 
well functioning financial system improves resource allocation through these mechanisms. 
(1992) and Thornton (1996) also show that the empirical evidence is 
inconclusive5 (Yulek, 1995:1-5). Consequently, De Gregorio and Guidotti (1992) 
and Fernandez and Galetovic (1994) have qualified these results and show that 
the relationship varies with the stage of economic growth6. 
This brief summary of the literature also reflects an historic approach to the 
subject as well: Within the framework of the development of the literature on 
financial liberalisation and its effects on economic growth, three distinct phases 
can be detected: The initial phase was concerned with the idea that finance 
does not matter in economic growth7. The second phase, which paved the way 
for financial liberalisation efforts throughout the world, favours the importance of 
financial markets and their structure in economic growth. However, the reliance 
on perfect market assumptions stopped the wider application of the theory. The 
third, and a more realistic phase, has the same theoretical underpinning of the 
second phase but omitted the perfect market assumption. This final approach 
formed the basis for public policy in the financial liberalisation process8 . 
The main literature regarding the effect of the financial market on economic 
growth can be shown as follows: 
Table 1.1: Financial Determinants of Economic Growth 
Financial Structuralists 
The quantity of financial 
variables and its 
composition affect 
economic development. 
Gurley (1960), Porter 
(1966), Patrick (1966) and 
nnlth:mith (IQI'\Q\ 
Financial Repressionists 
Emphasise price variables as 
financial factors on economic 
growth McKinnon and Shaw 
(1973)Gulbis (1977}, Fry(1987). 
Greenwood Jovanovic (1990), 
Bencivenga and Smith (1991) and 
Kin2. and Levine (1993) 
Dissents 
Financial system plays an 
inconsequential role in 
economic development 
Dombusch and Reynose 
(1989), Stern (1989), Lucns 
(1988), Meier and Seers 
(1984). Robinson (1952) 
'Among the studies which find positive relations between financial development and real economic growth, King and 
Levlne (1993a) are careful in considering the direction of causality. They estimate a simple model to test If the starting 
financial development leads to a higher subsequent real economic growth. They conclude that the causality runs rather 
from financial development to real development. However, the conclusions of Jung (1986) and Thomton (1996) question 
the findings of King and levine and state that causality runs both ways. 
' More specifically, Fernandez and Galetovlc (1996) find that the positive relationship within the OECD countries Is 
much weaker than with non·OECD countries. Indeed, such a correlation is nearly absent when Japan is excluded from 
the OECD sample. For twelve Latin American countries, De Gregorto and Guidottl (1992) conclude that the 
development of the real and the financial sectors are negatively related using panel data analysis with six year averages 
(Becsl et.al.,1998:1). 
7 
·economists frequently exaggerate the role of financial factors In economic development and growth Is manly due to 
technological progress, leaving ltttle role for finance" Lucas (1988) "financial factors are Important only when financial 
lnstabiltty becomes a dominant force In the economy" Dornbusch and Reynose (1989) 
8 For a detailed discussion see especially Sak (1995) 
Figure 1 shows that the common element in the first two schools of thought 
relates to the financial variables affecting economic growth whereas the last 
school takes the view that financial variables are only important when they have 
an effect on the real sector and macro balances. 
Another aspect of the financial development and economic growth nexus is the 
contribution of stock markets. Especially in the last five years, stock markets 
have been analysed in detail due to two main reasons: Firstly, there has been a 
huge amount of capital flow to these markets and secondly, they are now 
regarded as an integral part of financial development. McKinnon and Shaw 
(1973) have taken important steps in examining the relationship between 
financial development and economic growth. However, they have contributed 
very little on the role of stock markets. Cho (1986) introduced the role of the 
stock market to the McKinnon-Shaw framework by applying the theory of credit 
rationing (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981 ). Cho's point of view can be summarised as 
follows: 
1) Banks inherently suffer from the problems of imperfect information in 
the credit market and cannot always achieve efficient capital 
allocation. 
2) On the other hand, equity finance is free from adverse selection and 
moral hazard effects. Therefore, expected return to an equity investor 
would be exactly the same as the expected return on the project. 
3) Accordingly, the substantial development of an equity market is a 
necessary condition for complete financial liberalisation. 
Within the context of the capital account, stock market liberalisation is basically 
concerned with the process bywhich foreign investors are allowed to trade (buy 
and sell) in a country's stock market. lt is argued that the stock market provides 
backing to economic growth by supplying liquidity, risk diversification, 
monitoring of firms and corporate control. 
Nevertheless, Singh (1997) and Stiglitz (1989, 1993), for example, challenge 
the argument that stock market development affects economic growth 
positively. They focus on the adverse effects of increased liquidity (on savings) 
and volatility (on efficient investment). Moreover, the interaction of stock 
markets with foreign exchange markets focuses attention on macroeconomic 
stability when faced with shocks. 
Irrespective of whether they are bank or market based, all financial systems 
operate within an economy. Intuitively this implies that there is a relationship. 
This relation has been identified as being statistically significant in most of the 
empirical studies. However, the direction of causation and the econometric 
techniques have raised significant questions. As has been argued by Levine 
(1997), country case studies capturing both banking sector as well as stock 
market development may be the key to solving these questions and revealing 
the real relationship. 
Within the confines of the abovementioned discussions, Turkey is a good 
country to examine with its liberalisation efforts in the 1980s and a number of 
crises in the 1990s, most recently in November 2000 and February 2001. 
Turkey's political and financial structures need to be investigated in order to 
understand the liberalisation efforts and why they failed. 
The analysis will, therefore, include an examination of the historical 
development of the financial, banking and stock market sectors as well as an 
examination of the existence of the McKinnon-Shaw relationship. Findings of 
other empirical studies will be brought into the analysis in order to provide a full 
picture of the consequences of Turkey's financial liberalisation. 
The next chapter (Chapter 2) will discuss the relevant academic literature and 
the research methods used in examining the relationship between financial 
development and economic growth. This chapter will also capture the main 
stream arguments from an historic as well as a functional approach. In 
summarising the methodologies used in the literature, the respective strengths 
and weaknesses and the criticisms of these approaches will be discussed. 
Accordingly, the chapter will outline the rationale of the alternative 
methodologies and also identify the various measures and variables used in 
these different approaches. 
Chapter three will focus on the historical development of the Turkish financial 
markets and analyse the political economy of Turkey from a wider perspective. 
This chapter will discuss the structure, development and current state of the 
markets and provide an appropriate political and social context for a better 
understanding of financial liberalisation efforts in Turkey 
Chapter 4 provides an in-depth descriptive analysis of the development of the 
Turkish banking sector. Accordingly, the various assets, liabilities, profits, 
income stream etc. of the Turkish banking sector will be discussed. An overall 
analysis of the banking sector, as well as the public and private bank's separate 
consolidated figures, will be considered. Developments in the banking sector 
will also be compared with changes in GDP. This analysis will be facilitated by 
looking at the relationships between the credit volume of the banks, the levels of 
savings, interest rates and money supply in the economy. This chapter will also 
assist in helping to understand the reasons for the current economic crisis in 
Turkey. 
Chapter 5 examines whether a McKinnon-Shaw type of reasoning is valid in 
Turkey by analysing the results of financial liberalisation to-date. The chapter 
will ascertain whether the financial liberalisation efforts have led to an increase 
in economic growth over the last 20 years by increasing the volume of 
investments. The relationship between savings, investments, GDP, credit, 
money supply and interest rates will also be investigated. 
In the penultimate chapter, the impact of the Istanbul Stock Exchange on the 
economic growth of Turkey will be investigated. The standard measures of 
stock market development that have been put forward in the literature will be 
used and the findings of some other scholars will be analysed to understand 
some of the current problems that the Turkish markets face. The thesis 
concludes by examining the main implications of financial liberalisation of 
Turkey and an assessment is made of their impact on the real economy. 
CHAPTER 11 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Financial Liberalisation 
Financial liberalisation9 can be considered an act of policy that eliminates or 
lessens control of price and quantity in a market. Patrick (1994:341) refers to as 
a goal and a process10• The goal is to achieve a market-based financial system 
in which institutions compete and prices (interest rates) are determined in 
competitive markets. On the other hand, the process component of financial 
liberalisation entails institutional transformation so that rules and practices are 
changed with the intention that prudential objectives continue to be met and 
cartel-like private market power is prevented (Cole and Slade, 1999:2). 
Financial liberalisation is primarily aimed at increasing the efficiency and 
competitiveness of the sector by liberalising interest rates, strengthening the -
supervisory framework, reducing the controls on credit, promoting growth and 
deepening the financial markets. Moreover, a usual consequence of domestic 
liberalisation is the abandonment or lessening of the restrictions· on international 
9 The word •uberalisatlon• will mean financial liberalisation throughout this study if otherwise Is not stated. 
10 This multifaceted nature involves deregulation, liberalization, globalisatlon and privatisation (see Bandlera et al (1999) 
for detailed discussion). 
capital flows and a more flexible exchange rate regime. The main impetus 
behind financial liberalisation is that it will promote economic growth better than 
a repressed system. In a repressed real interest rate environment, the quantity 
and quality of investments can be sub-optimum due to low returns on bank 
deposits, resulting in a decrease in the amount of loanable funds (Arestis and 
Demetriades, 1997). 
The objective of increasing the role of the market mechanism in resource 
allocation by financial liberalisation has been a policy option since the second 
half of the 1970s. A growing number of developing and developed countries 
have implemented programmes aimed at liberalisation. Today, there is fairly 
wide acceptance that these programmes, if put into practice appropriately, 
increase economic growth and the welfare of nations. lt is, therefore, clear that 
in many instances there should be a policy intervention in the financial system 
but the question remains as to what form this intervention should take. 
Essentially, the relaxation of controls on the financial sector over the last 25 
years or so have been accompanied by greater integration with world markets. 
lt will not be misleading, therefore to say that the easing of exchange controls 
and the increasing de facto integration of world capital markets, has been a key 
driving force behind the deregulation of most domestic financial sectors (Stiglitz 
et.al. 1999:3). 
In order to have a successful transition process and a liberalised economy, Fry 
(1995: 454~60 and 1997:759) stated that some prerequisites must be satisfied: 
1) Sufficient regulation and supervision of commercial banks; 
2) Sufficient price stability; 
3) Some fiscal discipline; 
4) Some competitive behaviour (profit maximising) by the commercial 
banks and 
5) A non-discriminatory tax system. 
Chandavarkar (1992) identifies three distinct components of financial 
liberalisation, with different policy implications: 
1) The negative aspect of eliminating financial repression and the 
restructuring of institutions with substantial non performing assets; 
2) The positive element of reform in the regulatory and institutional 
framework; 
3) The post-liberalisation agenda of how to maintain and monitor a viable 
competitive financial system and cope with the problems generated by 
liberalisation. 
Nevertheless, the specifications of almost every attempt at introducing 
liberalisation vary. On the one hand, the problem of sequencing and the speed 
of policy implementation usually pose problems. The need for a suitable order 
of policy implementation stems from the idea that all markets cannot and should 
not be liberalised concurrently. On the other hand, adjustment costs also 
determine the speed of the liberalisation process. Moreover, the sui generis 
characteristics of individual countries have inevitable effects on the liberalisation 
process. In addition, liberalisation attempts in a more volatile environment can 
sometimes end in either hyperinflation, or a retreat into barter11 or bank 
failures12. In essence, therefore, there is no generally accepted procedural 
approach to financial study. 
Stiglitz et.al. (1999:4) summarise the most important elements of financial 
liberalisation as: 
1) Elimination of interest rate and other price controls, amounting to a 
reduction in the implicit taxation of financial intermediation 
2) Privatisation of state owned intermediaries and a reduction of 
administrative control of credit by government agencies 
3) Admission of new entrants into the financial services industry, 
reductions in the range of business activities and the removal of legal 
protection for cartelised financial markets 
11 Concerning this matter, Fry (1997:768-9) notes that "financial repression reduces economic growth. Nevertheless, 
abandoning financial repression as a cost~reducing device for government deficit may result In extraordinarily high real 
interest rates that can be just as damaging. Experience Indicate that, to be successful, financial liberalisation must be 
accompanied by liberal reform aimed at ensuring that government debt will not explode In the aftermath of liberalisation, 
as well as sound prudential supervision of the banking system". 
12 See Stiglitz, J.E, Caprio, G and Honohan, P, (1999), Financial Liberalisation: How Far? How Fast?, World Bank 
Working Paper June 1999, for a detailed study. 
The criticism of financial liberalisation has been based upon both 
macroeconomic and microeconomic arguments. Macroeconomic criticism 
focuses on output, inflation and growth and is mainly made by the post-
Keynesian school. lt must be mentioned that conventional Keynesian theory 
generally avoided finance and provided support to the view that low interest rate 
policies were preferable, since they stimulated capital formation. This view was 
effective until the 1960s despite the fact that various economic historians 
disagreed with the main hypothesis. At the beginning of 1970s, however, a new 
theory emerged. The post-Keynesian school placed emphasis on the possibility 
of financial fragility after liberalisation, the effect of increased real interest rates 
on government budget deficits and most importantly, on the role of effective 
demand. The school argued that as a result of financial liberalisation, the 
marginal propensity to save would increase leading to a fall in aggregate 
demand. This will cause profit rates and hence investment13 levels to fall. If this 
causes investors to become pessimistic about the future, it will create an 
additional negative effect on investment and demand. Accelerator effects may, 
therefore, also be another potential force reducing investments. 
New-structuralists emphasise the working capital needs of firms, the credit 
supply mechanism in developing countries and the potential fall in aggregate 
demand due to liberalisation. New structuralists stress that firms in developing 
countries often have to resort to unofficial markets for their financing needs. 
Berthelemy and Varoudakis (1996c:25) argue that these considerations raise 
the possibility that financial liberalisation can lead to intermediated finance 
being substituted for informal finance. The authors also add that as the informal 
sector is not subject to the costs generated by reserve requirements and as it 
has an advantage in terms of risk monitoring for local markets, it may be more 
efficient in the financing of short term projects than the formal intermediation 
sector. 
Conversely, financial liberalisation can leave the doors open for government 
intervention: Levine (1996b:162) lists the activities of financial intermediaries 
"Yet, Bandlera et al (1999:4) states the characteristics of long term effect of settled compet~ive liberalised financial 
system on savings will be positive: Improved saving opportunities Including higher deposit Interest rates; a wider range 
of savings media with improved risk~return characteristics and more banks and more bank branches as well as other 
financial intermediaries. 
that potentially create a positive role for government intervention in financial 
markets: Firstly, the fear of contagion, i.e. the fear that the failure of one 
intermediary will cause other intermediaries to fail. Another role stems from 
externalities in monitoring financial institutions and appraising and monitoring 
their activities. Stiglitz et. al. ( 1999: 3) also note that governments have always 
acted to control financial intermediation with a view to limiting the concentration 
of wealth and monopoly power, protecting the general public from unexpected 
losses and preserving financial stability. 
Microeconomic criticisms of financial liberalisation emphasise failures in 
financial markets mainly due to informational asymmetries 14. Recent studies on 
the implications of informational asymmetries in credit markets have shown that 
financial constraints play an important role on the spending (on factor outputs) 
behaviour of firms in developed financial markets 15. 
Experience suggests that financial liberalisation can promote growth as well as 
distort it. However, it is also known that financial repression can restrict 
economic growth. There is theoretical and empirical evidence for both points of 
view. Fry concludes that (1997:768) to be successful financial liberalisation, 
must be accompanied by fiscal reform to ensure that govemment debt will not 
explode in the aftermath of liberalisation. The current debate seem to revolve 
around the question as to which policies will successfully transform a repressed 
economy into a more liberal one. 
Despite the pros and cons both developing and developed countries have 
introduced and implemented polices aimed at financial liberalisation. Apart from 
the policies themselves, political and social commitment also shapes the 
eventual outcome. These sort of considerations make it very clear that no one 
uniform approach to financial liberalisation is appropriate. In due course, the 
policies solely depend on specific country specifications. However, if politicians 
and bureaucrats adopt the wrong strategies the consequences can have far 
reaching detrimental effects on the financial sector and the wider economy. 
" See Stiglitz (1989) and Stiglitz (1993) 
15 See Gertler (1988) and Bemanke (1993) for surveys of this literature. See Gertler on a discussion of the relevance of 
this literature of financial liberalisation of developing countries. 
2.2 Financial Structure 
One aspect of the literature16 extensively focuses on the impact of the 
organisation of the financial sector. The argument is that there are relative 
advantages of bank based systems over market based ones and visa-versa. In 
general, banks play a leading role in mobilising savings, allocating capital, 
overseeing the investment decisions of corporate managers and providing risk 
management vehicles. However, securities markets can share centre stage with 
banks in market-based systems (Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1999:1 ). 
The functions and organisation of a financial system play a crucial role in 
determining the development of the sector17• Financial structure is defined to 
include the various institutions, the technology, and the rules of the game that 
define how financial activity is organised and controlled (Stulz, 2000:5). 
Hussein and Demetriades (1996:6) develop this argument by noting that there 
are three problems that financial systems have to overcome: information 
asymmetries, principal/agent relationships and uncertainty. By promoting longer 
time horizons, encouraging financial stability and fostering a framework for the 
implementation of successful economic policies, bank-based systems are 
generally regarded as more successful than market -based ones. 
The bank-based system, which is mostly associated with Germany and Japan, 
involves more government regulation and intervention and is more centralised 
than the securities based system. Proponents of the bank-based system argue 
that it allows banks to acquire rapid and reliable information at lower costs 
through close and direct relationships with its customers. The large number of 
bank investors, also suggest the bank based systems are better able to provide 
cross-sectional risk sharing and thus a better hedge than market based 
systems, in the form of insurance against liquidity shocks. 
"This section will capture a brief flavour of the topic. See Merton (1991 ). Levlne (1997 and 2000), West (1998), Knight 
(1998), Demlrguo-Kunt and Levine (1996 and 1999), Beck and Levlne (2000), Stulz(2000) for more detailed discussion 
of the topic. 
17 Merton (1991) states that financial system provides (1) a payment system"; (2) a mechanism for pooling funds (3) a 
way to transfer resources across space and time; (4) a way to manage uncertainty and control risk; (5) price information 
to allow the economy to implement a decentralised allocation of Investment; {6) a way to deal with the asymmetric -
information problems that arise when one party to a financial transaction has Information that the other party does not 
have. 
Conversely, Beck and Levine (2000:2) identify a number of criticisms of the 
bank based systems: (1) Excessively powerful banks may hinder the ability of 
new, innovative firms to obtain external financing. The bank's market power 
thus reduces the incentives of firms to undertake profitable projects (2) Bankers 
tend to be ineffective corporate controllers due to their insider status. That is, 
bankers might collude with managers against other creditors and minority 
shareholders and so reduce the effectiveness of corporate control (3) Banks 
might continue financing firms even for projects with negative returns. 
Accordingly, the failure of bank-based systems potentially emanates from a 
number of considerations. 
The securities or market-based system corresponds to the United States of 
America (US) and to a certain extent England. lt represents the traditional 
market approach in terms of assisting risk sharing opportunities. That is, the 
information about firm performance is publicised and the efficient allocation of 
funds is brought about via liquidity and corporate control (Levine, 1997:720; 
West, 1998:3). This approach focuses on the risk sharing abilities of systems 
(Diamond and Dyvbig, 1983; Arrow, 1964). Despite the fact that the US 
approach seems better in terms of risk sharing, it does not have the ability to 
provide insurance against liquidity shocks. West (1998:3) reasons that this is 
due to the fact that the US system can not distinguish between those investors 
with genuine liquidity needs from those trying to make arbitrage profits. 
Hussein and Demetriades (1996:6) note that the securities market-based 
system is more short-term and this introduces financial fragility. Moreover, the 
mismatch between debt commitments and income flows introduces the 
possibility for speculation. 
West (1998:1) notes that in essence, the debate between the two systems boils 
down to whether governments should play as greater role in averting market 
failure. He concludes that with Fry on the one extreme and Stiglitz on the other, 
it can be argued that the type of financial system best suited for particular 
developing countries, depends upon the available institutional framework and 
the stage of development. More precisely, while a more decentralised, market 
driven system can be beneficial to a developing country, in the absence of 
strong institutional structures, market failure is a greater concern and full 
liberalisation should be entered cautiously. 
Contrary to these arguments, Beck and Levine (2000: 1) argue that the financial 
structure does not matter. They find that industries grow faster in economies 
with higher levels of financial development and with better protection for 
external investors. In other words, while overall financial development matters, 
financial structure per se offers little additional benefit. Furthermore, Levine 
(2000) also shows that financial structure is not a positive sign of growth. 
Support for this argument also comes from Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1999:1) 
who argue that both Germany and Japan (bank-based systems), and the US 
and England (Market- based systems) have similar long term growth rates. 
Accordingly, the claim is that financial structures do not matter that much. The 
logic is that the availability and quality of financial services is more important 
than who provides them. In this respect, these academics do not reject the bank 
-based versus market-based debate. Rather the emphasis is placed on the 
legal background and the legal codes that protect outside investors. Emphasis 
is, similarly, placed on legal systems that enforce such codes, support financial 
systems that facilitate external finance and the financing of new firms (Beck and 
Levine, 2000:4). Levine (2000:6) notes that the cross-country evidence is very 
supportive of the legal based views of finance and growth. 
2.3 Financial Development and Economic Growth 
Does a well-developed financial market expedite growth, or does economic 
growth generate the demand for financial services? This seemingly chicken-
and-egg question has concerned economists for years. On the whole, there is 
general agreement among economists that financial development and 
economic growth are related, but a disagreement exists on the direction of 
causation. 
Accordingly, the relationship between financial development and economic 
growth has remained a topical issue in development economics since the 
pioneering work of Joseph Schumpeter (1911 ). Since Schumpeter, who argued 
that services provided by financial intermediaries (mobilising savings, evaluating 
projects, managing risk, monitoring managers and facilitating transactions) are 
essential for technological innovation and economic growth, the relation has 
been studied at both theoretical and empirical levels. 
There is now a substantial amount of theoretical and, to a certain extent, 
empirical literature· which focuses on the possible casual influence of financial 
development on long term economic growth. Within this literature, three distinct 
and successive approaches can be identified: First, finance does not matter in 
economic growth. The thought behind this belief was that the economy was 
dominated by government who directed credit schemes and implemented 
import substitution policies in conjunction with discretionary official controls on 
the interest and foreign exchange rates. (Sak, 1995:8). 
The second approach, which underpins financial liberalisation efforts through 
out the world, emphasises the importance of financial markets and their 
structure on economic growth. However, the reliance on perfect markets 
undermines the wide spread application of this theory. Financial Repression 
Analysis (FRA) is an integral part and the main assumption of this approach is 
that the markets will adjust automatically. However, as proposed by Shiller 
(1989) and Schleifer-Summers (1990), prices in asset markets may not reflect 
real values as they can reveal the intrinsic value of the projects they are based 
upon. Secondly, there is the issue of overshooting asset prices within the 
framework of foreign exchange markets, (Dornbusch, 1976; Sak, 1995:15). 
A more realistic third approach shares the same theoretical framework of the 
second approach but omits the perfect market assumption. This approach has 
formed the basis for public policy in the financial liberalisation process18. This 
stems from the fact that, if the prices in financial markets are wrong due to 
structural factors, the FRA objectives regarding economic growth can not be 
met.19 
In terms of empirical work, Goldsmith (1969) and McKinnon (1973) identified a 
close link between financial development and economic growth for a limited 
number of countries. While the main emphasis in Goldsmith (1969) is the 
impact of financial development on the efficiency of investment, McKinnon 
" See Sak (1995) 
19 This study will attempt to uneart~ the relation between financial development and economic growth In Turkey from the 
standing point of McKinnon-Shaw as well. 
(1973) and Shaw (1973) focus on the role played by financial development in 
increasing savings and hence investment (Leigh, 1995:25). 
Moreover, Bagehot (1962) and Cameron (1966) provide hypothetical examples 
and experiential models of when the financial system affects economic growth. 
Building on these seminal contributions, Gelb (1989), Ghani (1992), King and 
Levine (1993a) and De Gregorio and Guidotti (1995) show that measures of 
banking development are strongly correlated with economic growth in a broad 
cross section of countries. According to this vein of research, an efficient 
financial system is critical for sustained economic growth (Levine and Zervos, 
1996:326). 
In contrast, the role of the financial system in economic growth in Stem's (1989) 
survey of developing economies is not considered. lt is not even listed in the 
omitted variables. Equally, a collection of essays by pioneers of development 
economics, do not describe the role of the financial system in economic growth 
(Meier and Seers, 1984). lt is clear that, the financial system plays an 
inconsequential role in economic development according to these economists. 
Additionally, Lucas (1988) argues that economists frequently exaggerate the 
role of financial factors in economic development. Dombusch and Reynose also 
note that financial factors are important only when financial instability becomes 
a dominant force in the economy (1989:204)20. 
The relationship between financial development and economic growth has 
received a new source of inspiration with the emergence of the endogenous 
growth literature. The models within this literature have studied the role of 
financial factors in an attempt to analyse formally the interactions between 
financial markets and economic growth. Such theoretical models include inter 
alia, Greenwood and Javanovic (1990)21 , Bencivenga and Smith (1991 )22, 
20 Roblnson stated that "financial sector follows growth" (1952:86). At an extreme point. Lucas almost rejects the impact 
of finance on growth by stating that •growth Is mainly due to technological progress·, leaving little role for finance. 
21 In Greenwood and Javanovic (1990), the role of financial institutions is to collect and analyse Information in order to 
channellnvestible funds to activities that yield the highest return. They established an endogenous relationship between 
financial development and economic growth. The Intuition behind their result Is that activities performed by financial 
intermediaries Involve costs. Since the process of the growth stimulates higher participation In financial markets, it 
therefore facilitates the creation and expansion of financial institutions. Conversely, financial markets by collecting and 
analysing Information from potential investors, encourage Investment projects to be undertaken more efficiently and thus 
enhance economic growth (Leigh, 1995:27-8). 
22 In Benclvenga and Sm~hs" (1991) overlapping generations model (OLG), private market participants In financial 
markets face uncertainty about their future liquidity needs. Agents In this model can save In the form of liquid asset, 
which Is safe but has low productivity. In the model, financial development Increases economic growth not by increasing 
Levine (1991) and Rubini and Sala-i-Martin (1992). These new growth models 
emphasise how the creation and growth of financial institutions leads to a 
positive relationship between financial development and economic growth. In 
contrast to the McKinnon-Shaw (1973) model and in line with Goldsmith (1969), 
the new endogenous models tend to emphasise the effect of financial 
development on the efficiency of investment rather than its effect on volume. An 
attractive feature of the new growth models, therefore, is that they provide a 
framework in which financial development can affect short-run as well as long-
run growth (Leigh, 1995:25). 
2.4 Arguments 
As already stated, there are two lines of argument concerning the positive effect 
of financial development on economic growth. The main difference between 
these two schools of thought is whether financial development results in 
economic growth by increasing efficiency as suggested by Goldsmith or by 
increasing the level of saving and investment as advocated by McKinnon- Shaw 
school. 
2.4.1 Efficiency Effect: Goldsmith Type of Reasoning 
Goldsmith (1969) states that the correlation between financial development and 
economic growth reflects a two-way causal relationship and that financial 
markets enhance growth by raising the efficiency of investments (Pagano 
1993:620). Goldsmith used the value of financial intermediary assets divided by 
GNP to gauge financial development under the assumption that the size of the 
financial system is positively correlated with the provision and quality of financial 
services. Accordingly, he found (1) a rough correlation between economic and 
financial development if periods consisting of several decades are considered 
(2) indications in the few countries for which data was available that periods of 
rapid economic growth have been accompanied, though not without exception, 
the overall savings rate but by channelling savings Into activities with high productivity while enabling Individuals to 
reduce the risk associate with their liquidity needs. Although agents face uncertainty over their liquidity needs, banks 
face a predictable demand for liquidity and can therefore allocate Investment more efficiently. Benclvenga and Smith 
(1991) argue that In the absence of financial intermediaries, agents In this economy may be forced to liquidate their 
investment when liquidity needs arise. However, the emergence of financial intermediaries prevent unnecessary 
liquldations of firm capital. More significantly, their model shows that with financial development, economic growth 
Increases even when the aggregate savings rate is reduced. The rationale for this result is due to the dominant effect 
that financial development has on the efficiency of investment (Lelgh, 1995:28). 
by above-average rates of financial development (Goldsmith 1969:48) (Levine 
1997:703-4). 
Levine (1997:704) criticises this study by noting that (1) observations were 
limited to 35 countries (2) systematic control for other factors was absent (3) it 
did not examine whether financial development is associated with productivity 
growth and capital accumulation, (4) the size of financial intermediaries may not 
accurately measure the financial system and finally (5) the close association 
between the size of the financial system and economic growth does not identify 
the direction of causality. 
Accordingly new studies have been undertaken by numerous scholars in order 
to address the above mentioned weaknesses and the best known is the study 
of King and Levine (1993a)23• 
King & Levine (1993a) focus on the relationship between financial development 
and economic growth by analysing 80 countries over the period 1960-1989. 
After controlling for other factors relating to long-term economic growth, they 
found that financial intermediary development is strongly linked to growth and 
that the pre-determined component of financial development is a good predictor 
of future economic growth. 
Ram (1999: 2-3), however, suggests that the empirical evidence is at best 
uncertain and that it indicates the lack of a significant positive association 
between financial development and economic growth. His critiques mostly 
concentrate on methodology rather than the theory, however, he notes a weak 
negative eo-variation in the data between financial development and growth of 
real GDP per capita24. He also observes that the individual-country correlational 
pattern is in contrast to the large, positive and significant correlation seen in 
inter-country data. Moreover, multiple regression estimates of simple growth 
equations from individual-country data indicate the same pattern as the 
23 In addttlon Gelb (1989), Raulolnl and Sala-1-Martln (1992), Easterty (1993), review of Pagano (1993) and Razl (1994), 
address the same weaknesses (Levlne 1997:709). 
24 Like the study of King and Levlne (1993). he has taken the perfod of 1960-89 for 95 countrtes for which data 
available. He used the variable of King and Levlne as well which was DEPTH (ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP) and finds 
that out of the entire set of 95 countries, the correlations are posHive In 39 cases, of which nine show statistical 
significance at the conventional five per cent level. The correlations are negative in the remaining 56 cases, and 16 of 
these are significant at the five per cent level.' The mean of the 95 correlation coefficients Is ..0.06. The preponderance 
of evidence thus suggests a negligible or weakly negative association between economic growth and a prime proxy for 
financial development. 
bivariate correlations. Finally, in multiple regression estimates from the cross-
country averaged data (when the parametric structure is permitted to vary 
across three subgroups), a huge structural heterogeneity is observed, and the 
indication again is that of a weak negative parameter for the financial-
development variable in most cases. Ram, therefore, suggests that it would be 
better to look at the covariation between financial development and economic 
growth in each country. 
Ram also criticises the study of King and Levine (1993a) by noting that the 
correlation of the average value of the DEPTH variable (liquid liabilities of Banks 
divided by GDP) and the average annual rate of growth of GDP per capita for all 
95 countries was 0.33. This is statistically significant and thus presents a 
contrast with the mean of -0.06 for the individual-country correlations. In Ram's 
study, cross-country correlation in the sample is quite similar to King and 
Levine's (1993a: 723). Given the predominant individual-country scenarios, 
Ram concludes that the sizeable, positive and highly significant cross-country 
correlation is probably reflecting something other than the 'effect' of DEPTH on 
growth (Ram, 1999:4). 
In addition to Ram, Hussein and Demetriades (1996:2) also suggest that King 
and Levine's (1993a) approach is based on a fragile statistical basis. They 
argue that both the cross section data and the financial indicators are poor 
guides to the direction of causation25. 
2.4.2 Volume Effect: McKinnon-Shaw Type of Reasoning 
The McKinnon and Shaw (1973) model states that financial intermediaries raise 
the absolute level of savings and investments rather than, as proposed by 
Goldsmith, the efficiency of investments. In their model, banks allocate credit 
not according to the expected productivity of the investment projects but 
according to the transaction cost and perceived risk of default (Fry 1997:755). 
Consequently, Fry (1997:755) summarises the common elements of the 
McKinnon-Shaw model as follows: (1) a savings function that responds 
positively to both the real rate of interest on deposits and the real rate of growth 
in output (2) an investment function that responds negatively to the effective 
25 See the methodology section in the Overview chapter for a detailed critique of these authors. 
real loan rate of interest and positively to the growth rate (3) an administratively 
fixed nominal interest rate that holds the real rate below the equilibrium level 
and (4) inefficient non-price rationing of loanable funds. 
The arguments of Shaw and McKinnon started a whole new line of research 
studying the relationship between interest rate liberalisation and financial 
intermediation on the one hand, and financial intermediation, growth and 
inflation on the other. There are other researchers in this area who believe that 
a close association exists between interest rates and the growth of the broad 
money supply M2, the proxy used for financial intermediation26. In the McKinnon 
and Shaw analysis, the government's fixing of interest rates at below-market 
levels (interest rate repression), would have four main effects on the economy. 
lt would (1) Reduce the volume of loanable funds (by lowering the interest rate 
paid to suppliers); (2) Reduce the amount of loans; (3) Lowers the efficiency of 
credit use and (4) Generate a cross subsidy to those involved with direct credit 
(McKinnon 1973:76, Shaw 1973:77-8 and Capric and Hanson, 1999:9, see 
Capric and Hanson (1999) for a detailed discussion). 
Hence, according to the McKinnon-Shaw (1973) model, the level of financial 
development should be closely related to the prevailing level of real interest 
rates. Within this framework, positive real interest rates stimulate financial 
:;avings and financial intermediation, which increases the availability of credit to 
the private sector. In turn, this stimulates investment, which leads to growth. 
More recent models also argue that positive real interest rates make the 
allocation of investable funds more efficient, thereby providing an additional 
channel through which financial development can positively influence growth 
(De Gregorio and Guidotti, 1994). 
lt was, therefore, presumed that financial liberalisation would (1) drive real 
interest rates up and thus increase the flow of savings, (2) this flow would enter 
the financial system (financial deepening), (3) the financial system would 
channel this flow to fixed capital investments and (4) the investment projects 
financed by the liberalised markets would be on average more productive 
compared to the previous regime of repression. Accordingly, the performance of 
"'See Lanyl and Saracoglu (1993), Fry (1988) and Gelb (1989) 
the economy would improve. Gokce (1993:59) also adds to this argument by 
observing that low interest rates cause capital flight and, therefore, reduce 
savings for domestic investment. He also observes that if interest rates were 
liberated, investment would shift from low profitability self-financed investments 
to high productivity investments intermediated by the financial sector with better 
access to information. 
However, there are some factors that can influence the relationship between 
real interest rates and private sector investment in developing economies. For 
example, the positive impact of a rise in real interest rates on domestic credit as 
suggested by the McKinnon-Shaw (1973) model, could be offset by a portfolio 
shift from capital goods to monetary assets. Similarly, this positive impact on 
credit availability could increase the demand of the public sector for credit 
extended by the domestic banking system thereby limiting funds available to the 
private sector (Leigh, 1995:69). 
The literature on policy credibility provides even more fundamental weakness of 
the McKinnon-Shaw model. For example, high real interest rates may reflect the 
publics' expectations of lower inflation or more generally a lack of credibility of 
economic policies. High real interest rates may also reflect the fragility of the 
financial structure and the poor regulatory environment, as in the transition 
economies of Eastern Europe. Thus a large risk premia may cause excessively 
high real interest rates in such economies (Leigh, 1995:70). 
From an empirical standpoint, Fry (1989) finds evidence of a strong relationship 
between real interest rates and financial savings. He also affirms that the 
positive effect of real interest rates on growth does not come through its effect 
on the volume of investment. More recent econometric evidence documents a 
non-linear relationship between real interest rates and economic growth 
(Fry:1993 and Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1992)). These studies emphasise the 
positive effects of real interest rates on economic growth in periods of high 
interest rates but find no significant relationship during periods of moderate 
levels of real interest rates. Indeed, Fry (1993) supports an inverted U-curve 
relationship between real interest rates and economic growth (Leigh, 1995:70). 
All these considerations suggest that real interest rates are not likely to be as 
strong at indicating the level of financial development in an economy as the 
McKinnon-Shaw model would suggest. More generally, the impact of real 
interest rates on growth cannot be easily interpreted as a measure of the effect 
of financial development on growth. 
In essence, McKinnon and Shaw (1973) provide a neo-classical approach to the 
effects of government intervention in financial markets. Governments intervene 
in domestic financial markets by introducing taxes or interest rate controls, or 
manipulating foreign exchange rates or via directed · credit allocation 
programmes (this is customarily called financial repression). McKinnon argues 
in his later articles that the real rate of growth and the real size of the financial 
system relative to non-financial measures are greatly reduced as a result of 
financial repression (1989:29). Similarly, Shaw goes further and notes that 'in all 
cases this strategy has stopped or gravely retarded the development process' 
(Shaw, 1973:3; Fry, 1997:755, West, 1998:1). West (1998: 1-2) summaries this 
approach of McKinnon and Shaw by noting that they predict 'inefficient non-
price rationing of loanable funds' (allocated by banks according to transaction 
costs, perceived risk of default and even political pressure) and a fixed nominal 
interest rate that holds the real rate below its equilibrium level (McKinnon, 
1973:71-7; Shaw, 1973:84; Fry, 1997:755). 
Not all academics believe that government intervention is unfavourable, Joseph 
Stiglitz (1993) advocates 'prudential regulation and supervision' and notes that 
'financial markets are markedly different from other markets and that failures 
are likely to be more pervasive in these markets. Consequently, there exist 
forms of government intervention that will make these markets function better 
and also improve the performance of the economy (1993:20). Yet, Fry (1997), 
argues that financial repression is a particularly damaging quasi-tax from the 
perspective of economic growth and claims that such repression would only be 
appropriate over a very small range of real interest rates. 
West (1998) also makes a critical re-assessment of the above mentioned 
approaches to the role of the state in financial markets and notes that the state 
is not prohibited or restricted in economic theory, but instead acts as a tool to 
enhance the economic stability and solvency of financial institutions. He adds 
that Stiglitz emphasises the regulation of financial institutions as well as 
directing credit, as the key means by which states can influence development. 
Actually, this is a response to the McKinnon-Shaw financial repression 
argument, since, Stiglitz holds the view that financial repression theory often 
fails to distinguish between credit markets and other markets and ignores 
capital allocation and the efficiencies created in certain repressions. Thus, 
repression and government intervention cover a much larger 'range of issues' 
than Fry and McKinnon-Shaw are willing to recognise (Fry, 1997:760; Stiglitz, 
1993:39; West 1998:2). 
2.5 Methodologies 
Economic development is a complex and multifaceted concept and no single 
measure will adequately capture economic growth or financial development. 
The empirical literature on financial development and economic growth uses 
two different econometric methodologies: Cross-country regression, popularised 
by Barro (1991) and time series regression (Arestis and Demetriades, 
1997:784). The first examines a variety of macroeconomic variables to examine 
the relationship between financial development and economic growth among a 
number of countries and the latter method focuses on the time series analysis 
of a specific country. 
Both methods have strengths and weaknesses. In general, cross country 
analysis suffers from measurement, statistical and conceptual problems while 
time series analysis has problems associated with controlling other variables 
which affect economic growth. 
2.5.1 Approaches 
In the literature, most of the leading researchers have used the growth-
regression framework. In this model, the average growth rate in per capita 
output in different countries is regressed on a set of variables while controlling 
for initial conditions, country characteristics and measures of financial market 
development. 
Filer et.al. (1999:1) note that there are a number of problems associated with 
these studies. Primarily these problems relate to the issue of causality and 
cross country heterogeneity in factors such as savings rates that are potentially 
a cause of higher economic growth and greater financial sector development. In 
order to overcome such problems King and Levine (1993b) used only initial 
values of financial variables and Harris (1997) implemented the instrumental 
variables techniques. In addition, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1996) and 
Rajan and Zingales (1998) used cross-industry variations in growth that are 
supposed to be immune from country specific factors. 
In cross-country analysis, there are some methodological drawbacks which 
need to be highlighted. In terms of measurement, country officials sometimes 
define, collect and measure variables inconsistently across countries. In 
addition, it is constantly proposed that there are discrepancies between the 
measures and reality. 
In terms of statistical problems, the basic assumption in regression analysis, 
that the observations are drawn from the same population, does not always 
hold where there are different countries involved. Indeed, it is a fact that in 
many instances the countries are so different that separate examination is the 
best method of analysis. The Arestis and Demetriades' (1997:771) study shows 
that the over simplified nature of the results obtained from cross-country 
regressions may not accurately reflect individual country circumstances such as 
the institutional structure of the financial system, the policy regime and the 
degree of effective governance etc. They conclude by noting that "whilst we do 
not disagree with King and Levine that financial development and growth are 
robustly correlated (1997:785) ... the "average" country for which cross country 
regressions must, presumably, relate to may well not exist" (1997:796-7). 
Similarly, Lucas (1988:4) also supports the idea that country-case analysis can 
be more fruitful than a cross-country approach in analysing financial 
development. 
With conceptual problems and issues, the critiques appear to be more severe. 
In particular, the fact that in the long term, countries change economic policies, 
experience different economic cycles and political change, is simply overlooked. 
Thus, aggregation may cloud important events and differences across 
countries. In addition, causality is another important problem of cross-country 
regressions. Hence, coefficients should not be viewed as indicators that predict 
the magnitude of change in growth following a particular policy reform. Instead, 
the coefficient estimates and the associated !-statistics should be used to 
evaluate the strength of the partial correlation between stock market 
development and economic growth (Levine and Zervos, (1996:325). 
On that account, the cross-country approach has statistical, methodological and 
conceptual disadvantages. Consequently conclusions, which underestimate 
these problems, may result in a sub-standard study. Despite this fragile 
statistical basis, however, the cross-country approach seems to be the only 
option available for examining and making international comparisons. Levine 
(1997) recognises this problem when he states that economists still need to 
develop an analytical basis for making comparisons of financial structures in 
different countries. 
2.5.2 Measures 
The measures used to link financial development and economic growth differ 
from study to study. King and Levine (1993b), for example, use fairly traditional 
measures of financial development and economic growth. The traditional 
practice (Goldsmith (1969) and McKinnon - Shaw (1973)) is to use the size of 
the formal financial intermediary sector i.e. financial depth, liquid liabilities 
relative to economic activity (GDP), to measure the development of the financial 
sector. The basic assumption behind this approach is that the size of financial 
intermediation is positively related to the provision of financial services. These 
measures are used by most of the scholars and there is considerable evidence 
to validate their use. In addition to financial depth, King and Levine (1993a) 
used the importance of deposit banks (relative to Central Banks in allocating 
domestic credit); asset distribution (ascertained by two measures: i) credit 
issued to non financial private firms divided by total credit and ii) credit issued to 
non financial private firms divided by GDP) as measures of financial 
development. For economic growth, King and Levine used per capita growth 
rate of physical capital and the ratio of investment to GDP, however, they did 
not consider the differences in financial structures, economic policies, and legal 
systems which can exist between different countries. 
The problem of analysis is not only confined to the issue of identifying and 
defining appropriate measures. The initial level of economic performance and 
that of the financial sector also plays a crucial role in the process as well. 
However, this is not taken into consideration in the empirical studies. 
Berthelemy and Varoudakis (1996), in recognising the importance of the initial 
levels of the economic development, show that educational and financial 
development is a pre-condition for economic growth. In their study, they state 
that the development of the financial sector might initiate an economic growth 
process only after the accumulation of human capital has passed a certain . 
minimum threshold, thereby ensuring a minimal return on productive 
investments and intermediation activities. Their study also show that the 
countries starting with a smaller financial sector tend to experience faster 
economic growth. Some countries, however, despite reasonable levels of 
education, have been restricted to a relatively low standard of living due to the 
absence of a sufficiently developed financial services sector. 
Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1996b) show that at low levels of economic 
development, commercial banks are the dominant financial institutions. They 
show that under these circumstances the assets of the Central Banks decrease 
when levels of income increase. In contrast, the assets of commercial banks 
greatly increase as countries become more wealthy. The same conclusion 
applies to assets of non-bank financial institutions, credit issued to the private 
sector, financial debt and stock market capitalisation (1996b: 227). 
While assessing the relationship between financial development and economic 
growth, empirical studies have also employed various monetary aggregates. 
(McKinnon (1973), King and Levine (1993b), Berthelemy and Varuodakis 
(1996)). One rationale for this method of proxying financial development is that, 
a monetized economy reflects a highly developed capital market. Therefore, a 
high degree of monetisation should, ceteris paribus, go hand in hand with 
greater levels of financial development. 
However a key limitation of employing monetary aggregates as a proxy for 
financial development can be seen by examining the main functions of financial 
markets. Fama and Macbeth (1973) point out that financial markets channel 
funds to those requiring credit and liquidity. As discussed previously, one 
important aspect of financial development is thought to be related to investment 
and growth and is closely linked to the ability of financial markets to allocate 
credit and liquid aggregate such as M1 or M2 (De Greogorio and Guidotti, 
1994:12). However, a monetary aggregate with a high currency component is 
not necessarily a good indicator of financial development in an economy. 
In addition to monetary aggregates, influential studies have also typically used 
the ratio of private sector domestic credit to Gross Domestic Product as a proxy 
for the degree of financial development (see especially De Greogorio and 
Guidotti (1994) and King and Levine (1993b)). This measure corresponds to 
credit granted to the private sector by the banking system, but excludes credit to 
the public sector. lt therefore indicates in a general way the level of financial 
intermediation in terms of channelling funds to private market participants. 
Moreover, if financial sector interactions with the private sector are indicative of 
increased productivity, the ratio should be indicative of greater degrees of 
financial development. Higher values of this ratio, for example, indicate more 
credit to the private sector as a share of GDP and consequently may reflect the 
level and efficiency of investment and hence growth. 
However, De Greogorio and Guidotti (1994) and King and Levine (1993a) admit 
that the credit variables employed by them only measure the degree of financial 
development that occurs through the banking system. In that sense, it may be a 
weaker indicator of financial development in economies where significant 
portions of financial intermediation occurs outside the banking system. 
This small section shows that there is not a consensus on the appropriate 
variables to be employed in assessing the relationship between financial 
development and economic growth. Nevertheless, there are some measures 
which almost all leading scholars use in their studies. There is, however, a 
belief that, instead of assessing the impact of the entire financial system on 
economic growth, it is better to assess the effect of disaggregated parts on 
growth. 
2.5.3 Some Concluding Remarks 
Schumpeter's original argument was based on the fact that banks are important 
for an economy because they determine the allocation of a society's savings. 
His theory built on the impact of banks on productivity, growth and technological 
change and Diamond (1986), Williamson (1987), Greenwood and Jovanovic 
(1990) and King and Levine (1993a) subsequently supplied extensive 
documentation on this theory. In a recent study, Beck et al (1999:5), for 
example, show that banks exert a strong causal impact on real per capita 
growth and per capita productivity growth. They find that higher levels of 
banking sector development produce faster rates of economic growth and total 
factor productivity growth. 
The measures used to link financial development and economic growth differ 
from study to study and rather significantly, different measures of financial 
sector development are conducive to different conclusions. Most of these 
measures assess the impact and importance of the banking sector on financial 
development. lt is important, however, that the measures of financial 
development take into account the special circumstances of individual countries 
and address the research questions. 
Both of the main theories discussed in this chapter have pros and cons and 
their validity mostly depends on the policies and the methods of 
implementations of the countries concerned. lt would be misleading to conclude 
that one is better than the other. Nevertheless, there is a consensus that most 
countries focus on the volume of investment rather than efficiency in the first 
steps towards a liberalisation programme. 
2.6 Stock Markets: A New Source of Growth 
Many developing countries liberalised their financial systems and implemented 
wide-ranging reforms by making them more market-oriented. Not surprisingly, 
due to these financial reforms, the ensuing growth of the stock markets also 
shaped the financial development of these countries. 
Numerous studies have suggested that developed financial intermediaries lead 
or assist the macroeconomic development of countries and most academics 
incorporate bank-based systems into their models. However the boom in 
equities and the emergent capital flow, has focussed the attention of scholars 
on stock markets. Accordingly, during the last decade, especially the second 
half, stock markets began to be analysed in detail. The main reason seems to 
be that stock market capitalisation values are significant and there was also a 
realisation that stock markets are an integral part of financial development. 
King and Levine argue that as economies develop, self financed capital 
investment first gives way to bank-intermediated debt finance and later to the 
emergence of equity markets (King and Levine 1993c:525). 
Stock market liberalisation is the process were foreign investors are allowed to 
buy and sell shares in a country's stock market by the official bodies. This must 
be considered within the framework of capital account liberalisation. lt is 
assumed that, in the first instance, such a step will reduce the cost of equity. 
This is due to three reasons: First, stock market liberalisation will increase net 
capital flows which will reduce the risk-free rate of the country. Second, it will 
also facilitate risk sharing between foreign and domestic investors and finally, 
increased capital flows will also increase stock market liquidity (Henry 2000b: 
3). Henry (2000a:1-3) shows that, on average, countries experience large, 
temporary increases in the growth rate of real private investment in the 
aftermath of stock market liberalisation. 
A well functioning stock market is likely to assist economic growth by increasing 
savings, increasing the efficiency of investment resources and by a better 
utilisation of the existing resources. All of these points are associated with the 
concept of efficienc;P. This is because, a well functioning stock market is likely 
to implement a more efficient pricing process by rewarding well-managed 
profitable firms and valuing their shares higher than unprofitable ones. Leigh 
(1997:5) notes that the efficiency of share prices has two components: 
fundamental· valuation and information arbitrage. Fundamental valuation refers 
to the idea that aggregate share prices generally reflect the state of the 
economy, whereas the latter concept recognises that all available information is 
disseminated throughout the market and incorporated in share prices. 
A recent study also found that there is 1 ) evidence that stock markets, 
especially in more developed economies, incorporate expected future growth 
into current prices, a result that is consistent with efficient market hypotheses; 
2) a strong relationship between stock market activity and future economic 
growth for the low and lower-middle income countries but not in higher income 
27 A stock market Is said to be efficient If it fully and correctly reflects all relevant Information in determining share prices 
(Leigh 1997:10). Efficient market hypothesis (EMH) asserts that pries should reflect the information contained in the 
historical sequence of prices. This statement will lead us to the random walk model, which generally defines the nominal 
return on stock market as follows: 
SRt = {Pt+1 - Pt + 0,) I Pt Where Pt is the price per share of stock at timet, (Pt+1 - P~ represents total capital gains and 01 
is the dividend owned. 
countries with more developed alternative financial mechanisms; and 3) 
increased equity market activity has no impact on growth in developing 
economies where the lack of a proper institutional framework (as evidenced by 
excessive corruption or government interference in financial markets) hampers 
the ability of these markets to function (Filer et. al., 1999:9-1 0) 
The literature suggests four ways in which stock markets affect the economic 
growth of a country: liquidity, risk diversification (international integration), 
monitoring firms for information and lastly incentives to control corporations 
(Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 1996a:291 and Levine, 1997). 
Liquidity28 is one way that stock markets can affect economic growth. The 
reasoning behind this is that long-term flows of capital are needed for high 
return projects whereas investors have shorter time perspectives. In due 
course, liquid stock markets bridge these "time" differences. However, the 
"optimal level of liquidity" is also important as discussed by Bencivanga and 
Smith (1991) who show that greater liquidity, by reducing uncertainty, may 
reduce savings rates sufficiently to decelerate economic growth (Levine and 
Zervos 1996:327). In addition, a more developed equity market may provide 
liquidity that lowers the cost of the foreign capital that is essential for 
development, especially in low income countries that cannot generate sufficient 
domestic savings (WIDER (1990), Bencivenga et. al. (1996), and Neusser and 
Kugler (1998)) (Filer et. al., 1999:9-1 0) 
Risk diversification is another means by which stock market development can 
lead to economic growth. Saint Paul (1992), Devereux and Smith (1994) and 
Obstfeld (1994) show that stock markets provide a vehicle for diversifying risk. 
This is due to investments being moved into higher return and relatively risky 
projects in order to divert risk. Moreover, the role of equity markets in providing 
portfolio diversification enables individual firms to engage in specialized 
production, with resulting efficiency gains (Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997)). (Filer 
et.al., 1999:10). However, it must be mentioned that reducing risk can also 
reduce saving rates and result in slow growth. (Levine and Zervos 1996:327). 
28 1n the most general way, Liquidity can be defined as the ability of trading equity easily. 
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), Kyle (1984) and Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) put 
forward the idea that stock markets promote the acquisition of information about 
firms. Levine and Zervos (1996) note that in larger and more liquid markets, it 
will be easier for an investor who has information to trade and profit at posted 
prices before it becomes common knowledge in the market. This motivates 
investors to research and monitor firms. With regard to information, Filer et. al., 
1999:1 0) also draw attention to the ability of equity markets to generate 
information about the innovative activity of entrepreneurs (King and Levine 
(1993c) or the aggregate state of technology (Greenwood and Jovanovic 
(1990)). 
Another potential benefit of a developed market is that diverse equity ownership 
creates political stability, which, in turn, can promote economic growth (Filer 
et. al., 1999:1 0). Similarly, Atje and Jovanovic (1993:636) state that stock market 
development affects the level and growth rate of economic activity. However, 
they failed to find a similar effect with bank lending. This suggests that, 
countries who are not developing their stock market as quickly as they can are 
holding up their economic development. 
In terms of empirical evidence, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1996a:313) find that 
stock market size and liquidity are positively correlated with all of the indicators 
of financial intermediary development. Secondly, they find that volatility is 
significantly negatively correlated with all the indicators of financial intermediary 
development. Hence, they conclude that countries with well developed financial 
intermediaries, i.e. large bank and large insurance companies and pension 
funds etc. tend to have less volatile stock markets. They also show that 
countries with internationally integrated markets tend to have larger financial 
system and banks. 
Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1996a:292) conclude that large stock markets are 
more liquid, less volatile and more internationally integrated than smaller 
markets. Moreover, they show that countries with strong information and 
disclosure laws, internationally accepted accounting standards and unrestricted 
international capital flows tend to have larger and more liquid markets. 
Conversely, countries with markets concentrated in a few stocks tend to have 
smaller, less liquid and less internationally integrated markets. 
Levine and Zervos (1996:323) validate the above arguments by stating that 
there is a strong correlation between overall stock market development and 
long-run economic growth by using stock market indexes combining market 
size, trading and integration, whilst controlling for initial and other factors that 
may affect economic growth. 
The critiques against the positive effect of the development of stock markets on · 
economic growth have two foundations: The first is the belief that stock markets 
il}the developing world are not much different from "casinos". Their negative 
impact is more important than their positive one. The second and more 
plausible critique is that, as corporate investment is not exclusively financed by 
the issuance of equities, they are less important (Mayer 1988). 
Levine also emphasises that future researchers must focus on both stock 
market and bank based systems, as they have a combined impact on economic 
growth. However, Singh (1997:771) suggests that even a stock market based 
approach will contradict the predictions of most economic models and therefore, 
surprise not only the McKinnon-Shaw (1973) School but other economists too. 
He concludes that the establishment of stock markets are unlikely to help in 
achieving quicker industrialisation and faster long term economic growth in most 
developing countries. This is due to several reasons: First the inherent volatility 
and arbitrariness of stock market pricing under developing countries conditions 
make it a poor guide to efficient investment; Second, the relationship between 
stock markets and currency markets deepens macroeconomic stability when 
faced with economic shocks; Third, the group-banking system in developing 
countries is likely to be undermined by the stock market (Singh 1997:779-80). 
Consequently, despite Levine advocating the idea of combining a stock market 
approach with a bank one, Singh rejects the idea, and therefore the findings of 
Levine. 
Other critiques can be summarised as follow: Mayer (1988) states that even 
large stock markets are unimportant sources of corporate finance. Stiglitz 
(1994) argues that stock market liquidity will not enhance incentives for 
acquiring information about firms or exerting corporate governance. Deveroux 
and Smith (1994) emphasise that greater risk sharing through internationally 
integrated stock markets can actually reduce savings rates and slow economic 
growth. The analyses of Shleifer and Summers (1990) suggest that stock 
market development hinders economic growth by easing counterproductive 
corporate take-overs. (Levine and Zervos 1996, 323). 
Consequently, Henry (2000a:4) highlights the following three reasons which 
explain the negative effects of stock market liberalisation: Firstly, it might 
increase net capital flows which could reduce the risk free rate. Secondly, 
increased risk sharing (with foreigners - since they also purchase domestic 
shares) could reduce the equity premium and thirdly, as shown by Levine and 
Zervos (1998b), increased capital inflows may also increase stock market 
liquidity, thereby reducing the equity premium. 
2. 6.1 Measures for Stock Market Development 
The literature relating to the measurement of the development of the banking 
sector consists of a number of different studies, which use different measures. 
In order to analyse the relationship between stock· market development and 
economic growth, the measures for both variables have to be identified. 
Unfortunately, there are no accepted measures for both markets. However, 
markets size, liquidity, international integration, and per capita income, are the 
measures typically used. 
2.6.1.1 Market Capitalisation 
Stock Market Size or the Capitalisation Ratio is calculated as the market value 
of listed shares divided by GDP. 
The reason for choosing market capitalisation as a measurement of 
development is that it is positively correlated with the ability to mobilise capital 
and diversify risk. Moreover, the number of listed companies can also be used 
as a control variable for market capitalisation (Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 
1996a:295). 
2.6.1.2 Liquidity 
The second measurement -liquidity is defined as total value traded I GDP. This 
ratio measures the organised trading of equities as a share of national output. 
However, as noted by Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1996a:295) a comprehensive 
measure of liquidity must also include all the costs of trading such as time costs, 
settlement periods and the uncertainty of finding a counterparty. However, as 
the trading cost at lSE-EM (Istanbul Stock Exchange) is 0.002% of the volume 
of trade and because finding a counterparty is not a problem, these difficulties 
can be disregarded. 
Liquidity is also measured by the value of total shares traded divided by market 
capitalisation (turnover ratio). A high turnover ratio is often used as an indicator 
of low transaction costs. Moreover, this ratio also measures the value of trading 
relative to the size of the stock market. Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1996a) 
summarise this by noting that a small liquid market will have a higher turnover 
ratio but a small total value traded I GDP ratio. However, like the previous ratio, 
this also does not capture the trading costs (Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 
1999:9). 
Another justification comes from Filer et.al. (1999:2) for using the turnover ratio 
as a measure of stock market development. They argue that it overcomes the 
reverse causality effect because higher prices in anticipation of greater 
economic growth affect both the numerator and the denominator of the ratio. 
The logic behind this argument is that the forward-looking nature of stock prices 
could be driving any causality between the stock market and growth. In other 
words, current stock prices should reflect the present discounted value of future 
profits. 
2.6.1.3 Concentration 
Concentration is also an issue particularly in developing countries. lt is defined 
as the domination of the market by a few companies in terms of volume of 
trade. To measure concentration, the share of market capitalisation accounted 
for by the ten largest stocks is typically computed (Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 
1996a:298) 
Despite their recent rapid development, even the most advanced emerging 
markets are not yet mature. Typically, the markets concentrate on a few stocks, 
which account for a considerable part of the total market capitalisations. In the 
markets where few stocks dominate, the markets' indicators can be difficult to 
identify. 
2.6.1.4 Volatility 
Volatility is another measure of stock market development. lt is defined as a 
twelve month rolling standard deviation based on market retums29• In its 
simplest form, less volatility reflects greater stock market development 
(Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 1996a: 298). As noted previously, higher volatility 
is detrimental. This is due to a number of reasons: (1) lt can undermine the 
financial system as a whole; (2) lt makes share prices much less useful as 
guides to resource allocation; (3) lt discourages risk-taking by savers and 
investors and raises the cost of capital for corporations; (4) lt may also stop risk-
averse firms from raising funds or (5) Even from seeking a listing on the stock 
market (Singh, 1997:776). 
2.6.1.5 Institutional Development 
The markets do not need to be integrated with the World markets to develop 
but, the countries which are most integrated are regarded as more developed. 
Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1996a: 299-300) use seven regulatory-institutional 
indicators in order to analyse institutional development. They look at the 
publishing of price-earnings information, accounting standards, quality of 
investor protection laws, existence of Securities and Exchange Commissions, 
restrictions on dividend and capital repatriation by foreign investors and 
domestic investments by foreigners. The average of all the above indicators 
forms the basis for regulatory and institutional development (Demirguc-Kunt and 
Levine, 1996a: 300). 
Even though, this measure is a useful tool for international comparisons, it may 
not be appropriate in this research. Nevertheless, it will be noteworthy to 
analyse the institutional development of lSE-EM descriptively. 
2.7 Conclusion 
The aim of economic growth dominates the agenda of most countries. lt is a 
fact that one way or another the combinations of economic, political and social 
policy objectives increase the welfare of nations. Consequently, practitioners 
29 Calculating the volatility Is the subject of Ph.D. thesis. Hence, it will be one of the main obstacle and contribution of 
this paper to Investigate the ways of calculating volatility at lSE. 
and academics spend considerable time in attempting to determine the best 
policies/sources of growth. 
Not surprisingly, the 20th Century has witnessed numerous theories covering 
the impact that different variables and policy options have on economic growth. 
lt was during the beginning of the 1970s that economic growth caught the 
attention of scholars. Despite the fact that the pioneer studies date back to the 
early 20th century, the literature has flourished in the last 30 years. Since then, 
the different aspects of financial development and economic growth together 
with the policy implications and the associated theories have developed 
considerably. Nevertheless, the debate requires further investigation to fully 
understand the relationship between financial development and economic 
growth. 
The cross-country analysis tried to depict the financial sector as a whole and 
most corner stone studies concentrate on the general variables and measures 
of bank based systems. On the other hand, the effect of stock market 
development is analysed in more detail by using specific measures. In this 
sense, stock market development and its effect is analysed more rigorously 
than the financial sector. 
Unfortunately, it is not only the variables and measures but also the 
methodologies that need further examination. Both cross-country and country-
specific analysis have drawbacks, however, leading scholars, like Levine, 
promote the idea of combining bank with stock market approaches for a specific 
country in order to unearth the real combination of relationships. 
2.8 The Turkish Endeavour 
Within the confines of these discussions on financial development and 
economic growth, Turkey is a deviant country to examine with its liberalisation 
efforts in the 1980s and a number of crises in the 1990s, most recently in 
November 2000 and February 2001 30. In fact, there was almost no doubt that at 
the turn of the century the Turkish economy was in need of an urgent 
stabilization in order to halt a treacherous process of high and volatile inflation, 
3° For a detailed summary see Akyuz, Y., Boratav, K., The making of Turkish financial crisis, 
UNCTAD paper, 2002 
unsustainable public debt accumulation, and increasing financial fragility, 
resulting from irresponsible policies and lack of fiscal discipline that had been 
endemic under various governments since the liberalisation attempt began in 
1980. 
Given the fact that Turkish financial sector was predominantly a "bank-based 
system" and dominated by larger banking groups, a weakly regulated banking 
sector is costly notably in the context of transitional financial systems. Political 
and institutional forces play and important role in explaining the inability to 
implement proper banking sector regulations over lengthy periods of time. 
In addition, the difficulties arose largely due to structural problems and fragilities 
on many fronts, most notably in public finances. Such that, the banking sector 
was heavily dependent for its earnings on high-yielding T-bills associated with 
rapid inflation, and was thus highly vulnerable to disinflation while government's 
increasing crowding out of the private sector resulting in an exploding debt and 
debt burden for the Treasury. Many of the imbalances and fragilities that 
characterised the current state of the Turkish economy had their origins in the 
policies pursued in the previous two decades. 
Recent Turkish crises have a number of features common to crises in emerging 
markets that implemented exchange-rate-based stabilization programs. Such 
programs typically use the exchange rate as a credible anchor for inflationary 
expectations, often leading to currency appreciations and relying on capital 
inflows attracted by arbitrage opportunities to finance growing external deficits. 
The consequent build-up of external financial vulnerability eventually gives rise 
to expectations of sharp currency depreciations and a rapid exit of capital, 
resulting in overshooting of the exchange rate in the opposite direction and 
hikes in interest rates. Through such a boom-bust financial cycle, some 
countries (e.g. Mexico, Brazil and Russia) have succeeded in overcoming their 
chronic price instability and avoiding a return of rapid inflation, despite the 
collapse of their currencies and the external adjustment necessitated by the 
crisis. The Turkish program initially followed a similar path, but ran into 
difficulties at a much earlier stage of the disinflation process, forcing policy-
makers to abandon the peg and setting of a sharp economic downturn in the 
context of a high inflation (Akyuz and Borotav, 2000). 
Turkish experience, hence, can be a unique attempt when the preparation, the 
specific needs of liberalization efforts, the structure and the actual development 
of the financial sector were taken into account. Since, the previous 3 crises had 
similar reasons, an analysis of the Turkish financial development and economic 
growth can be interesting to look at. 
Consequently, the main objective of this research is to analyse this attempt in 
detail and further investigate why it has failed. In doing so, we will look at the 
overall reasons and financial sector specific ones. In addition, we will 
investigate whether the existence of the McKinnon-Shaw type of reasoning 
existed in Turkish case or not, rather in a descriptive way as well. Findings of 
other empirical studies will be brought into the analysis in order to provide a full 
picture of the consequences of Turkey's financial liberalisation. The rest of the 
study organised as follows: we will analyse the broader picture of Turkish 
financial sector in the following chapter followed by the analysis of the banking 
sector and the results of the financial liberalisation att~mpt. The concluding 
section will serve for two main objectives: a summary of findings and topics for 
future researches. 
CHAPTER Ill 
TURKISH FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT 
3.1 Turkish Financial Markets31 
The economic history of Turkey in the second half of this century is a sad story 
of chronic macro economic imbalances. Since 1950, Turkey .has experienced 
periodic balance of payment crises every decade with steadily rising inflation. 
Nearly every decade has ended with a major stand by agreement with the IMF, 
including the most recent one in December 1999. 
The legacy of the 1979 crisis, however, was deeper than the previous ones. By 
the end of the 1970s, Turks were experiencing shortages of many basic foods 
31 This section is based a number of recent articles published by leading Turkish academicians most notably Gultekln et 
al (2000) 
and the harsh winter of 1979 saw many households without heating oil. For 
ordinary citizens, after several years of an improved standard of living, Turkey 
became an economy of shortages while political violence was growing in the 
streets32. 
In the midst of this upheaval, Turkey has implemented a series of new policies 
and entered a new era that will permanently change its structure. These policies 
were ultimately blamed for the subsequent financial crisis, especially, those in 
the 1990s. Nevertheless, it is a fact that the Turkish financial markets have 
undergone. massive restructuring and evolution since the 1980 stabilization and 
reform programme33. 
Previously, the system was depressed by excessive regulation, and was 
dominated by commercial banks with poor product portfolios. A comprehensive 
list of the elements of "financial depression" includes, interest rate ceilings, 
subsidised credit allocations to designated industries, exorbitant taxation rates, 
high reserve and liquidity ratios, intertwined ownership relationships between 
financial institutions and non-financial 
financial institutions, restrictions on 
institutions and the international 
corporations, poor asset portfolios of 
the operations of foreign financial 
transactions of domestic banks, 
underdeveloped capital markets and over-reliance on bank financing, and 
finally, the government's excessive resort to deficit financing through the 
financial markets. However, none of these distortions were peculiar to the 
Turkish financial markets. They were rather common consequences of 
economic policies implemented in emerging countries over a long period of time 
spanning the second half of the 1960s and the entire 1970s. These policies put 
the entire financial system and its monetary resources at the disposal of the 
political authorities to facilitate economic development, until they were 
32 For a detailed analysis of macroeconomic Issues In Turkey, see Arlcanll and Rodrik (1990), OECD (1999); for an 
analysis of macroeconomic Imbalance and economic crises, see Mariano, Gultekin, Ozmucur and Tayyeb (1999) 
33 Until 1980, the Turkish financial system developed under an umbrella of monetary and regulatory policies aimed at 
supporting the state orchestrated development strategy. Particularly after the early 1960s, the commercial bank 
dominated financial system became an instrument of planned industrialization policies and operated under a framework 
characterized by controlled Interest rates, directed credit programs, high reserve requirements, and other restrictions on 
financial intermediation, as well as restricted entry. While these financial and regulatory policies were not exclusive to 
Turkey and contributed to Its Industrialization, they had their costs on the banking system's competitiveness and 
efficiency33• Interest rate controls led to non-price competition in the form of branch network building by banks already in 
the system. This situation and restrictive entry policies, coupled with the exit of significant number of banks between 
1960-80, gave rise to concentrated market dominated by public and private banks owned by industrial groups with 
excessively large branch networks and high overhead costs. In retrospect, it is generally thought that the combination of 
these factors created an uncompetitive market structure and an Inefficient banking system. 
challenged by the economists of the Stanford school. The most notable 
contribution came from McKinnon and Shaw, who developed a version of neo-
classical financial theory, applicable to emerging countries. They argued that 
the removal of "financial depression" and a movement towards "financial 
deepening" would accelerate economic development by increasing savings, and 
that this would lead to a more efficient resource allocation system. The 
limitations of external financing faced by the emerging countries at the end of 
1970s, created an intensifying need to mobilize internal resources. Since then, 
policy recommendations made by the supranational institutions such as the 
I. M. F. and the World Bank have focused heavily on financial liberalization. 
Turkish governments postponed the implementation of these new policy 
recommendations until the end of 1979. However, when the new government 
was inaugurated in November 1979, the necessity for a structural adjustment 
programme was inevitable. Increasingly uneasy creditors of Turkey had 
recognized that the short-term adjustment programmes, necessary to remedy 
balance of payments problems, were not adequate for longer-term stability. All 
of these factors and conditions combined to mark the beginning of Turkey's 
transition programmes. The backbone of the programme covering the financial 
system was embedded in the covenants of the Structural Adjustment Loans 
provided by the World Bank. A three-tranche loan, a more detailed approach to 
the structure of the financial markets, and the reforms implemented by the 
Turkish governments, lay the foundations for the current structure of the Turkish 
financial system. 
Until the 1980 transition, intermediation in the financial system was carried out 
by private and state-owned commercial and development banks. Although the 
emphasis on the development of the capital markets dates back to the 1980 
liberalization programme, the central role of the banking system in the 
allocations of funds has gradually shifted towards the capital markets only as 
recently as the early 1990s. The introduction of the capital markets law in 1982, 
and the establishment of the Capital Markets Board and the Istanbul Stock 
Exchange were milestones in the emergence of modern Turkish financial 
markets. In the spirit of universal banking, capital market operations and 
banking services are not strictly separated in the Turkish financial system. Most 
commercial banks are major players in the money and capital markets. 
However, brokers licensed to operate in the capital markets are not allowed to 
engage in traditional commercial banking activities, such as, lending and trade 
finance. 
Structurally, the Turkish financial system has not had private social security 
institutions, such as private pension funds, as major fund suppliers to the 
system. Instead, state owned social security institutions have supplied the 
wholesale funds to the system. However, these funds were appropriated by the 
government, through compulsory placements in government securities. These 
institutions have increasingly been subject to political manipulation, and in less 
than a decade have been marginalized as major fund suppliers to the financial 
system. In many developed economies, insurance companies have formed 
another significant part of the financial system. However, this segment of the 
system has, similarly, never played a significant role in the Turkish financial 
system. This has been partly attributed to the excessive regulation of the 
industry which has recently been deregulated to allow product diversification 
and efficient funds management. The absence of major institutional fund 
suppliers in the financial systems means that households and corporations act 
as the major fund suppliers. Moreover the significance of the households or the 
personal sector has become more obvious, as the corporate sector is in 
aggregate deficit. 
Like many other market economies, surplus funds are demanded by individuals, 
corporations and the government. The most notable characteristic of the 
Turkish financial markets is the dominance of the government as a deficit entity. 
Never ending budget deficits and the inadequacy of tax revenues means that 
Domestic and external borrowing is the only sensible alternatives to printing 
money. Given the structural restrictions on external borrowing, frequent resort to 
the domestic money and capital markets has become inevitable. Therefore, 
crowding-out is prevalent and, other deficit entities have been at a significant 
disadvantage compared to the government in raising finance. The dominance of 
the government in the debt markets leaves the corporations with only a limited 
number of options to finance their deficits: internally generated funds, short term 
commercial credits and equity financing. However, the banks have become 
increasingly reluctant to extend loans to corporations because government 
financing is a lucrative business with low risk. The recent surge in initial public 
offerings and primary equity issues is generally attributed to this phenomena 
(Gultekin at al 2000). 
Interest rate ceilings imposed by the regulatory authorities during the 1970s 
were the basis of negative real interest rates in the economy. This regulation 
resulted in economic distortion, had numerous adverse implications for savings 
behaviour of households and allocated funds to corporations at negative real 
costs34. However the negative real rates of interest on bank deposits finally 
turned positive in 1982. This dramatic switch in interest rates along with high 
intermediation costs and reserve requirements triggered an increase in credit 
costs. Consequently a number of financial institutions went bankrupt and the 
monetary authorities loosened their tight control over the financial system. In the 
following period of 1983-1986, the Central Bank smoothly guided the markets, 
and real rates of interest fluctuated within a narrow percentage band. 
In the aftermath of the 1987 elections, the government continued to deregulate 
and implement its liberalisation policies. As a first step, the Central Bank's 
control over interest rates was removed. However, this deregulatory move led to 
intense competition based on the interest rates offered for demand and time 
deposits. This destabilised the system and the Central Bank intervened and 
imposed interest rate ceilings. The implications of this era of liberalization were 
increasing real interest rates and high interest bearing loans to the corporate 
sector in the period 1989-1990. In the following period, banks stayed away from 
interest rate based competition, and moved toward indexing deposit and loan 
rates on the expected rate of inflation. Today, interest rates in the banking 
system are largely driven by the dynamics of the government debt markets. 
The Turkish experience provides other valuable lessons, by demonstrating the 
possible dramatic consequences of a hasty and unprepared attempt at 
liberalisation. The economy has experienced a number of serious crises in the 
financial markets showing that a stable financial market still does not exist even 
after 20 years. The "bankers crisis" in 1981-1982 was the first example. The 
34 This has skewed the capital structure of the Turkish firms towards excessive use of leverage, which caused significant 
problems In 1980s as the real interest rates turned out to be positive. 
oligopolistic structure in the financial sector led the government to use bankers 
and small banks to drive the interest rates up. The lack of supervision attracted 
many "entrepreneurs" and substantial amounts of financial savings were 
deposited with these entrepreneurs. The lack of adequate real placement 
opportunities for funds soon forced them to enter into a Ponzi scheme35 which 
increasingly raised interest rates to attract fresh funds into the system. The 
bankers operated in a sort of regulatory vacuum and by the time the authorities 
· became aware of the severity of the situation, it was too late to take effective 
action. Moreover the measures which were eventually taken only accelerated 
the crisis36 (Sak, 1995:7)3738• 
Recently, the liquidity crisis of late 2000 and the current financial crash 
emphasised the fact that there are serious problems with :Turkey's attempt at 
financial liberalisation. However, it is not easy to identify all of the reasons for 
failure. Nevertheless, the main points can be identified and these will form the 
basis of the following sections and chapters. 
3.2 Macroeconomic Factors: Persistent Fiscal Imbalances and Financial 
Opening 
Turkey started the 1980s with a stabilization-cum-liberalization experiment 
under a military rule in response to a deep debt and balance-of-payments crisis 
beginning in late 1970s. Turkey also entered 1980 with a stabilisation program 
from the IMF after one of its worst balance of payment crises. The crisis, 
according to the consensus, reflects the limits of a development policy based on 
import substitution and it also reflects some strategic policy errors. The 
immediate objective of the programme was to stabilise the economy by 
improving the balance of payments and containing inflation. 
The stabilisation programme, announced on January 24, 1980, was primarily a 
response to the foreign exchange crisis of the late 1970s. However, it included 
35 Ponzi schemes are a type of illegal pyramid scheme named for Charles Ponzi, who duped thousands of New England 
residents into Investing In a postage stamp speculation scheme back in the 1920s. In this system, the money from new 
Investors Is used to pay off earlier Investors until the whole scheme collapses. 
" This crisis will be addressed In more detail in the coming sections. 
37 Studies by Akyuz (1990), Atiyas (1990), lnselbag and Gultekln (1988), which covered the period until the mid 1980s, 
are some of earlier attempts to asses the results of liberalisation. Atiyas and Erse! and Ozturk (1993) and Atiyas (1990) 
also consider the micro level effects of the post 1980 financial policies. 
38 Most recently, Turkey had witnessed further financial crisis at the end of 2000 and in February 2001 when the interest 
rates soared to 16500 and 3700% respectively. These issues will be addressed in the coming chapters. 
measures that made it more of a structural adjustment programme, aiming at 
bringing about a major structural change in the economy that emphasised 
market forces in the determination of prices and the allocation of resources. 
The military coup of September 1980 provided an excellent environment for the 
implementation of the programme, because the military government was 
supportive of the measure. The leading figure behind the programme, Turgut 
Ozal, was nominated as the Deputy Prime Minister and kept that position until 
July 1982 when he resigned during the last phase of the so-called bankers' 
crisis39• 
In addition to short term stabilisation measures like tight monetary control, fiscal 
policies to curb inflation and devaluation to reduce the current account deficit, 
the January 1980 package included the liberalisation of imports, incentives to 
encourage exports, a hike in interest rate ceilings, limitations on public sector 
investment for infrastructure projects, privatisation and increasing the 
institutional efficiency of the public sector. 
Later the package was expanded, incorporating a broader agenda of financial 
liberalisation (liberalisation of interest rates and the introduction of a number of 
new financial instruments and markets) and the liberalisation of capital 
movements. On the financial side, "deepening" increased in the form of both 
bank deposits and the stock of securities issued relative to GDP. However, 
bank credits/GNP did not increase. In addition, the medium and long-term 
credits extended by the banking system declined substantially. 
The dominance of the State in key industries and banking, as well as in pricing 
and the resource allocation processes, including foreign exchange rates and 
imports policy, was reduced and the economy was opened-up and export 
oriented growth became the key policy objective. Since then, much has been 
achieved. The overvalued Turkish Lira was devalued in 1980 and Turkey has 
maintained a committed to a flexible exchange rate policy ever since. In fact, 
the exchange rate was devalued more than the rate of inflation to maintain 
export competitiveness. Another important feature of trade reform was an 
38 Free elections In November 1983 and December 1987 were won by Ozal's Motherland Party which maintained the 
same paradigm The government changed In October 1991 elections but the main lines of the paradigm continued. In 
short, the January 1980 programme brought about a major break In the economical paradigm that prevailed In the 
1980s and continued since then. 
aggressive drive to promote exports by generous export promotion schemes. 
These included tax rebates, preferential export credits, and import duty 
exemptions for imported intermediary goods for exports. The last element of 
trade reform was the liberalisation of the import regime. The highly restrictive 
and complex import regime was gradually eased and duties were lowered. 
Turkey's decisive implementation of these liberalisation policies changed the 
structure of her economy. Exports grew from less than US$2.9 billion in 1980 to 
US$10 billion in 1987 and to more than US$30 billion in the mid-1990s. The 
successful performance of exports under the regime of aggressive real 
devaluations of the lira lasted until 1988. By then the government had shifted its 
priorities to control the rate of inflation by allowing the real appreciation of the 
lira. Another important development in 1989 was the further liberalisation of the 
capital account, which was fully liberalised the following year. Changing the 
economic policies in this way had a significant impact on external balances. 
However, the important thing to note is that by 1989 Turkey had a liberalised 
and open economy and a rapidly growing private sector. While Turkey 
successfully liberalised its foreign trade regime, removed price ceilings and 
other distortions on goods and services, and deregulated its financial sector, 
economic stability has still not been attained. 
By 1999, Turkey was in the process of implementing a major stabilisation 
programme and there are indications that this programme is being perceived as 
more credible than the others. However, mostly for political reasons, this initially 
successful programme turned out to be one of the worst financial crises that 
Turkey has encountered. Since the early 1980s to date, the source of the 
problem has been fiscal deficits, which have ultimately reflected Turkey's 
inability to deal with the underlying causes of poor public finance. 
The failure to control fiscal deficits has been a major factor behind the volatile 
economic environment. The inflation rate ranged between more than 100 
percent in 1980 and 34.6 percent in 1986 and by 1990 it was around 60 
percent. As Table 3.1 shows, output growth has also been volatile with periods 
of rapid growth followed by sharp contractions. As the Turkish lira devalued, 
foreign exchange deposits became increasingly important and represented 
about 50 percent of M2 by late 1980s. The 1980 programme aimed to reduce 
the fiscal deficits by increasing tax revenues while reducing public spending and 
transfers to public entities. 
Initially, there was an improvement in the fiscal position. Tax rates were 
reduced while enforcement and the widening of the tax base was increased. 
Despite this initial success, the public sector deficit followed a path similar to 
that of the previous decades. In 1987, public sector deficits resumed its secular 
climb until 1993 when public sector borrowing requirement (PSBR) reached an 
all time high of 12% of GDP (see Table 3.1 ). There were times, especially after 
1994 when Turkey managed to improve its fiscal balances but these were never 
sustained. As a result, the fiscal dynamics generally drove monetary and 
exchange rate policy and set the key parameters for the evolution and 
functioning of the financial markets (Gultekin et al 2000). 
The capital account was opened in 1989 under these unstable conditions. While 
the officially declared objective was to further integrate with international 
markets, it appears that the easing of financing constraints on high levels of 
public expenditure may have been the overriding consideration (Asian and 
Celasun, 1996). An open capital account, which requires sound monetary and 
exchange rate policies for sustainability, further complicated macroeconomic 
management. Financial opening not only strengthened the links between 
domestic and foreign interest rates, but also because of the persistent lack of 
fiscal discipline, generated a large risk premium on Turkish lira assets, 
particularly on government paper. As shown by Celasun, Denizer, and He 
(1999), the differential between interest rates in Turkey and abroad was a major 
factor explaining capital inflows40• Monetary and exchange rate policies also 
encouraged foreign borrowing. While there were two distinct periods, they had 
the same effect on the financial sector's portfolio decisions. In the first period, 
starting in 1989, the real exchange rate policy that Turkey had followed since 
1984 to support exports was abandoned. This change, coupled with inflows of 
40 This Is one of the main reason of the current crisis. 
Table 3.1: Main Economic Indicators: 1980-1998 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Real GNP growth rate -2.8 4.8 3.1 4.2 7.1 4.3 6.8 9.8 1.5 1.6 9.4 0.3 6.4 8.1 -6.1 8.0 7.1 8.3 3.8 
Inflation rate (1) 110.2 36.6 29.9 31.4 48.4 45.0 34.6 38.9 73.7 63.3 60.3 66.0 70.1 66.1 106.3 88.0 80.4 85.8 84.6 
Current account balance• -4.9 .2} -1.4 -3.1 -2.4 -1.5 -1.9 -0.9 1.8 0.9 -1.7 0.2 -0.6 -3.5 2.0 -1.4 -1.3 -1.4 -1.3 
Total PSBR' 8.8 4.0 3.5 4.9 5.4 3.6 3.7 6:1 4.8 5.3 7.4 10.2 10.6 12.0 7.9 5.2 9.0 9.5 8.6 
Consolidated Budger 
PSBR 2.9 0.4 1.6 1.3 4.6 2.6 3.1 3.4 3.1 3.5 3.4 5.3 5.4 6.3 3.9 3.7 8.5 7.6 7.2 
Bq>enditures 20.3 18.9 15.1 18.7 17.1 15.3 16.7 17.4 16.6 16.9 17.3 20.5 20.1 24.3 23.1 21.8 26.3 27.2 29.1 
klterest p~ents 0.6 0.9 0.8 1.5 20.0 1.9 2.6 3.0 3.9 3.6 3.5 3.8 3.7 5.8 7.7 7.3 10.0 7.7 11.5 
Foreign 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.9 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.1 1.1 0.9 1.2 1.7 1.3 1.1 1.0 1.0 
Domestic 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.6 0.8 0.7 1.3 1.7 2.4 2.2 2.4 2.7 2.8 4.6 6.0 6.1 8.9 6.7 10.5 
Pnmary budget balance -2.6 -0.6 -0.7 ~.7 -2.4 -0.3 -0.1 -0.4 0.9 0.3 0.2 -1.5 -0.6 -0.9 3.8 3.3 1.7 0.1 4.6 
Domestic debt stoc!{- 13.6 12.4 12.6 22.8 20.9 19.7 20.5 23.0 22.0 18.2 14.4 14.8 17.6 17.9 20.6 17.3 21.0 21.4 21.9 
Foreing debt stocJ<- 24.0 22.8 27.1 30.2 34.3 37.7 42.1 46.0 44.8 38.4 32.2 33.2 34.6 37.0 50.1 52.8 58.5 61.6 59.3 
Treasury average bill rate(%) (2) 28.0 30.6 33.3 32.0 51.0 50.7 51.8 49.1 66.6 59.1 52.3 85.9 94.7 85.8 159.5 132.5 111.8 118.9 116.3 
Real interest rate on savings accc -75.3 35.6 65.0 34.3 -6.9 21.7 37.6 32.8 13.7 -7.0 -1.5 10.0 5.8 12.8 -10.0 4.8 16.5 12.4 11.9 
Real appredation of$ 17.8 24.6 7.2 7.3 13.3 -2.9 -4.6 ·12.5 -6.9 -15.4 -37.5 -5.8 -5.5 -5.6 63.6 C34.0 -24.0 -1.2 -13.2 
Net capitallnf!W 1.0 1.2 0.4 1.4 0.1 1.6 2.8 2.2 -1.1 0.7 2.7 -1.6 2.3 4.9 -3.2 2.7 4.7 4.3 0.4 
o es: (1} Inflation rate is measured by change in Consumer Price Index 
(2)1980-1985 figures are obtained trom Atlyes and Erse! (1991). 1985-1998 figures are obtained from CBoT.lhe rates tor 1985-1998 are 3 month T-bllls annuat,< compaounded 
": Percert share in GNP 
PSBR: Public sector borrowing requirement 
Sources: Treasury of Turkey, State Institute of Statistics: Denizer, Gu!tekin & Gultel<in (2000) 
capital, led to a rapid real appreciation of the currency1. Another aspect of this 
episode of currency appreciation was the particular way exchange rate policy 
was implemented. While competitive real exchange rate policy was abandoned, 
the Central Bank used a managed float approach and the exchange rate 
became an implicit nominal anchor. This inevitably fuelled real appreciation, 
already boosted by capital inflows, and the lira became overvalued by as much 
as 30 percent by 1993, which made foreign borrowing a profitable short term 
strategy. 
By 1994, these fundamental economic policies and the fiscal stance in the 
economy were deteriorating rapidly. As the required fiscal discipline necessary 
to complement the use of exchange rate policy as a nominal anchor was 
ignored, monetary and fiscal policies presented an unsustainable policy mix. 
The PSBR further deteriorated from 6 percent of GDP to 12 percent in 1993, 
and this fact coupled with the Government's fundamental policy error of 
attempting to control interest rates, triggered a major crisis in early 19942. The 
currency depreciated by almost 50 percent, GDP contracted by 6 percent, and 
three small banks, who had extremely large net foreign exchange positions, 
were closed. The financial system's instability was contained when deposit 
insurance was increased to 1 00 percent. The real appreciation of the currency 
had provided both the commercial banks and others with incentives to borrow 
abroad. This was consequently reflected in the bank's balance sheets. Turkish 
bank's liabilities to non-residents have grown from being negligible in the early 
1980s to 13% of total liabilities by 1993 and 16% by 1999. 
The post-crisis period since 1994 has also been characterised by stop-go 
stabilisation policies and improvements in fiscal accounts, but the lack of a 
credible programme has seriously undermined attempts at economic recovery. 
1 In 1989, the Central Bank and the Treasury announced a protocol to llmtt the Central Bank of the Treasury financing 
up to 15% of the annual budget appropriations, which was the legallimft. The Idea behind the protocol was to force the 
political authority to limit the magnetisation of the public sector deficits. Domestic borrowing became an Increasingly 
Important source of financing for the Treasury, which was then constrained In International debt markets then. Under the 
new policy of appreciating exchange rate, commercial banks found it extremely attractive to finance the Treasury with 
the short-term foreign debt. 
2 Despite all warnings, the Ciller government delayed a stabilisation programme until the local elections in March 1994. 
This delay was a serious polfcy mistake. The delay was coupled with a series of other policy mistakes that, in the first 
quarter of 1994, trtggered the fourth economic crisis of Turkish economic history. The Central Bank tried In vain to slow 
the capital flight by increasing the overnight lnterbank rates to over 1000% during February and March. By the end of 
March, the Central Bank ran out of reserves. Following a slim margin of victory at the nation-wide elections for 
municipalities, government announced a stab!llsation programme and stand-by agreement with the IMF on April 5, 
1994. 
Under these conditions, the Central Bank's primary concern has been the 
stability of the financial markets and the current account rather than the rate of 
inflation. lt began to target the real exchange rate and devalued the currency 
more or less in line with past inflation. By operating this type of policy, the 
Central Bank in essence validated past inflation, which in tum became the 
expected inflation rate for the next period. This in turn implied a predictable 
depreciation path for the currency and encouraged banks and the private sector 
to borrow abroad and invest in high yield securities. Consequently, foreign 
capital inflows increased, reaching about 4.4 percent of GDP and this made 
financing of the deficits easier. While real exchange rate targeting policy 
brought a degree of stability into domestic financial markets, it rendered the 
economy without a nominal anchor. Despite the fact that fiscal accounts have 
improved since 1993 and there have been primary surpluses, the lack of a 
credible programme has forced the Central Bank to maintain its real exchange 
rate policy because economic stability was perceived to be too fragile. The 
result was a very high rate of inflation, which averaged around 90 percent 
between 1995-1998. 
Another result was the effect on interest rates, which in tum made borrowing 
abroad attractive. Since this policy was being implemented without a credible 
programme, markets factored a large risk premium into domestic interest rates. 
At times the rates demanded by markets to roll over debt was as high as 40 
percent in real terms. Hence, from a macroeconomic point of view, Turkey's 
particular monetary and foreign exchange rate policy mix created ever growing 
debts, initially driven by high deficits and later by high interest rates, which 
needed to be financed. With small domestic financial markets, for example, 
M2/GDP is only 17 percent without foreign exchange deposits and 32 percent 
with them, external financing was crucial. For both the financial and private 
sectors, the incentives were relatively straightforward: borrow as much as 
possible either at home or abroad and lend to the Treasury. 
The Central Bank helped the Treasury in two ways. First, it funded commercial 
banks in the open market and provided them with enough liquidity to absorb 
treasury securities. As the size of domestic markets limited Treasury borrowing, 
the Central Bank encouraged banks to borrow abroad and foreign borrowing 
ratios were accordingly relaxed. As noted by the OECD (1999), the government 
and the financial sector became interdependent. Incentives arising from this 
distorted macroeconomic environment have determined the composition and 
performance of bank portfolios, the evolution of capital markets, as well as the 
portfolios of the corporate sector. By the end of the 1990s, the sole function of 
the financial system in Turkey was virtually reduced to transferring funds from 
the domestic and international markets to the Treasury. 
3.3 Financial Liberalisation and the Evolution of the System 3 
3.3.1 Financial Policies and Reforms 
The Turkish financial system before the 1980s represents a textbook case of a 
financially repressed structure. Interest rates had been set by the state since 
the 1940s and had been seldomly changed. Because of rising inflation during 
the 1970s, real interest rates had become increasingly negative; deposit rates, 
for example, were almost minus 40 percent in early 1980. At the same time 
disintermediation became a serious issue. The M2/ GDP ratio declined from 29 
percent of GDP in 1970 to 19 percent in 1980. Preferential credit to priority 
sectors also increased over time and it was almost 75 percent of total bank 
credit by 1979. 
During the 1970s, capital markets were not developed and there was a. very 
limited set of financial instruments. Banks were the dominant institutions in the 
financial markets and the corporate sector relied almost exclusively on bank 
credit. Central Bank credit was an important source of public sector financing. 
There were severe restrictions on the holding of foreign assets. Financial 
markets were protected from foreign competition as a natural extension of the 
prevailing regime of import substitution. When the liberalisation of the system 
began after the 1980 economic crisis, it consisted of four main themes, namely 
interest rate deregulation, development of money and foreign exchange 
markets, development in capital markets, and banking sector reforms. The first 
three will be discussed in this section. 
3 There are a number of detailed studies on the development of the financial system of the post 1980 era In Turkey. 
These articles were written by Akyuz (1990), Atlyas (1990), Atiyas and Ersel (1992), Cosan and Erse! (1986), Sak 
(1995) and further developed by Guitekin et al (2000). 
3.3.2 Interest Rates 
Interest rate deregulation began in July 1980. The stabilisation programme 
announced on January 24th included primarily a hike in the interest rates. The 
interest rates were liberalised to a large extent as of July 1980 which can be 
considered as the first act of liberalisation. The interest rate ceilings on non-
preferential credit were totally abolished. However, a certain percentage of 
credit interest payments had still to be deposited in the Interest Rate Differential 
Fund which was used to compensate for the low interest rates on the 
preferential credits mainly extended by the development banks. For deposits, 
the ceiling on household saving deposits were abolished and interest on 
commercial and public deposits were set at zero (Sak, 1995:11 ). 
The initial reaction of the largest banks to interest rate liberalisation was to 
reach a consensus interest rate for deposit rates by a so called "gentlemen's 
agreement", in a way, colluding among themselves with the hope that the rest of 
the system would follow. According to this agreement, the deposit rates were 
kept nominally low and also negative in real terms4. This first started as a secret 
agreement but it later became public. However, the smaller banks did not follow 
this lead and entered into fierce competition with the larger banks. To attract 
deposits these small banks issued large amounts of discounted newly 
introduced commercial deposits (COs) to brokers, who then sold them to the 
public at much higher interest rates. Brokers who were unregulated also issued 
their own promissory notes, bought and sold corporate bonds and lent heavily 
to those without bank financing. The situation eventually turned into a Ponzi 
scheme as the payment of interest on CDs to the public depended on the sale 
of new COs. Inevitably, the system collapsed after the largest broker closed its 
business in Turkey and moved abroad5. The result was a financial crisis and the 
liabilities of five banks were taken over by the government. it was estimated that 
the cost of this crisis was about 2.5 percent of GDP in 1982. The result was that 
interest rates began to be regulated by the Government. The Central Bank 
moved in to set the rates and prevent the leading banks from exploiting their 
4 The Interest rates on 6-month deposits remained at 15% at a time when the annual inflation rate was around 100%. 
5 High and rising interest rates soon put the banks and bankers under liquidity problems and most of the small bankers 
collapsed towards the end of 1981. The crisis culminated later, In the mld-1981, In the collapse of the largest banker 
(Kastelli}. The scrcalled bankers crisis caused the loss of the confidence in the .financial system. 
market power; it also periodically adjusted interest rates to maintain positive 
rates in real terms. This policy lasted until 1988, emphasising the fact that, 
interest rate liberalisation was not an immediate success once the ceilings were 
abolished. lt took nearly eight years, towards the late 1980s, for short-term 
interest rates to be determined by the market at which time the Treasury debt 
markets were well established. This episode also reflected the poor regulatory 
state of the financial markets in Turkey and the importance of sequencing 
reforms. There was no regulatory structure to oversee the players in the market 
when reform began and the risky behaviour of banks and brokers could not, 
therefore, be controlled. One major outcome of the crisis was the establishment 
of an explicit deposit insurance scheme for banks in 1993. This scheme was 
funded by premiums paid by the commercial banks and offered a limited 
insurance for depositors (Gultekin et all, 2000). 
The cost of the crisis was high especially in terms of the resources used to 
bailout depositors. The behaviour of the bankers left a legacy of mistrust and 
the exclusion of non-bank institutions from the later development of the money 
markets, led to banks dominating the money markets. 
3.3.3 Money and Foreign Exchange Markets 
Development of the money and foreign exchange markets was a priority for the 
Central Bank if it was to conduct the new monetary policy .. 
In due course, one of the key elements of the January 1980 stabilisation 
programme was a major devaluation of the Turkish Lira. Adjustments to the 
exchange rate for inflation differentials continued throughout 1980 and the first 
half of 1981. In May 1981, the policy of maintaining a target for the real effective 
exchange rate was institutionalised and the began setting and announcing 
nominal rates on a daily basis. With the easing of the foreign exchange crisis 
and the elimination of payments arrears, most of the multiple currency 
practices, introduced in the 1970s, were phased out in the first three years of 
the stabilisation programme (Sak, 1995: 17). 
In addition to the Central Bank setting daily exchange rates they also allowed 
banks to fix their own rates within a specific band. In 1984, banks were allowed 
to accept foreign exchange deposits and in the following year they were allowed 
to set their own exchange rates. 
As already mentioned, the capital account was fully opened in 1990. The 
consequences of the liberalisation of the exchange rate regime were high levels 
of currency substitution and changes in the bank's asset and liability structure, 
which weakened the stability of the system. The Central Bank introduced the 
inter-bank money market to facilitate the asset-liability management of banks in 
1986 and the following year it commenced open market operations. The idea 
behind these initiatives was to cut down on Central Bank's direct financing of 
the Treasury. The development of government debt markets was expected to 
provide proper tools for the debt management of the Treasury and for the 
conduct of the money markets while allowing interest rates to signal the relative 
scarcity of funds6• 
3.3.4 Capital Markets 
The lessons from the financial crisis of 1982 were not lost on the policy makers. 
In addition to inexperience, the lack of an institutional structure to enforce the 
existing legislation for the regulation of the capital markets was one of the 
crucial reasons for the inability of the authorities to crack down on the behaviour 
of the brokerage houses. The response of the government was to speed up the 
formation of the Capital Market Board which was given responsibility for the 
regulation, supervision and development of capital markets. 
The Capital Market Board was active in building the legal and the institutional 
infrastructure for the capital markets in Turkey and the Istanbul Stock exchange 
was consequently opened in 1986. Once the interest rate restrictions on 
corporate bonds by the Central Bank were eliminated in 1987, new instruments, 
such as commercial paper, were introduced and others were revived. Mutual 
funds, for example, were recognised by the authorities for the first time in 1987, 
but commercial banks had the exclusive right to establish them until19927. 
11 Another Important objective was to increase private savings by re-establishing a pricing mechanism for flow funds. 
There Is considerable debate In the financial development literature about the role of interest rates in mobilising the 
domestic savings. See Goldsmith (t 969), McKinnon (1973) .. 
7 Commercial banks were also allowed to be the custodians and managers of their own funds. 
The Ozal government was eager to develop the capital markets. They 
introduced new instruments to encourage the public to save with financial 
assets. An extra budgetary fund, the Mass Housing and Public Participation 
Fund was created to finance housing development and public infrastructure 
projects were financed by direct borrowing from the public8· The fund introduced 
long-term revenue bonds, called Revenue Sharing Certificates, secured against 
the income generated from the infrastructure projects. The idea behind this new 
instrument was to shift the portfolio composition of households from gold to 
financial instruments and eventually to pave the way for the privatisation 
programme of the govemment9. 
3.3.4.1 Capital Markets and the Corporate Sector 
One of the basic tenants of financial economics is that the efficient allocation of 
plant, equipment and working capital depends on the efficiency with which 
financial capital is distributed across firms. The amount of funds a firm seeks to 
raise in the financial markets depends to a large extent on the return on 
investment and on the firm's cost of financial capital. If the cost of capital is too 
high, aggregate investment will be insufficient, and the economic growth of the 
country will be jeopardised. If the relative capital costs of firms are mispriced, 
the distribution of funds and consequently real investments across firms will be 
similarly distorted. As the cost of capital for a firm depends on the price it 
receives for its newly issued securities it follows that the efficient allocation of 
funds will be achieved only if the primary market for financial capital operates 
efficiently. 
For the primary market to operate efficiently and properly value securities it 
requires an efficient secondary market. Marketability of a security in essence 
turns illiquid investments in a firm's assets into liquid portfolio holdings. With a 
secondary market, any investor who buys shares when they are issued is free 
to sell those shares in the market, at the market determined price. Any investor 
8 Revenue sharing certificates were an innovative Instrument at first. They were used to finance Incomplete public 
Investment projects, predominantly dams for electricity generation. The Incremental return on a one or two year 
Investment to complete a dam is extremely high. The other objective was to Introduce non-interest bearing instruments 
to those who believed usury was Illegal in Islam. Eventually, however, this Instrument was so abused that the Public 
Participation Fund became a major burden on the budget. 
8 According to an extensive survey of household saving behaviour by Eser (1999), Turkish households have the 
following portfolio (stock) of assets: 86% real estate; 2.3% securities; and 1% gold. They allocate their current savings 
into: 35% foreign exchange; 29% gold; 12% bank depos~s; securities 1 0%; and 9% real estate. 
who did not purchase shares when they were originally issued is free to buy 
them subsequently in the secondary market. In this respect potentially short 
term investments of individuals are turned into long-term investments in real 
assets. 
Marketable securities fetch higher prices in the primary markets and effectively 
reduce the cost of capital. In addition, market determined valuation is 
informationally efficient and reflects the market's assessment of managerial 
performance. In this respect it is a forward-looking measure of performance. 
Many countries, including Turkey, invested heavily in the development of equity 
markets to allow firms to have access to risk capital. 
3.3.4.1.1 Primary Markets 
The outstanding securities issued by the non-financial and financial 
corporations in Turkey and registered with the Capital Market Board (CMB) are 
presented in Table 3.2. A modest amount of $409 million was issued in 1986. 
The share of corporate bonds was higher than the equity offered by the firms at 
this time. However, by 1987, the dollar amount of securities issued by the firms 
had doubled. 
Although the equity offerings increased, bond and commercial paper offerings 
were the principal instruments used by companies to raise funds in the capital 
markets in the early years. However from 1990, the equity issues increased 
significantly while corporate bond issuances declined. In aggregate, the amount 
of securities issued by companies increased each year from 1986-1993. 
Asset Backed Securities (ABS) were introduced to the market in 1992 for the 
first time. The introduction of ABS had a significant impact on the market. lt 
became the preferred method of raising funds, especially for the banks. In 1993, 
securities issued in the primary market reached a record of $6.6 billion. This 
level was mainly fuelled by the issuance of $4.8 billion of ABS and corporate 
bond issues declined significantly from 1993 onwards. In 1999, there were no 
bonds issued by the corporate sector. Similarly, commercial paper also declined 
and became non-existent by 1998. ABS issues declined significantly during this 
period as well. With the introduction of new regulations by CMB, the primary 
ABS market ceased to exist in 1999. As ABS declined, equity offerings 
increased to an all time high. ABS was popular in the first instance because 
they were exempt from bank reserves, however, when this advantage was lost, 
they disappeared. Mutual Funds' Participation Certificates (MFPC) were first 
issued in 1990. Although the mutual funds technically started operating in 1986 
with the opening of the Istanbul Stock Exchange (lSE), under the new Capital 
Market Law of 1984, there were no MFPC offerings in the primary market. The 
MFPC issues also coincided with the liberalisation of financial markets. The 
total market value of all the government and corporate outstanding securities in 
the financial capital market are presented in Table 3.3. The share of private 
securities accounted for 39% of the $14.181 billion outstanding securities and 
Government securities accounted for the remaining 61% in 1990. In 1991, the 
share of Government securities declined 56% and the following year reached 
69%. From 1993 onwards, the share of Government securities significantly 
increased and reached a record level of 87% in 1996. As of 1999, Government 
bonds account for 84% of the $60.468 billion securities outstanding in the 
market. 
In general, the fixed income securities markets are larger than the equity 
markets in developed capital markets. However, in the case of the Turkish 
capital market the relative size of fixed income securities is disproportionately 
high. lt is dominated by government securities and by the end of 1990s, it 
accounted for almost 1 00 percent of government securities. 
Table 3.4 reports the trading volume in the Istanbul Stock Exchange (lSE), the 
most important secondary market in Turkey10. In terms of dollar volume it is 
clear that Government securities dominate. In contrast the share of corporate 
securities by trading volume in 1990 was only 17 percent. Moreover, it declined 
to 15 percent in 1991, 11 percent in 1992, and to less then 5 percent in 1996. 
By 2000 the share of corporate securities traded by volume in the secondary 
market was less than 4 percent of the total. Although the total fixed income 
securities outstanding were in excess of equity securities, trading volume of 
equities were substantially higher than the trading volume of fixed income 
securities. 
10 There is no reliable data for fixed Income securities, corporate and government, prior to 1990. 
Table 3.2: Primary Security Issues Registered With the Capital Market Board (USD mn) 
te Commerc Sharing Bank Funds' 
Years Shares Bonds ial papers ABS Cert Bills Part.Cert1 
1986 152 166 1 90 
1987 219 371 65 1 89 
1988 256 148 190 167 
1989 458 285 219 1 46 
1990 1,576 293 83 2 127 328 
1991 1,066 195 160 4 174 16 
. 
1992 775 116 147 2,110 9 112 13 
1993 873 65 110 4,811 218 488 
1994 1,266 17 5 1,426 68 . 74 
1995 1,124 41 34 2.494 7 28 93 
1996 1,261 15 36 514 29 110 
1997 2,022 10 15 152 66 227 
1998 2,682 10 42 506 
Notes: 
1. Mutual Fund Participation Certificates are reported at market values after 1998 
Source: capital Markets Board 
Estate Mutual 
Cert Funds' Part. 
33 
12 
Total 
409 
745 
761 
1,009 
2,407 
1,615 
3,282 
6,565 
2,856 
3,821 
1,999 
2,502 
3,239 
Table 3.3 Outstanding Securities In Turkish Financial Markets (In USD billion) 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Public 1.71 1.81 1.86 1.78 2.47 3.28 4.63 6.31 5.91 7.31 9.74 10.72 19.64 24.67 19.12 26.30 35.11 
Treasury Bills 0.90 1.24 0.47 0.82 0.96 1.19 2.22 1.76 1.65 2.11 4.39 6.14 5.87 10.25 13.81 18.83 
Government Bonds 1.71 1.81 1.24 1.79 1.37 1.93 2.24 2.80 3.45 5.14 7.21 5.92 12.58 17.34 7.84 11.20 15.41 
Other 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.39 1.20 1.17 0.70 0.52 0.42 0.43 0.90 1.46 1.04 1.30 0.87 
... ~ 
-- -·'" .. - . 1 
Private 0.91 1.24 1.34 1.10 1.16 1.64 2.45 2.67 3.77 6.17 8.27 8.82 10.19 4.40 6.47 3.20 ' 
Stocks 0.91 1.24 0.89. 1.10 0.96 1.20 1.87 2.18 3.16 5.56 7.75 7.15 6.49 3.68 4.90 2.99 
Asset Backed Securtties 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.31 3.33 0.67 1.46 0.10 
other 0.00 0.62 0.45 0.27 0.19 0.15 0.58 0.49 0.61 0.61 0.53 0.36 0.36 0.05 0.11 0.11 
.. .. .. 
TOTAL 1.71 2.72 3.10 3.12 3.57 4.44 6.27 8.76 8.58 11.08 15.91 18.99 28.46 34.86 23.52 32.77 38.31 • 
Table 3.4: Tmding Volume of the Istanbul Stock Exchange (USO mn) 
Ptlvate Sectot Securities Public Sector Secutltles 
Years Shares ASB Others 1 Total Govt Bonds T-Bills Others 2 
1986 13 13 
- - - -
1987 118 118 
- - - -
1988 115 115 
- - - -
1989 m 773 
- - - -
1990 6,195 1,487 7,682 23,712 12,295 1,042 
1991 8,583 3,140 11,723 34,114 31,627 1,146 
1992 8,217 432 1,875 10,523 30,405 54,772 3,641 
1993 23,315 2,908 818 27,040 59JJ74 93,706 4,462 
1994 21,968 3,496 1,451 26,915 56,581 117,240 6,975 
1995 51,990 3,615 2,933 58!537 100,269 324,685 3,557 
1996 37,510 2,947 2,196 42,653 159,D63 705,777 5,442 
1997 60,D74 1,317 61 ,391 565,639 600,697 746 
1998 69,647 296 69,943 423,114 655,825 234 
1999 58,930 73 59003 798,291 422 892 
Notes: 
1999 figures are as of August 30, 1999 
!.Includes Corporate Bonds, Commercial papers and Bank Bills and Ban Guaranteed Bills 
2. Includes Revenue Sharing Certificates, Housing Certificates, FX Indexed Bonds 
Source: Cap~al Markets Board and Istanbul Stock Exchange 
Total 
-
-
-
-
37,050 
66,888 
88,818 
158,142 
180,795 
428,511 
870,283 
1,167,082 
1,079,172 
1 221 183 
TOTAL 
13 
118 
115 
m 
44,732 
78,611 
99,341 
185,183 
207,710 
487 ,D48 
912,936 
1,228,473 
1,149,115 
1 280 186 
In Table 3.5, the portfolio composition of mutual funds1 is shown. A-Type 
mutual funds started in 1994. These funds were required to have at least 25 
percent of their investments in equities. In return, they were given significant tax 
advantages. The law was intended to help the deepening of the equity market 
and alleviate the significant crowding out caused by government bonds. There 
were no restrictions on investments of other mutual funds. Equities constituted 
approximately 36 percent of the Type-A mutual funds holdings. With the 
1 Data before 1990 Is not available 
exception of the last two years, their investment in Government bonds has been 
less than 1 percent and Treasury bills accounted for the rest of their portfolio. 
With the entry of Repo and Reverse Repo activities into the secondary markets 
in 1997, the proportion of treasuries significantly declined. Accordingly in 1999, 
reverse repo's accounted for 48 percent of their portfolio, equities accounted for 
38 percent, and government bonds (9.45%) and treasuries (4.6%) accounted 
for the remainder. 
Type-8 mutual funds' portfolios revealed that they were primarily investing in 
government bonds and T-bills. The exception was 1993 when investments in 
equities accounted for 18 percent of their portfolio. Corporate bonds accounted 
for 19 percent of their portfolios in 1990 and 1991. However, the proportion of 
corporate bonds declined very rapidly to insignificant levels during the next two 
years. 
Table 3.5: Portfolio Composition (USD mn) 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Private Sector Securities 
Shares 4,946 6,366 5,743 4,931 2,843 3,761 3,950 4,441 6,012 9,735 
Corporate Bonds 475 322 195 115 37 40 25 22 22 17 
Commercial papers 71 100 88 83 5 26 27 
AS8 1,056 2,530 519 1,122 75 
% ofTotal 39 31 29 18 20 13 
Public Sector Securities 
Government Bonds 6,423 4,863 10,097 13,122 6,060 8,601 11,628 
T-B ills 1,888 3,598 4,938 4,460 7,919 10,609 14,212 
Revenue Sharing Certificates 273 20 530 209 
FX Indexed Bills 102 328 729 1,099 1,053 367 
%of Total 61 56 69 71 82 80 
otal Outstandin 14181 15 22 858 26 429 18 970 25173' 3J 
1999 figures are as of August 30, 1999 
1. Consist of Bank bills and bank guaranteed bills, real estate certificates and profit and loss certificates. 
Source: Gultekin et al (2000) 
41 
127 
11 
64 23 7 
13 14 16 
17,440 18,399 38,754 
11,599 18,619 11,407 
62 
Similarly, government bonds accounted for almost 60% of the portfolios in 1990 
but this proportion declined to 43 percent the following year and subsequently 
declined as they were replaced with treasury bills. Accordingly, treasuries 
accounted for 90% and 96% of their portfolio in 1994 and 1996. As such, their 
portfolio consisted of very short-term government securities. From 1997 
onwards, reverse repo displaced investments in treasuries and government 
bonds. Shifts in the mutual fund portfolios showed the agility of these funds to 
respond to tax incentives. Differential taxes also resulted in distortions which 
lead to generous arbitrage opportunities. 
The number of mutual funds increased over the years. However, a close 
examination of the detailed transactions filed with CMB and the records of lSE 
reveal that three mutual funds and seven investment funds account for more 
than 20 percent of the trading volume in the market1• 
3.3.4.1.2 Secondary Markets 
The Istanbul Stock Exchange (lSE) is the principal secondary market in Turkey. 
Although the stock exchange pre-dates the Republic, it only started orderly 
operations in 1986. In Table 3.6, we report on the main indicators of the lSE. 
The number of companies listed in the lSE rapidly increased from 350 in 1986 
to 730 by 1989 while the number of companies with shares trading on the 
market decreased slightly from 80 to 76 firms over the same period2. After the 
liberalisation of the capital account in 1989, a significant increase in the number 
of companies entering the market occurred. The number of companies listed 
increased to 916 and the companies with shares trading on the market jumped 
to 110 with the addition of 33 companies that went public in 1990. The number 
of companies listed reached 1 ,284 in 1993 while 160 companies' were actively 
trading on the lSE. 
Following the economic crisis of 1994 the number of listed companies rapidly 
declined as the public companies were "crowded out" of the debt market and 
1 Most Investment funds are owned by banks. lt is possible for a mutual fund to finance government securities In a group 
bank Indirectly via reverse repos with differential taxes and reserve requirements 
2 listed companies include all companies with public debt and equity. Listing requirements and procedures are 
published by lSE periodically under the title "Halka Arz ve Borsa'da lslem Gorme." Companies must sell at least 15 
percent of the shares to the public to be classified as a public company. Current regulations do not require share 
registration. There Is no data series on the profile of share ownership. In addition, there are no provisions for minority 
rights at this point. 
Tabl&3.6: M.lln lndieolfoltors of Stoek lr1•llk&t anti lSE 
Humber of Companies 
V&oliS Usted Traded IPO 
1~ 350 Ill 
1987 414 82 
1988 556 'IS 
1989 73J 76 
19!10 916 110 
1991 1092 134 
1992 1236 145 
1993 1284 160 
1994 1204 176 
1995 922 205 
1996 788 228 
1997 743 258 
1998 686 277 
1999 285 285 
1999 figures are as of November 30, 1999 
Source: lSE 
35 
24 
13 
17 
25 
30 
25 
31 
20 
10 
De-listed 
1 
2 
2 
9 
1 
2 
1 
1 
2 
Secmhtes lssnetl ~USD mn rl'l.lrket 
Colphllls<!tlon 
IPO Caoitallncrease Debt Instruments IUSD mn\ 
32 '2fil 938 
118 526 3,125 
218 506 1,128 
393 551 6.756 
761 742 503 18,737 
69 1,436 532 15);64 
71 918 2tm 9m 
122 579 5,189 37,824 
176 962 1,508 21,785 
233 886 2,602 20,782 
165 608 592 30,797 
429 920 242 61,879 
358 1 ;253 52 33,975 
223 NA N.' 114271 
Tuullng 
Volume Number of SIHues Avt Dally Trading Avr Dally Traded Nilrnher oflladed lSE ..fnclex 
fUSDmn Tlcltled Volun1e (USO mn) Slhli&S Contracts fx1.000) IJolll 86-100 
13 3 0 0 132 
118 15 0 0 385 
-
115 32 0 0 112 120 
773 236 3 1 247 561 
5,854 1,537 24 6 756 643 
8i>J2 4,531 34 18 1,446 502 
8);67 10,285 34 41 1,662 273 
21,770 35.249 88 143 2.815 833 
23,203 100,062 92 396 5,(1l5 413 
52$7 Di,254 209 1.220 11,867 383 
37,737 3ro,924 153 1 ,583 12,447 534 
58,104 919,784 231 3,850 17 ,1)59 962 
70,396 2,242,531 284 9P42 21/5T7 484 
58$0 4 242 890 289 20798 19.8201 962 
many of them failed the listing requirements. Consequently, at the end of 1999 
there were 285 companies listed but only 256 were trading in the market. 
Between 1990 and the end of 1999 a total of 223 companies went public and 20 
companies' had their shares de-listed from the exchange. 
Table 3.6 also reports on the nominal value of share issues, capital increases, 
debt issues, market value of initial public offerings (IPO's), and the market 
capitalisation of lSE companies. In terms of market capitalisation lSE is one of 
the leading emerging stock exchange markets since 1990, IPO's have 
accounted for 18.9 percent of the value of share issues in the market and 
capital increases have accounted for 66 percent (for the whole period the ratio 
was 66.3 percent). Despite the crowding-out effect of the public sector, 
corporations raised $11.4 billion in net equity capital and $16.5 in debt capital 
on the lSE. This is an impressive result, despite the fact that the numbers are 
dwarfed by treasury securities. 
Trading volume in public companies increased from $13 million in 1986 to $70.4 
billion in 1998. The turnover rapidly increased, especially after the opening of 
the capital account. For example, the turnover ratio rose from 11 percent in 
1986 to 210% in 19981. The turnover ratio is used as a measure of market 
liquidity and based on this ratio lSE is. one of the most liquid markets in the 
world. By comparison liquidity in the NYSE increased from 54% to 113% during 
the same period. However, greater liquidity has also led to excess volatility. A 
closer examination reveals that the largest 10 companies - about 54% of the 
market by capitalisation- accounted for more than half of the dollar and share 
volume. One, therefore, should perhaps exercise care in interpreting specific 
measures for emerging markets. 
3.4 Performance of the Financial System: Reforms and Financial Structure 
By 1986, Turkey had a stock exchange, brokerage houses, a legal framework 
for the securities markets, and regulatory agencies to supervise the system. 
Accounting standards were improved to confirm to internationally accepted 
standards, though there still is room for further improvement. Auditing standards 
1 Turnover ratio dropped to 53% as of November 1999. The data are not complete for the year. The market was closed 
for a week after the August earthquake 
were introduced and required for companies with publicly issued securities2• By 
the end of the decade, Turkey seemed to have laid the foundations for financial 
markets with basic institutions and a regulatory structure. Current institutions in 
the Turkish financial system and their total asset sizes can be seen in Table 3.7. 
Table 3.7: T111klsh Financial Secto·r at a Glance 
Number of Total Assets Major Players Regulator 
Institutions 
36 Turkish *Ziraat Bank CBOT/Minislry of 
18 Foreign "Halk Bank Treasury to hand over 
5 State-Owned *Is Bank to new Independent 
BANKING 12 Development USD122 bn "'V api Kredi Bank Banking Regulation 
7 Turkish- *Guaranty Bank and Supervision 
3 Foreign· *Akbank Agency (BRSA) 
2 State -pamukbank 
60 Companies (171ife Total premiums in 1997: Millie Reassurance (all 
and 43 non-life) USD1.8 bn insurers obliged to Insurance Supervisory 
INSURANCE . 46 Privata Total assets of insurance re insure a fixed Office (Ministry of 
11 Foreign companies: USD3.5 bn percentage with them) Treasury) 
· 3 State 
Foreign portfolio 
Istanbul Stock Market Cap of USD48 bn investment accounts for 
EQUITY MARKET Exchange has about (1998); free float is about large demand in equity Cap~al Markets Board 
300 listed companies 20% of market cap market (more than 50% 
of equtty in earl!_ 1998) 
141 Intermediaries 
authorized to trade on Is Investment 
INVESTI~ENT lSE Daily tradirlg volume ranges Ata Invest Capital Markets Board 
COMPANIES/ 116 brokerages. 55 from USD300 mn to USD1 Global Investment 
BROKERAGES commercial banks, bn Garanti Investment 
and 12 investment 
banks authorized to 
trade in the bonds 
and bills market. 
198 mutual funds (as 
of beginning of 1999) 
including· 97 
Type A funds (25% of 
assets invested in 
MUTUAL FUNDS I Turkish equny wnh Total net asset value of 
INVESTidENT TRUSTS some talC advantages) mutual funds is USD1.2 bn Cap~al Markets Board 
. 101 Type B funds 
Oess restrictive and 
80% of total market 
net asset value) 
. 171nvestmenl 
Trusts (all Type A) 
. 5 Reites 
70 leasing companies Volume of leasing 
LEASING I FACTORING 0n 1997) transactions is US02.5 bn Ministry ofTraasury 
85 facto ring Factoring turnover was 
companies~ 0n 1998) USD3.3 bn in 1997 
3 State controlled Ministry of Employment 
social secur~y funds Yapi Kredi Faktoring and Social Security, 
PENSIONS (PAYG) Is F actoring Not applicable Capnal Markets Board 
Umited private 
I pension funds 
The banking sector clearly dominates the system. The insurance sector is one 
of the least developed sectors compared to similar developing countries. Mutual 
2 In a survey conducted by the Capital Market Board, 45% of the firms surveyed had used external auditors without any 
legal requirement. See Erkan and Temlr (1998) 
funds and pensions are also small players in the system. The equity market, 
mutual funds, leasing/factoring sectors were all created by the financial reforms 
of the 1980s. These reforms have had an impact on the banking sector as well. 
Entry of foreign banks was encouraged during this period and Table 3. 7 shows 
that the financial landscape has an institutional diversity comparable to middle-
income countries. The Commercial code allows corporations to issue debt 
instruments up to a certain proportion of their equity capital. Corporations, in 
effect, were not allowed to issue debt until they were allowed to revalue their 
assets in 1983. 
Traditional measures of financial deepening are provided in Table 3.8 for the 
1980-1998 period. 
Financial development is often expressed in terms of the relative size of 
financial assets to GNP. Table 3.8 shows that there was a significant deepening 
during this period. Financial assets to GNP tripled from 23.1% in 1980 to 63.7% 
in 1998. The composition of this financial deepening, however, reveals some 
structural problems. The financial deepening and the evolution of the system, 
were severely distorted by the massive fiscal imbalances of the public sector. 
The M1/GNP ratio, a financial deepening measure used for developing 
countries, dropped from 13.9% to 4.79% but M2/GNP rose modestly from 
17.4% to 21.34%. M2Y/GNP, where the money supply measure include foreign 
exchange deposits, rose form 20.2% to 37.8%, this was because of currency 
substitution that took place after residents were allowed to have foreign 
exchange deposits. These ratios are lower than countries with similar income 
per capita level. The results clearly indicate the impact of rising and volatile 
inflation throughout this period on the demand for the national currency. 
The ratio of financial assets to GNP rose from 23.1% in 1980 to 63.7% in 1998 
and currency in circulation declined from 4.1% to 2.1% during the same period. 
Total deposits rose from 14.1% of GNP to 35.8%. Nearly all of this increase 
came from the increase in foreign exchange deposits. The ratio of outstanding 
securities to GNP also rose from 4.9% to 25.8%. Most of this increase came 
from public sector securities, predominantly treasury bills and bonds. The ratio 
of public securities to GNP was 3.6% in 1980 and reached 22.3% in 1998. The 
share of private securities rose from 1.3% to 3.6%, mostly from the appreciation 
Table 3.8: lndlca1ors of Financial Deepening 
A. Stocks of Financial Assets ae percent of GNP 
1900 1981 1982 1983 1!184 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 19!10 1991 ,., 
"" 
199-1 1995 1996 1997 1998 
1. CURRENCY IN CIRCULATION 41 3.5 3.9 3.9 33 2.9 2.5 2.9 3.0 2.9 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.4 2.4 22 2.1 
2. TOTAL DEPOSITS 14.1 18.8 223 22.1 22.5 226 27.6 29.3 27.1 25.2 22.1 24.9 252 22.5 29.9 3).2 36.2 37.1 35.6 
Sa-.ing Deposits 6.5 10.4 12.8 12.8 13.7 13.7 12.7 11.0 10.7 10.8 66 9.6 6.6 6.3 6.5 6.6 11.6 10.9 11.2 
Other 7.6 6.4 9.5 9.5 6.6 6.9 9.6 10.9 9.1 6.3 7.6 7.2 7.1 6.3 6.0 5.4 7.1 7.5 7.3 
FXOeposite 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.3 7.4 7.3 6.1 5.5 6.2 9.6 9.9 1.5 16.0 17.5 18.7 17.2 
3. TOTAL SECURITIES 4.9 4.5 5.3 5.1 5.9 6.5 6.2 9.9 9.5 10.2 10.4 12.5 17.7 19.2 18.0 19.1 22.0 239.0 25.6 
Public S.curltlee 3.6 3.1 32 3.0 4.0 6.1 7.1 6.5 6.7 6.4 7.0 12.2 13.6 14.8 15.3 19.0 2ll.7 22.3 
Treasury Bills 0.9 1.1 0.4 1.5 1.4 1.6 2.6 2.0 1.5 2.9 3.6 32 1.6 6.0 102 8.1 
"" 
Government Bonds 2.7 2.0 1.1 2.6 2.4 2.9 3.0 3.2 3.6 3.9 7.6 9.5 6.0 6.5 6.3 12.1 10.9 
Other 0.0 0.4 1.5 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.3 
Pdwte Securities 1.3 2.1 2.1 1.9 1.1 1.6 2.6 3.0 3.5 4.0 5.4 5.5 5.6 3.4 3.6 1.7 3.2 3.6 
Stock a 0.6 0.6 1.1 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.6 2.2 2.4 2.9 3.6 5.1 4.5 3.6 2.6 2.6 1.6 3.1 3.6 
Asset Backed Securities 0.0 ..... . 0.6 1.6 0.5 0.9 0.1 0.0 0.0 
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B. Financial Deepening Ratios 
1960 1981 1962 1983 1984 1965 198& 1987 1988 1989 1990 1!191 1992 1993 
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1997 1998 
M1!GNP 13.9 12.7 13.3 15.0 11 9.7 10.3 11.5 68 8.5 7.9 7.4 7.1 6.5 5.9 4.9 6.0 48 
M21GHP 17.-4 21.3 25.2 25.0 24.8 24.2 23.8 23.5 21.1 20.5 18.5 17.3 1-4.1 18.2 16.0 19.5 19.3 21.3 
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of share prices on the Istanbul Stock Exchange. This reflected the fact that the 
legal and institutional infrastructure for the private securities market was 
completed in 1986 with the opening of the Istanbul Stock Exchange. The first 
public offering was conducted in 1988 with the sale of the state's shares in a 
small telecommunication equipment firm. 
Until 1991, the growth rate of outstanding private securities was faster than 
government bonds. As the public sector deficits got larger, government bonds 
began to dominate the financial system. We can observe that the relative 
percentage size of outstanding issues of government debt market to private 
sector securities was around 58.8%/41.2% to 56.5%/43.5% between the years 
of 1984 to 1991. 
This ratio climbed to 86.1%/13.9% in 1998. Table 3.9 shows the severity of the 
distortions in the new issues market. Offerings of public securities dominated 
the financial markets. The relative size of government bond issuances was 
94.1/5.9 in 1982. This ratio improved to 76.9/23.1 in 1990 and rose to 94.9/5.1 
in 1998. With the newly established stock exchange and tax incentives, the 
private sector began to issue debt and equity instruments during 1987-1991. 
The privatisation programme, while not successful in itself; nevertheless, had a 
positive effect. The privatisation programme trained a cadre of investment 
bankers who were familiar with the underwriting process. Initially Corporations 
took advantage of the changes in the commercial code and tax rules and began 
to issue rights offerings. Public offerings of common stock became a permanent 
feature of the securities markets after 1988. By 1998, although the volume of 
shares increased to historically high levels, their relative share compared to 
government bonds declined. The Corporate bond issues virtually came to a halt 
after 1991. Asset backed securities, which were introduced in 1992 to increase 
the diversity of securities with the amendments to the Capital Market Law, were 
the largest newly issued securities during 1992 to 1995. By 1998, however, 
government bonds comprised 94.5% of all new security issues. Common stock 
issues were 4.6% of new issues and Mutual funds issues comprised 0.4 
percentage of the new securities. 
Two facts are evident from these observations: Public sector financing 
requirements created severe distortions in the financial system. The financial 
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T01ble 3.10: Yields and Return (~f) 
1980 1981 1982 1983 191U 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1!1"7 1998 
YIELDS 
Savings Deposits 1 26.5 50 50 42.5 45 55 413 52 83.9 58.8 59.4 n.7 74.2 74.7 95.6 92.3 93.8 96.6 94.8 
Government Bonds 2 29 34 34 31.8 43 50.6 51 47 52.4 522 413.2 85 137 109 115 111 100 
Tressury Bills 3 28 3J.6 33.3 32 51 50.7 51.8 49.1 66.6 59.1 52.3 85.9 94.7 85.8 159.5 132.5 111.8 118.9 116.3 
RETIIRNS 
Shsres 4 12 3J.4 79.9 110.2 ·5.2 46.8 86.5 293.9 -44.4 493.1 46.8 34.2 -8.4 416.5 31.8 46.8 143.8 25:3.6 -24.7 
Nominal Appreciation of US Dollar 11 128 61.2 37.1 38.7 61.7 42.1 3J 26.4 66.8 47.9 22.8 60.2 64.6 60.5 169.9 54 7B B7 71.4 
Foreign Exchange Deposits· US Dollar 11 40.4 41.5 44.5 89.2 51.7 34.7 73.2 79.3 68.5 181.4 61.6 88.9 100.7 
Inflation rate 7 110.2 36.6 29.9 31.4 413.4 45 34.6 38.9 73.7 63.3 60.3 66 70.1 66.1 100.3 BB 80.4 85.8 84.6 
REALIZED REAL RETURNS 
Real Return of Treasury Bills -73.9 -16 11 1.9 5.3 12.4 413.3 26.6 -9.5 -6.6 ·13.1 29.7 34.6 29.4 49.6 50 38.6 38.1 37 
Real Appreciation of US Dollar 17.8 24.6 7.2 7.3 13.3 -2.9 -4.6 -12.5 -6.9 -15.4 ·37.5 -5.8 -5.5 -5.6 63.6 -34 -2.4 1.2 -13.2 
Return on Shares in US Dollar' 257.9 -42.8 13.4 242.5 -39.8 -36.6 64.7 -25.1 26.1 -6 58.2 -7.2 
Source: Central Bank of Turkey, Istanbul Stock Exchange 
Notes: 
1. One year maturity 
2. 1980-1900 figures are obtained from Atiyas Ersel (1991), 1900-1993 figures are obtained from Central bank of Turkey 
3. 1980-1985 figures are obtained from Atiyas Erse! (1991), 1985-1993 figures are obtained from Central bank of Turkey. The rates between 1985-1993 are 3 month T-Bills annually compuonded 
4. Shares in Istanbul Stcok Exchange, figures from Treasury ofTurkey 
5. Exchange rate data obtained from Central bank of Turkey 
6. Weighted foreign exchange deposit interest rates obtained from Central Bank of Turkey 
7. Inflation rate is measured by change in Consumer Price Index 
B. F"1gures are obtained from Istanbul Stock E1Cchange (1900:100) 
system channelled a. significant part of funds available for the Turkish economy 
into the Treasury. The Tax treatment of treasury securities made them difficult 
to compete with. Table 3.1 0, which shows the yields and rates of returns on a 
set of instruments in Turkey reveals that real rates on government bonds were 
very high1• 
The second observation is about the role of banks in the intermediation 
process. After the 1982 crisis, the banks became the favoured institutions2. 
Only banks were allowed to be primary dealers in the government bond market. 
They were also able to underwrite and trade securities, establish and operate 
mutual funds exclusively until 1992, and to engage in insurance business. 
Banks became truly universal institutions dominating every aspect of financial 
activity in the country. They were the prime beneficiaries of the deepening and 
expansion of the financial system. Effectively, the financial and banking systems 
have become synonymous in Turkey. They have become sophisticated users of 
financial technology and products in both domestic and international markets. 
Likewise they became users of modern information technology delivery 
channels and upgraded human skills substantially after the financial reforms3. 
3.5 Microeconomic Factors: Regulatory and Supervisory Issues 
The institutional development of the regulatory and supervisory system did not 
go hand in hand with the deregulation of the financial s·ector. The initial reforms 
in 1980 were launched with minimal regulatory and supervisory capacity and it 
was only after the crisis of 1982, that serious efforts were made to improve the 
regulations. The overall system gradually improved but the financial sector 
functioned with fundamental deficiencies in t~e regulatory framework. In 
particular, a combination of a highly generous deposit insurance scheme, the 
1 Tax on government bonds was raised to 10% in 1994 .... There are tax advantages tor banks as well. Taxes due to 
Interest Income from government bonds is payable the next tax year, allowing banks to postpone tax payments for a 
year. In a high inflationary environment, the effective tax rate Is much lower. 
2 Th.e Central Bank took the leadership In the development of the money markets. The Central Bank was a member of 
the Banks Association and the governor of the Central Bank was the president of the association until 1994. The 
relationship between the banks and the Central Bank was reminiscent of a pretentioUsly exclusive club. As is often the 
ease with such clubs, there Is a strong discrimination against the non-members. While the non-bank institutions were 
smaller In capitalisation than banks, they could have grown if they were allowed In as primary dealers. 
3 There was a strong support for financial development from the International organisations. The World Bank provided 
Financial Sector Adjustment Loans during the early 1980s with a significant component of technical assistance for the 
Central Bank and the Treasury to strengthen their regulatory functions. OECD also provided funding for the Capital 
Market Board for technical assistance. An international banking school was established in Istanbul for training. Banks 
upgraded their own training programmes 
bias towards keeping failing banks in the system, and political intervention, 
deterred prudent behaviour and market discipline. 
As could be expected, deficiencies in the regulatory regime have been 
interacting with the sort of macroeconomic factors considered earlier and these 
have contributed to the vulnerability of the economy. We will next discuss some 
of the essential factors affecting incentives, both in banking and capital markets, 
and point out how they affected the financial structure. 
The first point to focus on is the deposit insurance scheme. Explicit deposit 
insurance was introduced in Turkey in 1983. lt was set up following the Kastelli 
crisis of 1982 and the bail out of depositors during that crisis is a good example 
of implicit deposit insurance. Following the financial crisis, the liabilities of five 
banks were taken over by the government, at an estimated cost of about 2.5 
percent of GDP in 1982. In the following years until 1994 the system did not 
encounter serious problems, at least on the surface. However, after the 
liberalisation of the capital account the banks were able to raise finance from 
abroad and some engaged in risky strategies, especially the smaller banks that 
lacked domestic branch networks. In pursuing such strategies, they were clearly 
encouraged by the monetary and exchange rate policies that the Government 
had been following and built up large open foreign exchange positions. The 
proceeds were either invested in government securities or issued as loans to 
the private sector at high real interest rates with longer maturities. lt was 
estimated that in early 1994, the banking system had open positions which 
totalled some 120 percent of their capital. The banks did not hedge these 
positions and when the TL was devalued in early 1994, their capital positions 
became negative and three banks failed and were closed4. 
The extent of this instability was such that even large and well-capitalised banks 
came under pressure. Calm could only be restored when the deposit insurance 
coverage was extended to 100 percent of deposits. While the authorities did not 
4 lt is also important to describe the rote of the commercial banking sector after the shift in the exchange rate regime In 
1989. The large Interest rate differentials between the foreign borrowing rates and the government debt offered tempting 
profrt margins for the banks; consequently, most banks ran unhedged foreign exchange positions. The aggregate 
unhedged (or open) position of the banking system was $2.9 billion (48% of the total capital of the banking system) In 
1992, and tt went up to $4.6 billion (68% of capital) In 1993. After the economic crisis of 1994, the banking sector 
reduced tts unhedged posttion to $.8 billion (18% of capttal). This sudden change in banking policy to close their 
unhedged position was one of the critical reasons for the run on the reserves that started In January 1994 and resulted 
In the economic crisis of 1994. 
initially assume all of the liabilities of the failed banks, later developments made 
it clear that they eventually did. The Government compensated depositors as 
stipulated in the 1983 deposit insurance scheme but foreign creditors of the 
banks were repaid in full by the Treasury. Although the 100 percent insurance 
policy has so far helped to stabilise conditions in the banking sector, the fact 
that it stayed in place for a long time and it is still in effect, encouraged risky 
behaviour. Large banks believed that such a policy was not creating a level 
playing field, but given the macroeconomic conditions in Turkey, the policy 
could not be changed. A comparison of bank deposit rates, particularly those 
paid on foreign exchange deposits is useful and reveals the extent of risky 
behaviour. In order to reap the benefits of arbitrage opportunities due to the 
difference between treasury securities and foreign exchange deposit rates, 
some banks were offering 20-25 percent for dollar deposits. 
Another dimension of this moral hazard is related to connected lending and 
equity holding by banks in industrial firms. Almost all of the private sector banks 
belong to family owned industrial groups. Banks can extend loans to group 
companies within limits that were not rigorously enforced and they are allowed 
to own equity in companies within the same group. While. there maybe some 
merits to the argument that in an unstable environment like the one in Turkey, it 
makes sense to lend to group companies, it does not necessarily ensure that 
credit is used in the most productive way. Nor does it prevent banks from 
abusing the misuse of deposit insurance. In fact, groups that pursued 
aggressive growth strategies borrowed heavily from their banks and this has 
been a well-know problem for years. The crucial issue is that regulations were 
ineffective in controlling this practice. In the case of lending, for example, the 
limits to affiliates were double that of the banks capital and for equity holders 
and related third parties they have been 50 percent of bank capital. These 
exposures are too high by international standards and it was widely reported in 
the press that these regulations were sometimes exceeded. 
The situation is more serious when one considers the equity investments of 
banks. Consolidated reporting of equity holding is only required if the 
commercial bank has 51 percent of the shares of a group company or if it owns 
the majority of the voting power in one of its subsidiaries. However, 
consolidation is not necessary if the bank has a minority position. Thus, a bank 
can hold equity in a number of group companies without the risks being 
reported properly. The problems that can develop due to the combination of 
group lending and shareholding can be very serious as experienced by Turkey 
recently. In 1999, lnterbank, a medium sized bank, was taken over by the 
deposit insurance fund when it became insolvent. lt was subsequently revealed 
that a large part of its portfolio was to its affiliates and the failed bank had 
substantial shareholding positions in-group companies. 
The cost of this banks failure has so far been almost to US$2 billion. Suffering 
from the same problem, five more small banks were taken over by the deposit 
insurance fund in December 1999. The total costs of these failures could 
exceed US$5 billion, or 2.5 percent of GDP, which is indicative of the magnitude 
and seriousness of the problem. Very much related to the incentives issue is the 
lack of orderly exit mechanisms for poorly performing banks. While banks 
whose condition is thought to be weak are put under surveillance by the 
Treasury with the approval of the economy minister, this does not necessarily 
punish the banks or force them to exit if they do not restructure themselves. In 
fact, Article 64 of the Banking Law (1985) reads; "on strengthening financial 
health", the bank in question is exempt from reserve requirements and the 
minister is authorised "to take all measures" to improve the condition of the 
bank including tax breaks. Therefore, banks that were put under article 64 do 
not have any incentive to improve their condition. In fact, over the years, 15 or 
so banks have always been under its jurisdiction and removal from the list 
seems to have been a negotiated process rather than a regulatory decision. In 
fact, with the exception of crises such as in 1982 and 1994, no single bank was 
closed on the basis that its financial condition was poor or deteriorating. The 
IMF, in return for the recent stand-by agreement required the closing of five 
banks that had been operating under Article 64 for 20 years. In this connection, 
the importance of the political factors must be emphasised. The banking law 
assigned excessive discretionary powers to the minister in charge and the 
removal of weak banks from Article 64 to the bankruptcy process is completely 
dependent on the approval of the minister and the cabinet. In the case of the 
banks that failed and were taken over in 1998 and 1999, their problems have 
been reported and documented extensively by the banking department of the 
Treasury. Consequently, risk taking behaviour continued and was almost 
condoned, consequently problems and costs mounted. Given the above 
analysis, it is not difficult to see how microeconomic incentives may have 
affected the financial structure. First, moral hazard has been an environmental 
factor in Turkey for a long while and it is natural to expect it to have altered the 
risk/return perceptions of banks and corporations. 
Those groups who own banks have fewer incentives to use the equity markets . 
. I! is less costly to borrow from the group's banks when there is explicit and 
implicit deposit insurance. Even if the macroeconomic environment was stable, 
one could argue that systemic moral hazard may encourage firms to use bank 
financing as opposed to equity financing. The regulatory system in Turkey failed 
to establish an effective supervision of lending and equity holding in group 
companies. Furthermore, it failed to force the exit of weak banks from the 
system. Such regulatory failure has probably had a negative impact on capital 
market development as well. Even if there were no moral hazard, regulatory 
failure would again encourage bank financing because the large conglomerates 
in Turkey all have banks in their holdings. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE TURKISH BANKING SYSTEM 
4.1 A General Summary 
As mentioned earlier, prior to 1980, the Turkish economy was structured as a 
planned economy. The state agencies played an important role in economic 
decision making through the government's economic development plans, which 
dictated strategies for sources of finance and their use. The state had a majority 
share in almost all areas of economic activity. Consequently prices and interest 
rates were controlled by the state. 
During the late 1970's, the Turkish economy was in the midst of a serious 
foreign exchange crisis. When inflation climbed to an exceptionally high level, 
economic activity stopped due to a lack of foreign currency. Despite the fact that 
the public sector deficit exceeded 8 percent of GNP, interest rates remained 
unrealistically low in nominal terms and became negative in real terms due to 
planned economic regulation which meant that interest rates and exchange 
rates were determined by the state. Financial markets remained rather small 
while financial institutions were financially weak and inefficient. The markets 
were uncompetitive and were not subjected to international banking rules and 
competition. 
The macroeconomic situation in Turkey changed very dramatically after the 
announcement of the economic stabilization and structural adjustment 
programmes in 1980. These programmes gave priority to economic growth 
based on export promotion and to structural reforms including deregulation and 
liberalization of the financial markets. The programmes eliminated quantitative 
and price controls and put emphasis on a free market approach, relying on the 
price mechanism. 
Negative real interest rates, barriers to business entry, high intermediation 
costs, absence of modern financial instruments coupled with quantitative 
controls on bank balance sheet characterized the financial system prior to the 
reforms. The financial sector reforms attempted to increase savings and 
improve the allocational and operational efficiency of the financial system, which 
was mainly dominated by banks. As capital market instruments were barely 
existent, the promotion of capital markets emerged as a major objective. The 
Capital Market Board was established and the Istanbul Stock Exchange was 
reopened. 
In order to strengthen the banking system, substantial changes were made to 
the Banking Law in 1985. lt introduced new requirements regarding capital and 
problem loans, improved accounting and reporting standards and deposit 
insurance. Meanwhile, external auditing became mandatory for banks. Finally, 
there was an important move towards the lifting of the regulatory barriers 
restricting entry into the banking system which increased the number of banks 
operating in the market, partly through the establishment of new banks, and 
partly through the arrival of foreign banks into the market. 
Meanwhile, new institutions and reforms were introduced into the system such 
as the establishment of the TL interbank market and the sale of government 
bonds by tender. In addition, Turkish residents were allowed to hold foreign 
exchange deposit accounts, thus attracting unrecorded foreign currency 
denominated assets to the financial markets. A short time after the reopening of 
Istanbul Stock Exchange, a secondary market for fixed income securities was 
set up. The Central Bank started open market operations in 1987. In the 
following year, the foreign exchange market was established and controls on 
interest rates were abolished. The year 1989 was milestone for the economy 
when foreign exchange trading and capital movements were fully liberated. 
Turkish residents were allowed to invest in foreign securities and to hold foreign 
currency accounts abroad while non-residents were permitted to invest freely in 
the Turkish financial markets. The Turkish Lira became convertible with no 
restrictions on international capital flow. In 1992, an electronic fund transfer 
system and the Turkish lnterbank Clearing system became operational. 
Enhanced economic performance obtained during the stabilization programme 
enabled the Central Bank to introduce a monetary programme in 1990 to further 
ensure price stability and provide long-term predictability. 
The economy registered high growth rates during 1981 to 1990 when GNP 
increased from USD 63 billion to USD 150 billion. Income per capita, in the 
meantime, increased from USD 1,570 to USD 2,715. The share of industry in 
GNP increased by 7 percentage points while services remained fairly stable. 
Foreign trade volume and other external economic relations expanded 
dramatically. Exports followed a consistent growth path with the promotion of 
direct tax rebates and other incentives but the abolition of quotas and cuts in 
tariffs, coupled with high real growth caused a rapid increase in imports. 
Consequently, the trade deficit widened substantially. However, net invisible 
revenues and tourism revenues increased dramatically and prevented the 
current account deficit from growing further. Turkey easily financed its growing 
current account deficit and built up its foreign currency reserves. Liberalization 
of capital movements and the growing financial markets had positive impacts on 
capital inflow. Capital flows, albeit mainly short term funds amounted to USD 10 
billion in 1999, increasing from USD 0.7 billion in the early 1980s. 
The ratio of domestic savings to GNP was up to 6 percentage points in 1999 
compared to the ,1980's. Public sector savings improved until 1990 when the 
public sector deficit to GNP ratio went down to 6 percent from 9 percent in the 
previous year. All of these changes made a positive contribution to the 
reorganization and development of the financial sector. Institutional 
developments and changes in the legislation enabled financial institutions to 
offer new products. As Table 4.1 indicates, the ratio of M2R (M1 + TL time 
deposits +. repos) to GNP increased to 31 percent in 1999 from 15 percent in 
1980 and of M2YR (M2+fx deposits) increased to 52 percent from 15 percent. 
Table 4.1: Selected Indicators of Financial Sector 
1980 1990 1999 
M2R As per. of GNP 15 17 31 
M2YR As per. of GNP 15 22 52 
PSBR!Chg in M2R Percent 149 131 96 
PSBR/Chg in M2YR Percent 149 131 56 
G.securities/M2R Percent 23 41 85 
Source. Turkish Banking Assoctat1on annual reports 
However, chronic inflation remained the major problem in the economy. After 
declining sharply in the early 1980's, inflation followed an upward trend. This 
threatened the stability of the economy and had a negative impact on the 
growth of the financial markets. Political instability and a lack of political 
determination made the financial reforms incomplete and caused public sector 
borrowing to widen. Rising inflation together with a growing demand for finance 
from the public sector brought serious pressure to bear on the financial sector. 
Interest rates increased while maturities became shorter. In order to ease 
pressure on domestic resources, both the private and public sectors preferred 
external borrowing which enabled the governments to sustain domestic 
demand-led growth at the expense of rising inflation, a widening deficit in the 
balance of payments and further macroeconomic imbalance. Meanwhile, the 
government also borrowed from the Central Bank to finance the public sector 
deficit. 
Macroeconomic instabilities. accelerated currency substitution which led to a 
shrinkage in the financial sector in TL terms, which also put upward pressure on 
interest rates and shortened maturity structures. The government's objective of 
lowering interest rates despite worsening inflation and accelerating foreign 
currency demand compounded by a widening current account deficit, led to a 
severe crisis in the financial sector in the first quarter of '1994. TL depreciated 
rapidly, the average rate of inflation increased dramatically, interest rates 
soared and domestic demand contracted. By the end of 1994, the rate of 
inflation reached 121 percent, TL depreciated by 170 percent against the USD, 
interest rates on government securities increased to 190 percent and GNP 
declined by 26% in USD terms. The Current account was in surplus but capital 
outflows amounted to USD 4 billion. 
The crisis affected the banking system due to a shortage of foreign currency 
and the heavy investment in government securities. The total assets of banks 
fell by 28 percent and shareholders' equity declined by 35 percent. During the 
crisis, there was a substantial withdrawal of deposits from banks due to the 
panic created by a sharp depreciation of TL and a hike in interest rates. The 
Government stopped three small sized banks from continuing banking activities 
and introduced full guarantees to all deposit holders. 
The Turkish economy recovered quickly from the crisis of 1994. In the following 
years, GNP grew in excess of the long-term growth rate of 5 percent while the 
annual rate of inflation came down to 86 percent, albeit higher than the level 
before the crisis but significantly less than the peak of 121 percent. The public 
sector deficit however continued to remain high and put upward pressure on 
interest rates. One of the main policy changes was the money creation activities 
of the Central Bank because the Parliament brought a limit on the Bank's direct 
lending to the government. This had a positive impact on inflationary 
expectations and encouraged higher demand for TL. 
Capital inflows eased the pressures on domestic interest rates and helped the 
Central Bank to increase liquidity. The foreign currency reserves of the Bank 
also grew rapidly. In the meantime, TL depreciation was kept in line with the 
inflation rate, which led to exports growing faster than imports. it is important to 
note that, Turkey signed a customs agreement with the EU in 1996. Rapid and 
steady growth from 1994 onwards had a positive impact on the financial 
system. However, because there were no dramatic changes in the economic 
environment, banks continued to widen their currency positions and mismatch 
maturities. Turkish banks, therefore, continued to operate in a very risky 
environment and take high risks in order to make profits. 
4.2 Features of the Turkish Banking System 
The Turkish banking system has traditionally occupied an important position in 
the financial sector. Therefore, reforms during the 1980's led to substantial 
changes in both the financial sector and banking system. The Turkish banking 
system grew very sharply after the 1980's. Table 4.2 shows that the total assets 
of all banks were USD 132.6 billion in September 1999 compared to USD18.6 
billion in 1980 and USD 6 billion in 1970. At the same time, total assets to GNP 
ratio increased from 43 percent in 1970 to 80 percent in 1980. 
Table 4.2: Total Assets of Banking System (USD billion) 
1970 1980 1990 Sept. 1999 
Commercial banks 5.2 18.5 52.0 62.0 
State-owned banks 3.0 8.0 26.0 5.0 
Privately owned 2.0 8.0 25.0 36.0 
banks 
Banks under the 3.0 
Fund* 
Foreign banks 0.2 0.5 1.0 18.0 
lnv. and dev. Banks 1.0 2.0 5.0 12.0 
Total 6.2 18.5 57.0 74.0 
Total (as per. of GNP) 44.0 31.0 43.0 80.0 
.. Source. Turkish Bankmg AssocJatJon annual reports 
(•) These banks are under Banking Sector Auditing and Regulation Board management after falling to comply with 
accounting/financial regulations 
The restructuring of the economy and the liberal policies supported by 
legislative changes together with deregulation of the financial system, led to 
stable and rapid growth in the economy and a rise ir: the demand for financial 
services and foreign trade. The reforms also led to an increase in the level of 
competition in the financial services sector. 
Banks gradually adapted themselves to the new conditions and responded to 
increased levels of competition and deregulation by offering new services and 
products. Faced with intense competition from foreign banks coming into Turkey 
in the early 1980s, domestic banks accelerated the modernization of their 
activities by switching from manual methods to fully computerized systems. 
Similarly, highly qualified personnel were employed in order to extend the scope 
of professional services beyond the traditional markets, thereby, enabling them 
to increase efficiency and diversify their product range. Credit cards and 
consumer finance expanded quickly and banks simultaneously engaged in 
capital market transactions thus reducing dependence on interest earning 
assets. 
During this period bank balance sheets were transformed. More selective 
lending and realistic provisioning policies together with economic expansion 
helped most banks to reduce their portfolio risks. Meanwhile, profitability ratios 
improved as a result of investments high yielding government securities. The 
bank's also increased their involvement in leasing, factoring, and trading in gold. 
·Diversity of activity also encompassed foreign trade activities which increased in 
line with the increase in foreign trade. Similarly the sources of finance from 
abroad grew substantially following the liberalization of capital funds. The latter 
helped banks to grow rapidly and facilitated a reduction in the cost of financing. 
However, the increase in currency substitution also increased the banks share 
of foreign currency liabilities and adversely affected their foreign currency 
positions. 
Turkish banks can be classified into two major groups: commercial banks and 
investment and development banks. By ownership, each group can be put into 
three subcategories: private-owned, state-owned and foreign banks. 
Commercial banks operate as universal banks providing traditional depository 
and lending services, financing foreign trade activities and sustaining capital 
market services as well as investment banking activities. 
Privately owned commercial banks include large commercial banks with nation-
wide branches and a comprehensive range of services, and small sized banks 
who concentrate their main activities in the major cities. Recently, however, 
some small sized banks have tried to increase their share of deposits by 
expanding of their branches. Many of the private banks, irrespective of size, are 
owned by wealthy families and /or industrial groups. 
There are four large state-owned commercial banks, who have responsibility for 
subsidizing some industrial sectors such as agriculture, construction and small-
medium size enterprises etc. Although small in number, the state-owned 
commercial banks occupy a substantial position in the banking system with 45 
percent of the total assets. The state-owned banks which are heavily involved in 
quasi-fiscal activities are not sufficiently reimbursed by the government and, 
therefore, have low levels of liquidity. 
Foreign banks usually operate either with a main branch in Turkey. They are 
large (13 banks) in number but small in terms of market size with an asset 
share of only 5 percent. They face the same regulations as domestic banks, 
and can provide all kinds of banking services but they cannot take deposits. 
The 1980 reforms led to a number of important changes in the banking sector. 
At the aggregate level the size of the banking sector has increased. As shown 
in Table 4.3, bank assets in relation to GDP have. more than doubled, 
increasing from around 29 percent in 1980 to 64 percent in 1998. Banks are, 
therefore, still the most important intermediaries in the country. 
Public banks still have an important presence in the financial sector. Although 
their numbers had declined from 8 to 5 by 1998, and their asset share declined 
by 44 percent, their assets still account for more than one third of the sectors 
assets. The largest bank is also state owned. These banks support a variety of 
subsidised lending programmes that in essence are "preferential credits". The 
continued presence and importance of public banks has been a serious 
shortcoming of the reform process which aimed to reduce the role of the state in 
financial markets. Government still uses the state banks to bypass the 
budgetary process and dictates which sectors will receive "favoured status". 
The influx of new banks into Turkey and the freeing of interest rates, resulted in 
a change in the market share of bank deposits. In general, large banks lost 
some of their market share and medium sized banks gained. However, the top 
banks between 1980 and 1998 have kept their dominant positions and despite 
T.1ble 4.3: Evolution and Stmctme of the B.1nklng Se(tor In Tmhy 
Total Assets I GNP 
State Banks 
Private Banks 
Foreign Banks 
Tot.ll loolMI GNP 
State Banks 
Private Banks 
Foreign Banks 
Tot.ll Deposits I GNP 
State Banks 
Private Banks 
Foreign Banks 
FX Deposits f GNP 
State Banks 
Private Banks 
Foreign Banks 
Bank Credit to Prlv.lte Sector! GNP 
Source: Banking Asso(iation of Turkey 
1980 
28.9 
14.3 
13.8 
0.9 
15 
8 
6.7 
0.3 
15.2 
5.2 
9.6 
0.4 
0 
0 
0 
0 
12.1 
1981 
33.8 
15.4 
17.3 
1.1 
17.3 
9 
8 
0.3 
20.3 
6.5 
13.3 
0.5 
0 
0 
0 
0 
14.4 
1982 
39.5 
18.1 
20.1 
1.3 
17.7 
8.2 
9.1 
0.4 
24 
8.9 
14.6 
0.5 
0.2 
0.1 
0.1 
0 
15.4 
1983 
42.4 
20.5 
20.2 
1.7 
18.2 
8.6 
9.1 
0.5 
24.4 
9.9 
14 
0.6 
0.2 
0 
0.1 
0 
15.7 
, .. 
42.5 
20.7 
19.9 
1.9 
14.7 
6.8 
7.4 
0.5 
28.1 
10.9 
14.5 
0.8 
2.3 
0.7 
1.4 
0.3 
13.2 
1985 
41.4 
19.8 
20.1 
1.6 
16.4 
7.9 
7.9 
0.6 
28.2 
11.8 
15.6 
0.8 
3.3 
1.2 
1.8 
0.2 
13.7 
1986 
46.7 
21.9 
22.9 
1.9 
19.6 
9.5 
9.5 
0.6 
30.9 
12.6 
17.2 
1.1 
5 
1.9 
2.9 
0.2 
16.5 
1987 
52.5 
24.3 
28.5 
1.7 
21.9 
11.5 
9.7 
0.6 
32.1 
12.8 
18.2 
1.1 
7.5 
2.6 
4£ 
0.3 
17.4 
1988 
48.7 
23.5 
23.3 
1.9 
18.4 
10.1 
7.7 
0.6 
29.7 
12.9 
15.6 
1.1 
7.3 
2.6 
4.4 
0.3 
14.3 
1989 
44.3 
22.8 
20 
1.5 
17.2 
9.4 
7.2 
0.6 
28.2 
12.8 
12.6 
0.8 
6.1 
2.3 
3.6 
0.2 
13.4 
1990 
39.8 
19.9 
18.4 
1.5 
19.7 
9.1 
9.8 
0.7 
24 
11.6 
11.7 
0.6 
5.7 
2.1 
3.4 
0.2 
13.9 
1991 
43.7 
20.7 
21.4 
1.6 
17.9 
8.8 
8.4 
0.7 
25.9 
12 
13.4 
0.5 
8.4 
3 
52 
0.2 
13.7 
1992 
47.5 
23.1 
22.5 
1.9 
18.4 
8.9 
8.9 
0.6 
27.3 
13.8 
13.1 
0.5 
10.1 
3.8 
6.1 
0.2 
15.2 
1993 
46.6 
19.8 
24.8 
2 
18.7 
7.7 
10.4 
0.6 
25.6 
11.9 
13.3 
0.4 
10.5 
3.8 
6.6 
0.2 
15.6 
199-4 
47.2 
20.9 
24.7 
1.6 
17.5 
7.7 
9.4 
0.4 
32.2 
14.4 
17.2 
0.6 
16.7 
5.7 
10.6 
0.4 
13 
1995 
50.3 
20.5 
28.3 
1.6 
20.6 
9.1 
11.1 
0.4 
30.2 
13.1 
16.3 
0.8 
1996 
57.5 
23.4 
32.2 
1.8 
24.2 
9.4 
14.3 
0.5 
36.2 
16 
19.4 
0.9 
16 17.5 
5.2 4.8 
12.2 . 12.7 
0.3 0.2 
16.3 2112 
1997 
60 
21.9 
35.1 
3 
25 
9.4 
14.8 
0.7 
37.1 
14.8 
21 
1.3 
18.7 
4.5 
13.5 
0.0 
23.7 
1998 
64.7 
23.7 
3B 
3 
23.8 
7.6 
15.5 
0.8 
35.8 
14.6 
20.3 
17.2 
3.7 
13 
0.1 
20.1 
declines in concentration ratios competition seems to have made less of an 
impact than expected (Aydogan 1993, Denizer 1997). 
One of the most important results of the reforms in the sector has been the 
improvement in human capital and information technology. The entry of foreign 
banks has been particularly useful in this regard and the number of well-trained 
personnel has increased. The Turkish banking sector currently employs 
approximately 165,000 personnel. Turkish banks have also invested in new 
technologies and this has been a major expense item over recent years. 
However, this has enabled banks to engage in derivative instruments and by 
1998, Turkish banks were among the most sophisticated in the region. 
Table 4.4: Number of Banks Operating In Turkey 
1970 1980 1990 Dec.1999 
Commercial banks 44 40 46 59 
State-owned banks 12 12 8 5 
Private banks 27 24 25 36 
Foreign banks 5 4 23 18 
lnv. & Dev. Banks 2 3 10 12 
Total 46 43 66 71 
Source. Turkish Banking Assoc1at1on annual reports 
There are 71 banks, (see Table 4.4) in Turkey and the total number of branches 
was 7,476 in 1999. Almost 85 percent of these branches were opened before 
1980. However a modest increase continued until 1989 when expansion 
virtually stopped. After 1994, there has once again been a noticeable increase 
in branches as small sized banks began to widen their market share, leading to 
a decline in concentration. 
Concentration in the bankiJlg system is still high but it has followed a downward 
trend recently. The state-owned banks, for example, have a high share of the 
market. There are 2 state-owned banks among the top five in terms of total 
assets and 5 in the top ten. As measured by total assets the ten largest banks 
represent 66 percent of total assets, 72 percent of total deposits and 66 percent 
of total loans. However, following the restructuring efforts to reduce the size of 
the states involvement in the economy, the share of state-owned banks by total 
assets has declined. However, the state owned banks share of total deposits 
has increased. 
Deposits are the main source of total assets: 67 percent of the liabilities of 
commercial banks are composed of deposits. About 75 percent of bank 
deposits have three-month maturities and half are denominated in foreign 
currency. Since April 1994, savings deposits have been under the deposit 
guarantee scheme. A no risk sensitive premium which is 0.25 percent of insured 
deposits is paid on a quarterly basis and all banks collecting deposits are 
obliged to have their deposits insured. 
The high level of domestic interest rates and tax distortions induced banks to 
borrow from abroad to finance both loans and government securities. Repos 
reported in off balance sheet activities have also been an important source of 
liquidity for banks over recent years. Much of the repos have maturities of less 
than one-week. The increase in short term repos business offering high returns, 
is mainly due to the quasi-fiscal burden on liabilities and investors' preferences 
for short term instruments. Shareholders equity, including revaluation funds and 
net current yearly income has stabilized at around 10 percent of total assets. 
Regulation, which is largely based on the BIS requirements, obliges banks to 
maintain a minimum reserve asset ratio of 8 percent in terms of equity to total 
weighted assets. As can be seen in Table 4.5, in the case of mainly state-
owned banks, free working capital remained fairly low due to heavy investment 
in fixed assets. 
Half of the banking sectors liabilities are in foreign currency because of the 
emphasis on currency substitution and foreign borrowing. Likewise, half of total 
assets are denominated in foreign currency either in cash with foreign banks, 
securities exported by foreign countries or foreign currency loans. Banks also 
hold large amounts of government securities which provide liquidity via repos 
etc. Loans, of which around 50 percent are foreign denominated, comprise the 
majority of total assets, but their share does fluctuate and in 1998, for example, 
they comprised only 38 percent of total assets. Non-performing loans to total 
loans is about 7 percent at the present time. 
Table 4.5: Selected Balance Sheet Items of Banking System 
(As of Sept. 1999 USD billion) 
TL Fx Total 
Assets 
Liquid asset 21.8 24.6 46.4 
Marketable sec. 14.3 8.0 22.3 
Loans 20.6 20.8 41.3 
Tangible assets 9.1 1.8 10.9 
Others 32.1 2.0 34.1 
Total 83.6 49.1 132.6 . 
Liabilities 
Deposits 45.1 42.7 87.8 
Non- deposit funds 4.6 16.0 20.6 
Others 10.8 2.5 13.3 
Shareholders' 7.4 0.1 7.5 
equity 
Current year 3.4 3.4 
profits 
Total 71.3 61.3 132.6 
Source. Turkish Banking Assoc1at1on annual reports 
Banks have valuable fixed assets and equity on their balance sheet and both 
items are recorded at book value. In 1987, they were allowed to revalue 
participations, fixed assets and benefit from tax exemptions, provided 
revaluation funds are added to capital. Notwithstanding the revaluation, there 
has always been a discrepancy between the actual market value and the book 
value of equity and fixed assets which has resulted in hidden assets in the 
balance sheets. The ratio of equity to total assets has remained fairly stable 
over the last decade, at around 10 percent. The maturity mismatch between 
bank assets and liabilities is also significant. Assets have typically about 6 to 9 
months maturity while liabilities have an average of only 3 months. The main 
reason behind this mismatch is largely attributable to investments in 
government securities. 
As the short position in foreign currency has been profitable in recent years, 
banks have taken excessive currency risks and invested in TL. According to 
earlier legislation, the foreign exchange positions of banks was high, at 50 
percent of the capital base. The ratio was later lowered to 20 percent and in 
September 1999, the foreign currency position amounted to USD 12 billion, i.e. 
9 percent of total assets 1. 
Commercial bank profitability continued to improve following the financial 
reforms, however, it was dependent on fluctuations in the economy and is 
generally regarded as insufficient when risks and inflation are taken into 
account. Profitability levels in State owned banks, however, deteriorated due to 
rising real interest rates, high quasi-fiscal taxes and relatively poorer 
performance. State-owned banks also tend to be less profitable than their 
commercial competitors because .of their social missions. Indeed, the "average" 
return on bank assets during the period of 1990-98 was 3 percent compared to 
1.2 percent for state-owned banks. 
There have been two important developments recently: i) The move to expand 
operations abroad by opening branch offices or establishing correspondent 
banks or joint ventures, ii) Rapid growth in off-balance sheet business relative to 
on balance sheet business due largely to repos, interest rate and foreign 
currency transactions. 
The new banking law in 1999 also needs to be examined. The Undersecretariat 
of the Treasury, the Central Bank and the Capital Market Board has three main 
regulatory bodies in the financial sector. The Treasury is responsible for 
regulation and on site supervision while the banks are responsible for off-site 
supervision. However, the new Banking Law made the Banking Regulation and 
the Auditing Institution the regulatory body for the Turkish banking sector. 
The rehabilitation of the banking sector was at the top of the agenda for the 
coalition government that took office in June 1999. The long-awaited new 
Banking Law was approved by Parliament in June 1999. This new Law aimed to 
strengthen the banking sector and to improve the levels of supervision in line 
with international norms by establishing the Banking Regulation and Auditing 
Institution, which had administrative and financial autonomy. The Board, which 
is the decision making body of the Institution, consists of seven members and 
1 It is worth mentioning at this stage that these foreign currency short positions were one of the reasons that has deepened the 
financial crisis in Turkey, one in November 2000 and the other in March 2001. Basically, the real interest between the devaluation 
of TRL and yields of the government securities was the locomotive of this easy-earned money. However, a financial crisis in 
emerging markets and a domestic one sparked by a row between the prime minister and the president, forced Turkey to abandon the 
peg system and let foreign currencies, most importantly USD to free float in the market. In one month, the TRL devalued by 50% 
and unearthed the weakness of the Turkish banking sector and financial sector. At the time ohvriting. Turkey was trying to recover 
from this crisis with a substantial assistance from World Bank. 
has been recognized as the sole authority to license (and withdraw the license) 
of banks, and to decide on the takeover of failing banks by the Savings 
Deposits Insurance Fund (SDIF). 
The new Law is based upon the principles for bank supervision as designed by 
the Basle Committee. In addition to the minimum amount of capital required for 
new banks, all banks have to comply with a risk-weighted capital adequacy ratio 
derived from the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) model2. 
4.3 Performance of Commercial Banks: Profitability and Efficiency 
Available data suggests that since reforms began in 1980, the profitability of the 
banks has improved. Standard bank profit measures such as return on assets 
(ROA) and return on equity (ROE) are indicative of this as shown in Table 4.63. 
Even when account is taken _of the high rate of inflation in Turkey, the banks are 
still making positive real profits. However, as mentioned previously, the 
exception has been the State banks. State banks deliver subsidised credits to 
certain sectors of the economy and often charge interest rates below their 
funding costs. Consequently their profitability suffers and they are not fully 
compensated for this subsidised lending. State banks also carry large amounts 
of non-performing loans which totalled about US$12 billion in 1998, i.e. almost 5 
percent of Turkey's GDP. 
As always, efficiency is harder to measure. Simple measures such as overhead 
expenses to total assets indicate that the Turkish banking system has high 
expenses. In 1997, overhead expenses were about 6 percent of total assets, 
which is high compared to OECD countries. On the other hand, compared to 
other emerging market economies such as Brazil and Argentina, the Turkish 
ratios are not out of line. More detailed econometric studies, however, found 
that efficiency in the system (production efficiency) increased after the reforms 
(Zaim, 1997). 
One other factor that needs to be mentioned is that both the reserve and 
liquidity requirements have been consistently high in Turkey. During most of the 
2 While these were being written, Turkey was rocked with an other financial and banking crisis. The interest rates soared 
up to 6200% while the stock market lost 40% In two days' trading. 
3 Profitability data must be treated with caution. Inflation accounting is not required in Turkey and there are problems 
with the definition of non-performing loans 
Table 4.6: Stnu:tme oftl1e Conllll&lt:lcd Bc.nklng Sacto1 h1 Tmkey 
1930 1981 
"" 
198) 1m 1935 1986 .... 1989 1990 1991 1992 199) 19" 1995 1 ... 1097 1998 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 . 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
State Bank11 49.3 45.4 45.8 48.4 48.8 47.7 46.9 46.3 48.3 51.4 49.9 47.4 48.7 -12.4 44.3 40.7 40.7 36.5 :Jl.7 
Privata Banks 47.6 51.3 50.9 47.6 46.8 48.4 50.5 47.8 45.2 46.3 49 47.4 63.3 52.3 56.2 56.1 56.5 56.7 
Foreign Banks 3.1 3.3 3.3 4 3.8 4 3.3 3.9 3.4 3.8 3.6 3.9 4.3 3.4 3.1 3.2 5 4.6 
Tot.ll D11poshs 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
State Banks 34 322 37.3 40.4 41.6 41.9 40.8 39.9 43.5 48.7 48.6 46.1 50.4 46.5 «.6 43.3 44.1 39.9 40.7 
Privata Banks 63.7 65.4 lll.8 57.3 65.4 65.3 55.6 56.6 52.7 48.2 49 51.8 47.8 51.9 63.4 54 53.4 56.7 56.6 
Foreign Banks 2.3 2.4 1 9 2.3 3.1 2.7 3.6 3.5 :9.8 3.1 2.4 2.1 1.8 1.7 1.9 2.7 25 3.4 2.7 
Tot.ll Loans 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
State Banks 63.4 51.9 46.4 47.2 46.1 48 48.3 52.6 54.7 54.6 46.3 49.3 483 41.2 44.3 44.1 36.9 31.1 31.9 
PrWate Banks «.4 46.1 51.3 50.1 50.4 48.2 48.7 44.5 41.8 41.7 50.1 46B 482 65.6 53.6 63.8 59.1 59.3 64.9 
Foreign Banks 2.2 1.9 2.2 2.8 3.5 3.8 3 2.9 3.4 3.7 3.6 3.9 3.5 3.3 2.1 2.1 1.9 3 3.2 
Bo11nk Profltat.D RoA t 
1980 1!181 1982 198) 198.1 1985 198G 1987 1988 1989 1990 1091 1992 1093 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
o.n 0.17 1.41 0.51 2.21 1.93 165 1.01 2.92 1.28 0.39 -1.31 .o.sa 1.51 0.57 0.2 0.7 0.6 0.7 
Prlvllte Banb 1.00 1.34 0.68 1.75 3.4 2.95 1.4 2.51 3.57 2.61 3.59 3.49 2.54 2.69 3.1 4.9 4.6 3.8 2.7 
Forelun 8o1nkt 4.02 0.43 4.91 8.4 9.27 9.36 8.2 7.04 8.07 5.27 3.65 4.94 4.61 4.71 556 6.4 55 5.7 6 
Notes: 
1. Nominal profits defined as net incoma on IMirageassllts 
Bo1nk Proflto~blll Ro 
1930 1981 1982 1983 19" 1935 198G 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1995 1 ... 1097 1998 
Slolt& 8.1nb 12.2 5.6 245 10.2 :Jl.S 33.4 32.4 25.4 40.4 36.8 33.4 11.9 49.8 57.9 -1.2 4 22.1 17.9 20 
Prlv.lt8 Banks 25.75 35.4 15.2 21.2 39.6 53.4 7.2 16.2 46.4 21.8 42 47.3 40.6 56.5 63.7 n.3 69.6 70.8 
Foralqn Bo~nkt 21.3 12.4 21.8 47.4 61.4 66.5 62.4 55.2 64.2 48.45 45.6 63.1 101.8 73.9 171.1 93 78.8 98.5 100.7 
Source: Banking Association of Turkey 
1980's the required reserve ratios averaged about 16 percent and it was not 
until 1997 that they were gradually reduced to about 6 percent on TL deposits 
and 11 percent on FX deposits. However, liquidity requirements, which could be 
held in the form of treasury securities, were increased from 15 to 30 percent 
during the 1980s as budget deficits grew. After the mid-1990s, these 
requirements were reduced and in 1997, this ratio was reduced to 8 percent. 
High reserve requirements had the effect of encouraging repo transactions at 
the expense of deposits, as these were exempt from the reserve and liquidity 
requirements. Tax treatment of deposit interest income also had a distortionary 
effect. Interest income from deposits is taxable whereas repo income is not. 
Hence, there has been a bias towards repos as an alternative to deposits, 
especially in the last couple of years. 
4.4 Resource Mobilisation and Allocation: 
The analysis of the banking sector so far suggests that reforms enabled banks 
to compete and mobilise funds domestically and internationally. We also 
indicated that because of these reforms, banks developed their human capital 
base by attracting more qualified personnel, and their operations became more 
sophisticated. Given these positive developments, we now focus on the most 
important issue: resource mobilisation and allocation. We consider this below 
and discuss the implications for the financial structure. 
4.4.1 Resource Mobilisation 
Banks mobilise resources by issuing liabilities and it is, therefore, important to 
consider post reform changes in bank liabilities, since the reforms, both on and 
off the balance sheet. The first thing to note is that deregulation allowed banks 
to move from non-price competition, i.e. the establishment of large branch 
networks· and other forms of non-price related customer service, to price 
competition. While, as explained in the previous section, interest rate 
deregulation could not be fully achieved until 1989, the interest rate policy 
followed by the Central Bank gave banks a large degree of freedom to 
determine their own rates. Consequently, banks were able to attract new 
deposits which increased accordingly. As shown in Table 4.6, total deposits 
doubled from 14 percent of GDP in 1986 to 35.8 percent in 1998. In terms of the 
balance sheet, the deposit to total liabilities ratio also increased from 49 percent 
to about 65 percent. Also, there has been a marked change in the composition 
of deposits. FX deposits steadily increased and by 1998, half of total deposits 
were in foreign currencies. This was a direct result of the macroeconomic 
factors discussed earlier and is indicative of the lack of confidence in the 
Turkish currency. While deposits almost doubled, relative to GDP, in 
comparison to other countries, Turkey's ratio is low which suggests there is still 
more to be achieved in this aspect of financial development. During this period 
deposit maturities also shortened. In the 1990s most deposits (both foreign 
exchange and local currency deposits) shifted to 1-3 months maturities, 
reflecting the liquidity preference of the public given the volatile environment 
The next largest change was the amount of foreign liabilities booked to non-
residents. From being almost negligible in 1980, they increased to almost 14 
percent in 1994. 
As shown in Table 4.7, banks increased their capital. base from 1986 to 1990 
and since then it has remained fairly constant. Once again, however, there are 
important differences between state and private banks. While capital relative to 
total liabilities declined in state banks, it increased for both the private and 
foreign banks. 
Off-balance sheet business has also become increasingly important for Turkish 
banks. In fact, it has grown faster than the on balance sheet business and by 
1998 it had reached about US$105 billion, almost as large as the sectors on 
balance sheet business. The off balance sheet items comprised guarantees and 
warranties, foreign exchange and interest rate derivatives and repos. However 
not all of this off-balance sheet business creates resources that can be used for 
investment. For example, guarantees and warranties, which are the largest 
item, only generate fee income and they can create losses for the banks if their 
guarantees are called upon. In most cases, guarantees were in respect of large 
industrial groups' borrowings and amounted to USD 29 billion in 1997. Repos 
on the other hand enable banks to collect funds either from the public or 
corporations, that can be invested elsewhere. Due to reserve requirement 
exemptions and tax advantages, as explained, above repos became good 
substitutes for deposits and have accordingly grown very rapidly in recent 
years, from USD8 billion to almost USD25 billion in 1998. lt is estimated that 
Tt1ble .t.7: Structure of li.lbilities According to Bank Grour•s !~'fl 
1959.64 1965-70 1971-75 1976-80 1981-85 1986-90 1991-98 
Oven1ll Banking Sector 
Deposits 41.1 38.7 51.7 47.5 58.1 58.1 61.3 
Non-Depos~ Funds 3.9 8.9 9.3 7.7 12.9 18.7 17.9 
Other Uabil~ies 38.8 41.6 30.5 39.8 20.5 14.3 11.8 
Shareholders' Equity +Income 16.2 10.9 8.6 4.9 8.5 9 9 
Prlv.1te Banks 
Depos~s 76.5 77.3 83.5 70.2 75.8 69.3 64.4 
Non-Deposit Funds 0 0 0 0 7.7 9.5 14.8 
Other Uabilities 15.8 17.3 12.1 26.6 10.3 11.7 10 
Shareholders' Equ~y +Income 7.7 5.4 4.5 3.2 6.1 9.5 10.8 
State-Owned Banks 
Deposits 28.3 31.2 43 39.5 50.6 58.3 70.1 
Non-Deposit Funds 3.6 1.7 0.5 0.4 11.8 18.3 12.4 
Other Uabil~ies 47.3 52.8 44.6 54 28.7 15.9 11.4 
Shareholders' Equ~y +Income 20.9 14.2 11.9 6.1 8.9 7.6 6 
Foreign B,lnks 
Deposits 53 55.7 67.1 46.5 40.7 56 34.7 
Non-Deposit Funds 0 0 0 0 22.4 13.5 27.6 
Other Uabilnies 40.1 38.7 28.5 49.5 26.8 19.2 14.8 
Shareholders' Equ~y +Income 7 5.6 4.4 4 10.1 11.3 12.4 
Develor,ment and Investment Banks 
Depos~s 0.8 0.9 0.6 2.3 0.5 0 0 
Non-Depos~ Funds 59.4 45.4 60.3 57.8 50.7 69.1 68.9 
Other Uabil~ies 29.7 43.3 30 32.7 28.2 17.9 19.9 
Shareholders' Equity + Income 10.3 10.4 9.1 7.2 20.7 12.9 11.2 
Source: Banking Association of Turkey 
USD15 billion of this was used for investing in treasury securities. Once again 
this development is closely related to the macro environment and indicates the 
public preference for short-term liquid assets when they invest in the Turkish 
Lira assets. it is also possible for Turkish banks to sell foreign exchange for 
future delivery. The available data shows FX and interest rate derivatives 
transactions increased from virtually zero in the late 1980's to about US32 
billion at the end of 1997. 
4.4.2 Resource Allocation 
Banks allocate their funds in a variety of ways as discussed above, for example, 
by investing in loans, government securities, other financial institutions, fixed 
assets, private companies, and the acquisition of assets abroad. In an 
undistorted system, resources should flow to the productive sectors, which yield 
the highest returns. Table 4.8 provides some basic data from bank balance 
sheets since 1980. A number of interesting facts clearly stand out. The first is 
that the lending activity of banks has declined over the years. In 1980, about 
half of bank assets were made up of loans; but by 1998, this percentage had 
declined to about 40 percent. As already indicated state banks distribute credits 
to privileged sectors, such as, agriculture and small businesses and these sort 
of credits accounted for more than 20 percent of total bank lending. If the data is 
adjusted for this privileged lending then bank credit as a percentage of assets 
would be about 34 percent, a level which has been fairly consistent for a 
number of years. 
The distribution of credits suggests that more than 80 percent of bank loans 
were used for working capital or pre-export needs. The maturity structure of 
loans also confirms that most loans financed trade and activities of a short-term 
nature. The maturities of loans, like deposits, are typically less than one year 
and this reduces the risks for banks, but deprives businesses of funds for fixed 
investment. Available data suggest that bank loans for fixed investment could 
be as low as 5 percent of total lending. Among the classified assets of the 
Turkish banks, securities are the next largest item on the balance sheet after 
loans. Data shows that this asset, which is mostly made up of government 
paper, has steadily increased since 1984 and by 1998 it was almost 10 percent 
of total bank assets. If off-balance sheet government and other securities were 
T1lble 4.8: Asset St111cture According to B.lnk Groiii)S {~ .. fl 
1959.64 1965-70 1971-75 1976-80 1981-85 1986-90 1991-98 
OVer.lll Banking Sector 
Liquid Assets 22.5 19.8 24.3 29.5 31.8 36.3 36.7 
Credits 47.9 53.9 55.9 55 46.5 44.1 42 
Tangible Assets 14 10.7. 8.9 5.5 5.2 7.9 7.6 
Other Assets 15.6 15.6 11 10 16.4 11.7 13.7 
Private Banks 
Liquid Assets 45 42.8 41.7 45.7 41 44.2 41.4 
Credits 38.4 44.8 48.7 45.7 43.5 38.3 40.7 
Tangible Assets 9 7.1 5.5 4.4 5.9 8.1 7.1 
Other Assets 7.7 5.4 4 4.1 9.6 9.4 11 
State-Owned Banks 
Liquid Assets 12.4 12.6 17.2 20.7 26.4 32.1 32.4 
Credits 51.6 51.9 !ll.4 53.1 45.3 46.1 40.6 
Tangible Assets 17.9 16.6 14.3 8.5 5.4 8.1 9 
Other Assets 18.1 18.9 18.1 17.8 23.1 13.7 18 
Foreign Banks 
Liquid Assets 49.2 40.7 38.2 47.2 42 48.4 51.8 
Credits 43.3 46.6 51.6 38.7 31.4 38.5 27 
Tangible Assets 2.4 3.3 3.3 2.3 2.1 3 3.5 
Other Assets 5.1 9.4 7 11.9 24.4 10.2 7.3 
Develor,ment and l~tvestment B.lnks 
Liquid Assets 8.6 3.1 2.4 2.3 2.3 12.5 17.4 
Credits 63 77 90.8 83.6 83.6 66.8 64.7 
Tangible Assets 4.6 0.6 1.1 1.3 1.3 7.6 5.3 
Other Assets 23.7 19.3 5.8 12.7 12.7 13.2 12.6 
Source: Banking Association ofTurkey 
added to the total then slightly more than 20 percent of assets would be in 
securities. Inter-bank deposits also increased during the 1980s and 1990s. In 
1980, less than 1 percent of assets were classified as due from banks but by 
1998 this percentage was more than 10 percent. lt is also worthwhile noting that 
the foreign assets of the banking sector increased during 1980-1997 and until 
1997 they exceeded foreign liabilities. 
The analysis of the resource mobilisation and allocation process clearly shows 
the effects of the macroeconomic environment and the regulatory changes 
discussed earlier. Concerning resource mobilisation two observations need to 
be made. First, the analysis suggests that after the reforms banks significantly 
improved their capabilities to raise resources. By 1998, banks, in relation to 
their balance sheets and GDP had more resources than in the pre-1980 period 
and in this sense reforms were successful. However, the deposit and non-
deposit sources that banks mobilised have been very short term and maturity 
transformation by the sector has been limited. 
With respect to resource allocation, it is clear from the analysis that the poor 
economic environment and the regulatory framework limited the effect of the 
reforms. Bank portfolios shifted from lending to the corporate sector to the 
financing of the government. Liquid asset shares, interbank deposits and 
treasury securities, have increased while the share of loans to total assets 
declined. By 1998, banks were holding about 90 percent of the debt of the 
government and 70 percent of domestic debt. This is an indication of the extent 
and magnitude of the crowding-out of the private sector. This also influenced 
the financial structure in general in so much as it altered the composition of the 
stock of financial assets and deterred the private sector from investing in 
alternative assets. 
4.5 Conclusions 
The last attempt of the Turkish government to deflate the economy started in 
early 1998. The publication of the authorities' Memorandum of Economic 
Policies, under the Staff Monitored Programme, in July 1998 provided a positive 
boost to the deflationary efforts of the government. The new government has 
embarked on a strong program designed to free Turkey from high inflationary 
pressures and restore macroeconomic balance within a period of three years. 
This programme which aimed at reducing inflation to a single figure, rests on 
three main pillars: fiscal adjustment, structural reforms, and a firm exchange 
rate policy supported by an incomes policy. Within the context of the structural 
reform agenda, important initial steps were taken to change banking regulation 
and to strengthen the financial structure of the banking sector. 
The experiences of Turkey suggest that financial liberalisation without 
macroeconomic stabilisation and a proper regulatory structure does not 
necessarily lead to an efficient allocation of resources. Financial liberalisation 
and the development of the financial markets are not themselves responsible 
for the distortions described so far. Markets respond to the incentive structure, 
whether they are distorted or not. The public sector in Turkey embarked upon 
the financial reforms with the intention of paving the way for more efficient 
allocation of resources in the economy. However, because it was unable to 
establish fiscal discipline, it ended up creating serious distortions and this 
resulted in a misallocation of resources. Ironically a larger and more capable 
financial system accentuated the impact of the distortions. 
Another finding was that following the reforms there was further financial 
deepening, albeit less than other countries comparable to Turkey. Gultekin et all 
(2000) found that there were improvements in the resource mobilisation 
capacity of the banking sector. The level of both deposit and non-deposit 
sources in bank balance sheets and GDP all increased. External borrowing 
became increasingly important but resource allocation did not improve. Bank 
loans to total assets stagnated in the 1980s and declined in the 1990s. Bank 
portfolios shifted towards liquid government securities and most lending was 
short term, which meant that banks were financing short term-activities. The 
major reason for this was the attractiveness of government securities issued to 
finance the deficits. From a macroeconomic point of view, banks and the private 
sector had significant incentives to lend to the government. 
In addition there were major regulatory problems. The regulatory structure could 
not enforce existing banking laws but there was explicit and implicit support for 
a bank based system. Following the crisis of 1994, the deposit insurance 
scheme was raised to 100 percent and this introduced a serious moral hazard 
problem. Poorly performing and failing banks were kept in the system and this 
did not encourage large industrial groups, which owned these banks, to enter 
the capital markets and raise funds. Industrial groups make up at least half of 
Turkey's GDP and their ability to finance their activities in the banking sector 
had a serious impact on the financial structure. 
The volatile macroeconomic environment also restricted capital market 
development. While capitalisation has increased over time and the stock of 
outstanding securities to GDP showed large increases, government securities 
dominated the capital markets. Primary issues by corporations have been 
minimal and capital markets have not been a significant source of funds for the 
capital sector. By 1988, government bonds accounted for almost 95 percent of 
all new security issues, while common stock issues was about 5 percent. 
However, corporate bond issues virtually came to a halt after 1991. Most of the 
trading on the Istanbul Stock exchange was therefore in government securities. 
The cost of their financial distortions in the Turkish economy has been high. 
Capital formation, capital productivity, and output growth have been slower and 
more volatile than in comparable economies in the last two decades. For a 
country that needs to catch up with more advanced economies, the current 
structure diverts resources away from those firms with growth potential. This is 
most applicable to young and growing firms who have restricted access to 
credit. 
CHAPTER V 
RESULTS OF FINANCIAL LIBERALISATION 
5.1 The Real Economy 
5.1.1 Savings 
One major component of the McKinnon-Shaw line of thought is the hypothesis 
that the flow of savings is positively affected by the real interest rate. This 
controversial hypothesis opposes the ·theoretical ambiguity between the net 
effect of substitution and the income effects arising from a change in the interest 
rates 1. A Summary of the findings is made by Fry who is one of the major 
proponents of the McKinnon-Shaw view: "Those investigators looking for 
1 See end of section for a brief discussion of financial liberalisation and Its effects (in the Appendix section) 
interest sensitivity find it, while those expecting no influence find none. What is 
agreed, however, is that if the effect exists at all it is relatively small" (1978). 
The results of most empirical studies in a number of different developing 
countries indicates that the effect of real interest rates on savings is 
insignificant. In addition, in some of these studies, the coefficients on real 
interest rates are positive, whereas in others they are negative, thereby 
weakening the stance of the McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis. Some recent 
examples of these studies include De Melo and Tybout (1.986) on Uruguay, 
Warmanand Thirlwall (1994) on Mexico, Oshikoya (1992) on Kenya, Hanna 
(1994) on Indonesia, Schmidt Hebbel, Webb and Corsetti (1992) on a cross 
section of 10 countries, Khatkate (1988) on a cross section of 64 countries and 
Giovanni (1985) on a cross section of 64 countries2. 
In an earlier study, Fry (1978) reported, on a pool of seven Asian countries over 
the period 1962-1972, and claimed that expected real interest rates exert a 
positive and significant effect on saving. However, Giovannini (1985) questions 
these results and shows that two observations from Korea (which corresponds 
to the post liberalisation years of 1967 and 1968) exert an unproportional effect 
on the coefficients. Moreover, when they are excluded from the sample, the 
coefficient of real interest rates is no longer significant. Giovannini (1985) also 
reported on the results of a larger sample which incorporated the same seven 
countries (including Korea 1967-1968) examined by Fry. and found the 
coefficient to be insignificant and also negative. 
What has been the Turkish experience? Table 5.1 provides information on 
savings in Turkey in the pre- and post-liberalisation periods3. At first sight, Table 
5.1 shows that stagnation in private savings (as a ratio of GNP)- which started 
to fall in the late 1970s economic crises- continued until 1985 when it started to 
recover. There is a marked jump in the ratio in 1987 from 11.3% to 
2 There are a number of difficulties associated with the empirical estimation of saving functions. These include different 
definitions of saving, data availability, different calculation methods of saving In different countries. 
3 In 1991, the State Institute of Statistics (SIS) started a new GNP series. Later the series was extended untll1987. In 
some cases we need a longer GNP series for comparison. The old GNP series reported, in such cases, for the post-
1991 period, are calculated by extending the 1990 old-series GNP figure by the growth rates of new series. The old 
series, In fact, goes until 1993 but after 1990, instead of being computed independently, the GNP figure for 1990 of the 
old series was raised by the growth rates of the new series. However, the corresponding consumption and savings 
figures are not calculated by the SIS. 
T.'llble 5.1: Savings t~t) 
Savings- Do'llta Set UTt-1!11 
"" "" 
,.., nu .... 1t1S 1,., 1t1T .... .... . ... .. .. 1992 u, .... 199$ .... 1997 Uti .... 
Domestic Saving Ratio (okiGNPst~.s) 21.1 15.0 18.5 15.9 16.2 16.5 18E 21.9 24.1 26.:3 2:3.4 2:3.7 
Private S<Mng Ratio (old GNP ~s) 1:3.0 10.6 9.5 7.6 8.4 9.6 9.1 11.:3 15.6 17.5 17.1 19.1 
Public Saving Ratio (old GNP NMs) 7B 5.4 9.1 8.:3 7.8 6.9 9.8 10.6 8.5 8.8 6.3 4.6 
Domestic Saving Ratio {nmt"GNP!~Mes) 23.9 27.2 22.1 22.0 21.4 21.6 22.7 2:3.1 22.1 19.8 21.3 2:3,1 19,8 
Private sa-.;ng Ratio {MW GNP &ems) 17.3 20.4 17.2 18.6 20.6 21.9 24.5 24.8 22.1 21.5 20.5 25.0 26.2 
Public Saving Ratio~ GNPa~'*sl 8.5 6.8 4.9 3.4 0.6 -1.0 ·2.7 -1.8 .(),1 -1.7 1.0 -1.9 -0.4 
(1) Values are percentage ratio to GNP series. Old GNP series between 1970 and 1997, new GNP series betwaan 1987 and 1999. 
(2) Source: State Planning Organisation 
15.6%1• At the turn of the decade, the private savings rate doubled compared to 
its levels in the first half of the decade and it was also considerably higher than 
the average rate in 1975-1976. Private savings rates derived from the new GNP 
series steadily increased from 17% in 1987 to 22% in 1992 and 24.8% in 1994. 
However, the ratio fell back to 20% in 1997 but then increased to 26.6%in 1999. 
This variable pattern is supported by the total volume of deposits which 
increased from 32.4% in 1995 to 54.5% in 1999. lt is also interesting to note 
that during the same period, interest rates declined, suggesting that there is not 
a positive relationship between savings and interest rates. 
The trend for public savings was the opposite to that of private savings. The 
public sector saving rates remained at relatively high (positive) levels until1988. 
The memo item on the new GNP series in Table 5.1 for the post 1990 period 
shows that after 1988, the public savings rate started to decline, and turned 
negative in 1992. The ratio then remained negative and peaked at -6.4% in 
1999. Consequently, the surplus of savings over investments in the private 
sector started to finance the public sector deficit 2. This is a critical issue and will 
be further discussed later. 
Combining private and public savings, . domestic savings as a ratio to GNP 
started to rise after 1986, exceeding the low levels recorded in the first half of 
the 1980s. The savings rate in 1990 was about 2.5% higher than the average 
rate in 1970-76. The savings rate corresponding to the new GNP series, which 
can be seen from the memo item of Graph 5.2, indicates that savings rates fell 
after 1990, with the exception of 1994 which witnessed a major economic and 
financial crisis. Between 1994 and 1999, the ratio retained its tendency for 
moderate decline, increased slightly in 1997 and 1998 but dropped down to the 
19961evel in 1999. Overall, therefore, there was a slight increase in the savings 
rate after liberalisation. 
This raises the question as to whether the slight increase in the savings rate 
after 1980 reflected the financial liberalisation programmes. In other words, 
does the Turkish experience support the McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis? As it is 
1 In real terms, private saving grew by 45% In 1987. This growth seems to be too high to be explained by the economic 
snuation In 1987 and probably there Is a calculation error, although In interviews wnh authorities they Insisted the figure 
was correct. 
2 Note that the Turkish data for the private sector includes·both households and the corporate sector. 
difficult to disentangle the effects of other economic variables on savings, it 
would be problematic to derive a definitive conclusion from the partial analysis 
made above. As will be seen later in this section, econometric evidence yields 
ambiguous conclusions regarding the effect of interest rates on the private 
savings rate in Turkey in the post-liberalisation period. However, before an 
exposition of the empirical results, a few points need to be mentioned about the 
analysis of savings after liberalisation. First of all, liberalisation had already 
raised real interest rates by the first half of the 1980s but private sector savings 
actually fell in 1983 and did not surpass the 1979 level until 1987. In addition, 
1980 and 1981 were the "banker years" where real interest rates were much 
higher than the official bank rates. Thus, if it is real interest rates which triggered 
private saving, there should have been at least some sign of increased saving 
in the pre-1985 period. 
Secondly, the savings rate figures, irrespective of whether they are expressed 
as a ratio to GNP or private disposable income, are very erratic. In 1987, for 
example, the official figure for private savings recorded a 45% increase in real 
terms. This translated into an increase in the private saving rate of 4.3% from 
11.3% to 15.6%. The real GNP growth rate that year was only 7% and such an 
increase is, therefore hard to explain solely in economic terms. 
Finally, the increase in the savings rate in the post-1980 period may well be a 
continuation of the trend that started after 1950. Indeed, the national savings 
rate had increased from 9.2% in 1950 to 12.7% in 1960 and reached an 
average value of 21.2% in 1970-76 period. 
The econometric evidence presented in studies on savings in Turkey is not 
conclusive. Onis and Riedel (1993) find a positive and statistically significant 
relation between savings and the real after tax deposit rate for the period 1965-
1986. They use the ratio of real private savings to real private disposable 
income as the dependent variable. 
Fry (1978) found a positive relationship between the real interest rate and 
national savings for 1957-1977. As an extension of Fry (1978), Rittenberg 
(1988) regressed the ratio of national savings to GDP on the real deposit rate 
for 1961-1985. These findings suggest that the effect of the real interest rate on 
savings is statistically insignificant. However, when dummy variables taking the 
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Graph 5.2: Private and public sector savings-investment balance 
---Private Saving -Investment Difference 
• • • • • • ·Foreign Saving 
···-············· Consolidated Budget Total Interest Payments I GNP 
·················· Consolidated Budget Total Deficit I GNP 
--- - Public Saving- Investment Difference 
- • ·- • Consolidated Budget Primary Deficit I GNP 
- - Consolidated Budget Domestic Interest Payments I GNP 
value of 1 (for the post-liberalisation period) are included the coefficient of the 
real interest rate becomes significant. Rittenberg also found a significant 
coefficient for the real interest rates for the ratio of private saving to disposable 
income. 
Uygur (1993) found that the interest elasticity coefficient was insignificant. He 
used national savings and the real after tax deposit rate for the periods 1965-
1990, ·1969-1990 and 1971-1990. He also found that the ratio of total time 
deposits to GNP has a negative coefficient and interprets this as a negative 
wealth effect on savings. 
The results of empirical studies on interest elasticity of savings in Turkey, thus, 
do not provide any definitive conclusions. One point that stands out in these 
studies however is that the level of income is consistently significant. 
5.1.2 Public sector savings behaviour and the interaction with private 
savings 
An important development after liberalisation was the increased public sector 
borrowing requirement (PSBR). The PSBR/GNP ratio increased from 2.8% in 
1986 to 9. 7% in 1993. In the 1994 crisis, it dropped back to 5.5% but then 
increased to 7.0% in 1996 and to 12.6% in 1999. 
In order to explain the increase in PSBR we must consider that it is equivalent 
to the difference between public sector savings (defined as pubiic revenues 
minus current expenditures minus transfers) and public sector investments. At 
first glance one would suspect that public investments are responsible for 
increases in PSBR. However, public sector investments stayed constant at 
around 10-12% of GNP during the period 1975-1993 (except for two outliers). In 
addition, investment levels declined to 5. 8% of GNP between 1994 and 1999. 
Hence, it can be concluded that public investments did not play a role in 
increased PSBR except for the two outlier years of 1986 and 1987. 
Financial liberalisation had been an important factor in increasing PSBR via 
increased borrowing costs1 which raised current expenditure and reduced 
public sector savings2 (see graph 5.1 ). In other words, a direct effect of financial 
1 The other major reason was Increased personnel expenditures after 1989. 
2 See Snow den (1996) and Dornbusch and Reynose (1989) on the possible effects of liberalisation on budget balance. 
liberalisation on the public sector balance was to increase its borrowing costs. 
An inability to increase revenue also kept PSBR growing and effectively turned 
the situation into a vicious cycle. 
The process was accelerated by the monetary programme of the Central Bank 
which was unofficially implemented in 1989 but officially introduced in 1990. The 
deterioration in the public sector balance accelerated after 1990 as can be seen 
in Table 5.3. The programme effectively limited the part of the deficit financed 
by the Central Bank in an attempt to keep monetary expansion under control. 
This forced the Treasury to increase its borrowing and pushed up interest rates 
continuously after 1990. In fact, the initial impact of the monetary programme on 
total interest payments (and thus the public sector balance) was through 
increased borrowing costs. However, increased public sector borrowing also 
began to push up interest rates as seen in Table 5.33. 
The ratio of primary deficit (non-interest deficit) to GNP in the government's 
consolidated balance sheet (which constitutes about three quarters of public 
sector revenue and expenditure) was below 1% in the period of 1981-1987 but 
showed surpluses in 1988-1990. Since 1990 the ratio has shown negative 
values with the exception of 1994 and 1998. The deterioration in the public 
sector balance is a sign of the continuing increase in interest payments. The 
ratio of total interest payments (domestic and external borrowing) to GNP rose 
from 1.2% in 1981 to 4.8% in 1989. Likewise the ratio was 7.5% in 1994, 9.9% 
in 1996 and 12.9% in 1999 the ratio of interest expenditures on domestic 
borrowing to GNP rose from 0.6% in 1981 to 2.1% in 1989. The acceleration 
came after 1985, the year when the auction system for government securities 
and the liberalisation programme were introduced. The ratio increased to 1.7% 
in 1986 and continued increasing throughout the 1990s reflecting increased 
personal expenditure. 
The above discussion centres around the effect financial liberalisation had on 
the public sector's balance in terms of increased PSBR. An important related 
question is how was the growing PSBR financed? The earlier discussion on 
private savings shows that the private sector (household plus the corporate 
3 lt Is worth noting that elections and Gulf War played a further role In the detertoration of the public sector balance in 
1991. 
Table 5.3 : Interest rates and financial yields 
1984 1985 1988 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1995 1997 1998 1999 
DEPOSITS 
3-Month Nominal NA 45.5 38.7 35.0 49.1 53.5 47.8 62.8 68.6 64.6 87.8 79.5 79.7 83.2 62.9 72.3 
3-Month Real NA 6.7 10.7 -9.8 -9.3 0.6 -2.1 4.5 13.4 6.4 -1.9 
6-Month Nominal 49.3 51.2 44.8 38.1 55.6 56.3 49.8 63.9 69.4 69.3 88.8 83.3 84.6 91.5 86.0 69.0 
6-Month Real 3.8 9.4 14.6 -8.6 -6.8 -0.1 -2.8 1.6 9.3 6.0 -7.5 
12-Month Nominal 45.0 50.1 50.6 43.3 70.2 65.8 57.5 66.2 73.8 74.8 102.6 91.3 93.8 96.6 95.5 72.2 
12-Month Real -3.1 4.1 15.6 -7.6 -2.9 0.9 -1.8 -3.1 4.7 2.2 -10.2 
GOVERNMENT PAPER 
3-Month Nominal NA NA 43.6 42.8 55.6 49.6 47.6 68.4 74.4 70.7 102.4 NA 86.4 NA 
3-Month Real NA NA 15.7 -3.2 -3.9 -2.9 -2.3 97.0 19.2 12.1 10.4 
6-Month Nominal NA NA 49.6 45.2 57.8 53.0 49.0 69.0 74.0 73.0 113.0 107.7 96.1 86.0 
6-Month Real NA NA 19.2 -3.1 -5.2 -2.6 -3.4 5.5 13.1 8.9 8.6 
12-Month Nominal 43.0 50.6 51.0 47.0 62.4 68.3 51.9 . 72.1 75.4 86.4 118.7 118.8 99.4 NA 
12-Month Real -4.5 4.4 15.5 -5.2 -7.3 -3.7 -5.3 0.4 5.7 8.9 -3.0 
CORPORATE BONDS 
12-Month Nominal NA NA 55.3 53.7 74.6 72.0 62.0 76.8 80.7 64.9 117.3 
12-Month Real NA NA 18.8 -0.9 -0.3 4.7 1.0 3.1 8.8 8.1 -3.6 
lSE ANNUAL RETURNS 
Nominal NA NA 70.9 294.0 -44.0 493.0 46.0 34.0 -9.0 416.0 32.0 50.0 140.0 70.0 -20.0 480.0 
Real NA NA 30.8 154.0 -68.0 250.9 -9.0 -21.8 -45.2 201.6 -41.5 -34.0 62.0 14.0 -80.0 232.0 
Shorter maturities "Hill be compounded 
Source: Capital Marke1s Board, The Central Bank, The Treasury 
sector) ran a growing surplus of savings over investments after 1985, the de 
facto start of the liberalisation. 
government's growing deficit1. 
Thus the private sector financed the 
The mechanism behind this crowding out phenomenon, was at first, favourable 
interest rates on government paper with low risk compared to other financial 
and real assets. In addition to the tax advantages of government paper a 
number of regulations regarding reserve ratios and liquidity requirements 
encouraged banks to hold an increased amount of government securities2. In 
general, therefore, the private sector financed the public sector deficit. 
5.1.3 Private Investment 
From the aggregated private investment figures, it can be concluded that 
liberalisation did not cause the increase in private investments as suggested by 
the McKinnon-Shaw hypothesises. The relative stagnation in private sector 
investments, combined with the relative increase in private savings suggests 
that the private sector financed the public sector deficit. The ratio of private 
investments to GNP stayed in the range of 11-13% in the period of 1968-1979. 
In the 1980-90 period, the investment ratio was on average about 10.9% 
whereas it was 11.7% in the 1970-76 period (see Table 5.4). The new GNP 
series show that, on average, the private investments/GNP ratio increased in 
the period of 1990-94. The average private investments/GNP ratio was 15.7% 
in 1987-1990 and 17.4% in 1990-1994. The same ratio for the period 1995-
1999 was 18.9%, representing a further increase over the 1990-1994 period. 
The major reason for the stagnation of private investments between 1980-1994 
in spite of increased private savings, was the high real yields on financial assets 
which reduced the attractiveness of physical investments. Theoretically, the 
yield on financial assets and physical assets should be equalised after 
1 Snowdon (1996) shows. in the context of a simple model, that Increases In primary (non-interest) budget deficfi and 
nominal Interest have a direct reduction effect on the growth rate of bank lending to the private sector. On the other 
hand, if the government opts to Increase monetisatlon, than this will likely lead to a rise In the nominal interest rates and 
thus, again the growth of bank lending to private agents will decrease. Though the model assumes, for simplicity, that 
the government borrows only from the banks, the main conclusions of the exercise are general to security issues as 
well. 
2 The reserve ratios were lowered after 1980 while liquidity ratios were gradually raised. Liquidity requirements forced 
banks to hold government paper. However, generally speaking banks hold government paper In excess of the 
requirements due to mentioned high yields on government paper. One source estimated that banks' voluntary holdings 
of government securnes amounted to 13.7% at the end of 1990 and went up as much as 18.5% In 1991 (Akkurt et at 
1992). All this shifted the Interest expenditure burden from the Central Bank which used to pay Interest on bank 
reserves to the Treasury, of course with an amplification factor. 
Table 5.4: Investment 
Investment- Oata Set 1970-1976 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Total Investment Ratio( old GNP series) 21.1 19.7 19.0 18.0 18.8 17.9 20.0 23.1 24.0 24.0 22.3 22.4 
Private Sector Investment (old GNP series) 9.0 9.3 7.9 8.0 8.3 8.2 8.4 9.8 11.2 12.6 12.2 12.7 
Public Sector Investment RatiO( old GNP series) 11.7 10.4 11.0 9.9 10.5 9.7 11.6 13.3 12.8 11.4 10.1 9.7 
Total Investment RatiO( new GNP series) 24.6 26.1 22.5 22.8 23.5 22.8 25.3 24.2 25.3 24.6 25.1 23.8 22.7 
Private Sector Investment Ratio (new GNP series) 14.7 17.3 15.0 15.7 18.1 15.5 18.4 19.4 19.8 20.0 20.4 18.4 16.0 
Public Sector Investment Rat!O{runy GNPserfes! 9.8 8.8 7.5 8.9 7.4 7.3 6.9 4.8 5.5 4.6 5.1 5.4 6.7 
(1) Values-p~ge r.tlloto GNP series. Old GNP ter!MbttwMn1970 .. d 1987, n- GNP .-inbetwae11 1987 and 
(2)"SOI.I'Ct: state Plemlng 
controlling for risk. However, in Turkey's case, the growing borrowing needs of 
the public sector introduced a wedge between the returns on financial and 
physical or tangible assets. 
In addition to the relatively higher yields in the financial sector, a growing 
literature base investigates the effect of policy uncertainty and politics on 
investment. In particular, Conway (1991) and Ozler and Rodrik (1992) show that 
uncertainty in relative prices has a negative impact on private investment 
decisions. This may explain why the investment ratio increased in the second 
half of the 1990s, when there was political stability and economic growth. 
5.1.4 The composition of private investments 
The post 1980 period witnessed sharp changes in the composition of private 
investments. The major trend was a decline in two of the three productive 
sectors (manufacturing, agriculture and mining) and the share of productive 
investment in total private investment fell from 48.5% in 1981 to 33.6% in 1990. 
The share of private manufacturing investments which remained at around 40-
44% in the 1970-76 period fell to 33-35% in 1981-986. In the 1986-1989 period, 
it further to a low of 21.2% in 1989 and in 1990, it recovered and reached 
27.5%. The trend in agricultural investment was similar: from a range of 10-12% 
in 1970-76 anq 12-13% in 1981-1985, it then started to fall after 1985 eventually 
declining to 4.9% in 1990. 
The decline in productive sector investments coincided with a rise in housing 
construction and tourism investment. Housing investment had been around 27-
36% of total private investment in 1970-76 and started to rise during the crisis 
years of 1978 and 1979. (35.9% and 43.8% respectively). In the 1981-1984 
period it fell and stayed at around 28%. However after 1984, it started to rise 
again, reaching 50% in 1989. In the 1990s, it has remained above 40%. The 
share of tourism investment also went up from 0.8% in 1981 to 6.2% in 1990. 
In short, the effect of financial liberalisation on overall private investment relative 
to GNP was not decisively positive. However, there have been important 
changes in the composition of private investment, mainly in the form of a 
reduction in the share of the productive sectors in favour of housing 
construction and tourism. 
5.1.5 Growth performance of the Economy 
The growth of the economy in the post liberalisation period, similarly, does not 
fully support the McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis. it can be seen in Table 5.5 that, 
excluding the crisis years of 1977-1980 and 1994, the average annual growth 
rate of the economy in the 1963-1976 period was 6.9%; markedly higher than 
the average rate during 1981-1993. Relatively lower growth rates in the post-
1980 period compared, to the pre-liberalisation, years are also evident when 
sub-periods are observed. For example, if we disregard the 1981-1985 period 
and take 1986 as the fully fledged starting year of liberalisation, the average 
growth rate during 1986-1993 was lower than that of the 1963-1969 and the 
1970-1976 period. However, the period after 1994 is typified by significantly 
higher growth rates with an average of 6.78%. 
Tablt 6.5 : lntlr.lllllte• .,d flnanclll ytellho 
1963-1 1979-1976 1977.1980 1981 1982 1983 19~ 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 19S4 1995 199tl 1997 1998 1999 
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5.2 The Financial Markets 
5.2.1 Interest rates 
The level of deposit interest rates after liberalisation has already been 
explained. Table 5.5 presents the nominal and ex-post real interest rates for 
deposits and government paper, together with the returns on the Istanbul Stock 
Exchange Index. One point that immediately attracts attention is the high 
borrowing costs of the public sector. Nominal interest rates on government 
paper has been periodically close to and at times higher than the bank deposit 
interest rates. Given the relative high risk of deposits and their unfavourable tax 
treatment, one would expect bank deposit rates be higher than interest rates on 
government securities. 
The wedge between the average interest on corporate bonds and government 
paper perhaps give a better measure of risk return characteristics. This wedge 
gets smaller after 1990 and turns negative in 1993 and 1994, again indicating 
an irrational risk return structure. 
Interest rates on credit increased rapidly after liberalisation in 1980. However, in 
contrast to deposit interest rates, the government did not intervene in the post 
liberalisation period. Consequently, the effective nominal costs for bank 
borrowers was above 80% in the post liberalisation period. 
5.2.2 Bank deposits 
The share of Foreign Exchange Deposits (FED) to total deposits (including 
COs) became increasingly important after 1983. Zaim (1995) found that in 
considering deposit and credit outputs, financial liberalisation increased 
technical and allocative efficiency in commercial banking. The ratio for total 
deposits to GNP increased from 22.2% in 1982 to a peak of 29,3% in 1987. 
Between 1988 and 1993 it remained above 24.9% except for 1990 and 1993. 
The ratio averaged 25.3% in the 1982-94 period, some 7% greater than the 
1968-77 period when the around was only 18.5%. However, after the crisis in 
1994, the ratio soared to average 41.9% for the remainder of the decade. 
The main driving force behind this increase was foreign exchange deposits 
(FED). The ratio of FED to GNP went up from 2.3% in 1984 to 7.4% in 1990 
making FED one of the largest components of deposits and also indicating a 
growing tendency for currency substitution. 
Another important development was the increased share of time deposits in 
total deposits. This was triggered by differences between sight and time deposit 
interest rates. The share of time deposits in household saving went up from 
43% in 1980 and 69% in 1981 to over 80% after 1984. Similarly, the share of 
the denominated time deposits increased from 27% in 1980 and 47.6% in 1981 
to over 60% after 1984. 
The overall conclusion is that total deposits in relation to GNP increased by an 
average of 7% after liberalisation compared to 1970-76. Though this increase 
cannot be ignored, the ratio is still relatively low. However, liberalisation was 
instrumental in attracting funds to the banking sector and extending the term 
structure of deposits. 
5.2.3 Credits 
The ratio of bank credits (which here includes commercial banks and the 
Development Finance Institutions -DFis) to GNP averaged 20.1% during the 
1982-1994 period. This represented a 2% increase compared to the 1968-1976 
period. Thus after liberalisation, credit supply increased relative to the size of 
GNP. However this increase was quite small compared to that of total deposits. 
Moreover, the ratio of medium and long term credits to GNP showed a drastic 
fall from above 5% in 1981 -1984 to 2.5% in 1993. About half of the total 
medium and long term credits were extended by the DFis which also provided 
short term working capital credits. Total medium and long term credits extended 
by the commercial banks was therefore slightly in excess of 1% of GNP. 
Bank participations in corporations, which is another kind of term finance, 
became relatively more important. The ratio of participations to GNP rose from 
0. 9% in 1982 to 1 .1% in 1983 and 1.5 in 1987. The trend however was partially 
reversed after 1990 and the ratio fell to 0.9% in 1993 and 1994. However, given 
the decline in medium and long term credits, the relative importance of 
participations increased. 
In general, credit in relation to GNP slightly increased but term finance followed 
a declining trend throughout the decade. It can thus be concluded that financial 
liberalisation, so far as bank lending was concerned, did not improve the 
financing of private investments. Consistent with this conclusion, Atiyas and 
Erse! (1992) argued that corporate reliance on internal funds did not change 
after liberalisation. 
CHAPTER VI 
STOCK MARKET DEVELOPMENT 
REFLECTIONS ON ISTANBUL STOCK EXCHANGE 
6.1 Introduction 
One of the most enduring debates in economics is whether financial 
development causes economic growth or whether it is a consequence of 
increased economic activity. Historically, economists have focused on banks. 
Waiter Bagehot (1873) and Joseph Schumpeter (1912) emphasize the critical 
importance of the banking system in economic growth and highlight 
circumstances when banks can actively spur innovation and future growth by 
identifying and funding productive investments. In contrast, Robert E. Lucas 
(1988) states that economists 'badly overstress' the role of the financial system, 
and Joan Robinson (1952) argues that banks respond passively to economic 
growth ("where enterprise leads finance follows"). Empirically, Robert G. King 
and Ross Levine (1993a) show that the level of financial intermediation is a 
good predictor of long-run rates of economic growth, capital accumulation, and 
productivity improvements (see Filer et. al., 2000; Levine and Zervos, 2001 ). 
Ever since the pioneering contributions of Gurley and Shaw (1955, 1967), 
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973), the relationship between financial 
development and economic growth has been an important topic of debate. 
Numerous studies have dealt with different aspects of this relationship at both 
the theoretical and empirical levels. The broadest division of a financial system 
is between financial intermediaries (banks, insurance companies, and pension 
funds) and capital markets (bond and stock markets). A large part of an 
economy's savings is intermediated towards productive investments through 
financial intermediaries and capital markets. Since the rate of capital 
accumulation is a fundamental determinant of long-term growth, an efficient 
financial system is essential for a economic development. 
Earlier research emphasized the role of the banking sector in economic growth. 
In the past decade, however, the stock markets have grown in importance. 
Recent research has, accordingly, begun to focus on the linkages between the 
stock markets and economic development. New theoretical work shows how 
stock market development might boost long-term economic growth, and 
empirical evidence appears to support this view. For example, Demirguc-Kunt 
and Levine (1996a), Singh (1997), and Levine and Zervos (1998, 2001) find that 
stock market development plays an important role in determining future 
economic growth. The World Bank Economic Review also dedicates its May 
1996 issue to the role of stock markets in economic growth. 
it is by now widely recognized that a well functioning comprehensive financial 
system is crucial to economic growth. The question as to what exactly 
determines stock market development is, therefore, important. However, 
surprisingly, inadequate amount of academic work has been undertaken in this 
area. 
Traditionally, the view has been taken that indirect finance through financial 
intermediaries is more important than direct finance through the capital markets, 
especially in developing countries. Therefore, most existing literature focuses 
on the contributions of financial intermediaries to economic growth. Numerous 
empirical tests have shown that a number of financial variables have an 
important impact on economic growth. However, most of the evidence uses 
bank-based measures of financial development, such as, the ratio of liquid 
liabilities to GDP or the ratio of domestic credit to the private sector divided to 
GDP etc. Not until recently has emphasis increasingly shifted to stock market 
indicators, for example, Atje and Jovanovic (1993) test the hypothesis that stock 
markets have a positive impact on economic growth and performance. They 
found significant correlations between economic growth and the value of stock 
market trading relative to GDP for 40 countries over the period 1980-88. 
Similarly, Levine and Zervos (1996, 1998) and Singh (1997) showed that stock 
market development is strongly and positively related to long-run economic 
growth. 
In another study, Levine and Zervos (2001) studied the empirical relationship 
between various measures of stock market development, banking development, 
and long-run economic growth. They find that, even after controlling for many 
factors associated with growth, stock market liquidity and banking development 
are both positively and robustly correlated with contemporaneous and future 
rates of economic growth, capital accumulation, and productivity growth. "This 
result is consistent with the view that a greater ability to trade ownership of an 
economy's productive technologies facilitates efficient resource allocation, 
physical capital formation, and faster economic growth. Furthermore, since 
measures of stock market liquidity and banking development both enter the 
growth regressions significantly, the findings suggest that banks provided 
different financial services from those provided by stock markets. Thus, to 
understand the relationship between the financial system and long-run growth 
more comprehensively, we need theories in which both stock markets and 
banks arise and develop simultaneously while providing different bundles of 
financial services to the economy. They find no support for the contentions that 
stock market liquidity, international capital market integration, or stock return 
volatility reduce private saving rates or hinder long-run growth" (Levine and 
Zervos, 2001) 
Existing models suggest that stock market development is a multifaceted 
concept, involving issues of market size, liquidity, volatility, concentration, 
integration with world capital markets and institutional development1. Using data 
·on 44 developed and emerging markets from 1986 to 1993, Demirguc-Kunt and 
1 This section has been cited from Valeriano F Garcia and Lin Llu, 2001, Macroeconomic determinants of stock market 
development, Michigan University 
Levine (1996a) found that large stock markets are more liquid, less volatile, and 
more internationally integrated than smaller markets. 
Furthermore, institutionally developed markets with strong information 
disclosure laws, international accounting standards, and unrestricted capital 
flows are larger and more liquid. Theory also points out a rich array of channels 
through which stock markets may be linked to economic growth. For example, 
Pagano (1993) showed the increased risk-sharing benefits from larger stock 
markets through market externalities, while Levine (1991) and Bencivenga, 
Smith, and Starr (1995) showed that stock markets may affect economic activity 
through the creation of liquidity. Similarly, Devereux and Smith (1994) and 
Obstfeld (1994) showed that risk diversification through internationally 
integrated stock markets is another method through which stock markets can 
affect economic growth. Theorists have also examined stock return volatility. 
For example, Delong et.al. (1989) argue that excess volatility in the stock 
market can hinder investment, and therefore economic growth. 
6.2 Stock Market Development and Economic Growth 1 
There is an expanding theoretical literature on the links between stock markets 
and long-run growth, but very little empirical evidence on this subject exists. 
Levine (1991) and Valerie R. Bencivenga, Bruce D. Smith, and Ross M. Starr 
(1995) derive models where more liquid stock markets - markets where it is 
less expensive to trade equities - reduce the disincentives to investing in long 
duration projects because investors can easily sell their stake in the project if 
they need their savings before the project matures. Enhanced liquidity, 
therefore, facilitates investment in longer-run, higher-return projects that boost 
productivity growth. Similarly, Michael B. Devereux and Gregor W. Smith (1994) 
and Maurice Obstfeld (1994) show that greater international risk-sharing 
through internationally integrated stock markets induces a portfolio shift from 
safe, low-return investments to high-return investments, thereby accelerating 
productivity growth. These liquidity and risk models, however, also imply that 
greater liquidity and international capital market integration ambiguously affect 
saving rates. In fact, higher returns and better risk-sharing may induce saving 
rates to fall enough such that overall growth slows with more liquid and 
internationally integrated financial markets. Moreover, theoretical debate exists 
about whether greater stock market liquidity actually encourages a shift to 
higher-return projects that stimulate productivity growth. Since more liquidity 
makes it easier to sell shares, some argue that ·more liquidity reduces the 
incentives of shareholders to undertake the costly task of monitoring managers 
(Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny 1986; and Amar Bhide 1993). In turn, 
weaker corporate governance impedes effective resource allocation and slows 
productivity growth. Thus, theoretical debate persists over the links between 
economic growth and the functioning of stock markets (Levine and Zervos, 
2001 ). 
The academic literature does not provide a unique concept of stock market 
development to guide empirical research. Nevertheless, there are some general 
conditions: the size of the banking system, the amount of credit going to private 
firms, the size of non-bank financial institutions, and the size of private 
insurance and pension companies.(Demirguc;:-Kunt and Levine 1996. p.291-
337; Korojczyk, 1996. p. 267-289). 
Broadly speaking, stock exchanges are expected to accelerate economic 
growth by several possible mechanisms. Among these are: 
1. The fact that a more developed equity market may provide liquidity that 
lowers the cost of the foreign capital essential for development, 
especially in low-income countries that cannot generate sufficient 
domestic savings. 
2. The role of equity markets in providing proper incentives for managers 
to make investment decisions that affect firm value over a longer time 
period than the managers' employment horizons through equity-based 
compensation schemes. 
3. The ability of equity markets to generate information about the 
innovative activity of entrepreneurs (King and Levine, 1993b) or the 
aggregate state of technology. 
4. The role of equity markets in providing portfolio diversification, enabling 
individual firms to engage in specialized production, with resulting 
efficiency gains. 
5. The fact that diverse equity ownership creates a constituency for 
political stability, which, in turn, promotes growth (Filer et all 2000). 
As mentioned above, Levine (1991) and Benchivenga, Smith and Starr (1996) 
emphasize the positive role of liquidity provided by stock exchanges on the size 
of new real asset investments through common stock financing. Investors are 
more easily persuaded to invest in common stocks, when there is little doubt on 
their marketability in stock exchanges. This, in turn, motivates corporations to 
go to public when they need more finance to invest in capital goods. Although 
some contrary opinions do exist regarding the impact of liquidity on the volume 
of savings, arguing that the desire for a higher level of liquidity works against 
propensity to save (Benchivenga and Smith, 1991), (Japelli and Pagano 1994), 
such ·arguments are not well supported by empirical evidence. 
In addition, stock prices determined in exchanges, and other publicly available 
information help investors make better investment decisions. Better investment 
decisions by investors mean better allocation of funds among corporations and, 
as a result, a higher rate of economic growth. In efficient capital markets, prices 
already reflect all available information, and this reduces the need for expensive 
and painstaking efforts to obtain additional information (Stiglitz 1994). 
Stock markets are places where corporate control mechanism is at work. As the 
economic performance of corporations is reflected in, and measured by, stock 
prices, corporate managers would try hard to minimize agency problems and to 
maximize shareholders' wealth. In a market economy the link between 
corporate profits and economic growth is quite obvious. Stock exchanges are 
also expected to increase the amount of savings channelled to corporate sector. 
Some evidence can be found in the work of Greenwood and Jovanovich (1990). 
Another important contribution of stock exchanges to economic growth is 
through global risk diversification opportunities they offer. Saint-Paul (1992), 
Deveraux and Smith (1994) and Obstfeld (1994) argue quite plausibly that 
opportunities for risk reduction through global diversification make high- risk-
high return domestic and international projects viable, and,. consequently, 
allocate savings between investment opportunities more efficiently. Whether 
global diversification might reduce the rate of domestic savings (Deveraux and 
Smith 1994) seems to be a weak argument as it is not convincingly evidenced. 
One empirical research investigating causal relationships between stock 
exchanges and economic growth belongs to Levine and Zervos (1998). Using 
cross-country data for 47 countries from 1976-93, Levine and Zervos found that 
stock market liquidity is positively and significantly correlated with current and 
future rates of economic growth, even after controlling for economic and political 
factors. They also found that measures of both stock market liquidity and 
banking development significantly predict future rates of economic growth. They 
concluded, therefore, that stock markets provide important but crucially different 
types of financial services compared to banks. One of the financial deepening 
indicators used in the analysis was the level of development of stock exchange 
measured by a composite index combining volume, liquidity and diversification 
indicators. Economic growth indicator selected, on the other hand, was the real 
growth rate in per capita GDP. Levine and Zervos reported a very strong 
positive correlation between stock market development and economic growth. 
The most interesting aspect of this study was the decrease in the statistical 
significance of other financial deepening variables after stock market 
development index was included in regression equation. According to the 
authors this was the proof that stock market development was more influential 
than other financial deepening indicators on the growth of the economy2• 
Using data from 44 industrial and developing countries from 1976 to 1993, 
Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1996a) investigated the relationships between stock 
market development and financial intermediary development as well. They 
found that countries with better-developed stock markets also had better-
developed financial intermediaries. Accordingly, they concluded that stock 
market development goes hand-in-hand with financial intermediary 
development. 
All of these studies face a number of potential problems. In particular, they must 
deal with issues of causality and unmeasured cross-country heterogeneity in 
factors such as savings rates that may cause both higher growth rates and 
greater financial-sector development (see Caselli et. al., 1996). 
2 As mentioned earfier, devising an indicator for stock market development is not an easy task at 
all. Ideally, such an indicator should simuHaneously reflect liquidity, volume of transactions, 
infonnational efficiency, degree of concentration, volatility, depth, legal and institutional and 
other factors that detennine the overall perfonnance of a stock exchange. 
A more difficult question arises with respect to whether the forward-looking 
nature of stock prices could be driving apparent causality between stock 
markets and growth. Current stock market prices should represent the present 
discounted value of future profits. In an efficient equity market, future growth 
rates will, therefore, be reflected in initial prices. This argues for using turnover · 
(sales over market capitalization) as the primary measure of development, 
thereby purging the spurious causality effect because higher prices in 
anticipation of greater growth. would affect both the numerator and the 
denominator of the ratio (Filer et al, 2000). 
Other studies on this topic include Thornton (1995) who analyzes 22 developing 
economies with mixed results although for some countries there was evidence 
that financial deepening promoted growth. Luintel and Khan (1999) study 10 
developing economies and find bi-directional causality between financial 
development and economic growth in all the sample countries. Spears (1991) 
reports that in the early stages of development financial intermediation induced 
economic growth. According to the International Federation of Stock Exchanges 
some exchanges count as turnover only transactions that pass through their 
trading systems while others include off-market transactions subject to 
supervision by the market authority. In addition some sources compute turnover 
as annual sales over market capitalization averaged over the past twelve 
months, while others u_se the average of monthly sales to monthly market 
capitalization. in Sub-Saharan Africa, while Ahmed and Ansari (1998) report 
similar results for three major South-Asian economies. Demetriades and 
Hussain (1996) report "very little evidence that finance is a leading sector in the 
process of economic growth" in a sample of 1 0 countries, while Neusser and 
Kugler (1998) report that financial sector is not playing an importance. Finally, 
Rousseau and Wachtel (2000) analyze 47 economies and report that greater 
financial sector development leads to increased economic activity (Filer et al, 
2000). 
In summary, empirical research has suggested a possible connection between 
stock market development and economic growth, but is far from definitive. 
Although the relationship postulated is a causal one, most empirical studies 
have addressed causality obliquely, if at all. Moreover, most studies have not 
adequately dealt with the fact that efficient markets should incorporate expected 
future growth into current period prices (Filer et al 2000). 
On the contrary, Filer et all (2000), in their study, find that there is little 
relationship between stock market activity and future economic growth, 
especially for the lower income countries in their sample and there is evidence 
that stock market activity does cause appreciation in currency rates. The results 
of this research suggest that, while a developed equity market may play several 
roles in a modern economy, none of these appear to be essential for economic 
growth. Where such a market does not exist alternative channels appear to be 
equally effective (or ineffective) in allocating capital in growth promoting ways. 
In the light of these discussions, the establishment of Istanbul Stock Exchange 
(lSE) in 1986, and the large momentum it has gained since then, has provoked 
considerable academic curiosity about the causal relationships between lSE 
and the country's economic growth. Nevertheless, the topics tackled and 
subjects chosen to investigate failed to go in detail, both in terms of content and 
context. In addition, the stock market performances are only temporary unless 
there are positive and stable developments in the main economic indicators. In 
order to get the desired performance from the capital and stock market, it is 
' necessary to stabilise basic economic indicators by reducing inflation and 
interest rates, and decreasing budget deficits, which were all lacking in Turkish 
case. 
6.3 Turkish Stock Market Development 
6.3.1 Some History 
The Capital Market Act numbered 2499 was passed in 1981 and marked the 
birth of Turkey's modern stock exchange. Subsequently, the Capital Market Act 
was established with the aim of regulating floatation and supervising other stock 
market operations. Turkey. applied an outward-looking economic model after 
1980 and introduced measure to increase efficiency of allocation and operation 
in the financial sector. In the period 1981-1983, priority was given to the control 
of inflation and the promotion of exports. However, emphasis was placed on 
deregulation and this resulted in the bankers' crises of 1982. In order to resolve 
some of the emerging problems, independent external auditors put legislative 
arrangements into operation to provide supervision of banks and other 
intermediaries. In the secon~ period of financial deregulation (1984-1987) 
institutional arrangements took place. Priority was given to financial markets, 
rules were fixed, and regulatory and supervisory bodies were defined. The 
period 1988-1991 was seen as period of "fatigue" (Toprak, 1992. p. 217) and it 
was recognised that there was a clear need to make new arrangements for the 
capital markets, which were showing rapid development. A review was 
accordingly made in the 2499th and the 3797th Acts of 1981 and 1987. 
The objectives . of these arrangements, which aimed to promote the 
development of capital markets, can be summarised as follow: The main 
objective was to provide sufficient funds to finance company investments 
because of the inadequate resources of banks. Secondly, they aim to 
encourage the public to take part in the management of some companies by 
participating in IPOs; Thirdly, to provide less expensive funds through the 
selling of bonds; another aim was to widen industrial ownership by allowing 
sales of stocks and shares and so to encourage companies to increase their 
investment by the funds they raised by these IPOs. For the general risks 
associated with the markets, these regulations tried to avoid the risks 
associated with short term money markets. Other aims include providing wider 
participation of the public in the economic development process through the 
investment of savings ihto the securities; to pass legislation in order to protect 
the rights and benefits of savers, and to ensure the safe and efficient working of 
the capital market; to allow residents in Turkey to buy and sell stocks, and 
deposit them in foreign countries irrespective of the foreign exchange rate; to 
allow Turkish residents to buy/sell securities on the Turkish stock exchange 
through banks and other intermediaries operating in accordance with the 
Capital Market Act and finally, to deregulate credits provided from abroad by 
Turkish nationals, and the opening of foreign deposit accounts by Turkish 
banks. 
6.3.2 Istanbul Stock Exchange (IMKB) 
Generally, the exchange of securities in Turkey has taken place at the Istanbul 
Stock Exchange Market (IMKB) which started operations at the end of January 
1986. Turkey is one of ten financial markets classified as 'emerging' by the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC) (DemirgOc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 
1996). lt also stands out as the most rapidly developing market in the World 
(Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 1996). 
While the number of firms quoted on the stock market was originally 848, the. 
number increased rapidly, and peaked at 1,305 in November 1993, before 
coming down to 285 at the end of 1999. 
The banking sector has a large share of total operations in the IMKB. Banks 
have an "oppressive" superiority compared to other financial institutions and 
controlled very large amounts of funds after 1980. The market capitalisation 
value of the IMKB was TRL 938 million in 1983 but it had increased dramatically 
to TRL 114,271 million by 19993. 
In terms of securities, the government dominated the market with increasing 
Treasury bills and bond issuance. The government has increasingly turned 
towards internal resources as a result of the decline in tax revenues over recent 
years. The inadequacy of savings to meet government budget deficits has also 
been responsible for the Government's dominance of the Stock Exchange. 
Consequently, the share of public sector involvement on the exchange 
increased. The private sector predominantly sells private securities, common 
stock, mortgage bonds, participation certificates and various other bonds. While 
the involvement of the public sector has increased over the last few years, the 
involvement of the private sector has fallen below 10 %. 
In terms of the primary capital market it has been described as "crawling 
market" up until now. Securities are limited except for public securities. Current 
shares have been concentrated on a few large firms and the ownership of firms 
has not spread to the private sector. Public securities comprise the most 
important part of new shares sold in the market and this has led to "crowding" in 
the financial markets. 
The IMKB is not big enough in terms of capitalisation value to match the World's 
stock markets but it has performed adequately, particularly, in 1993 and 1997. 
The most important structural problem, however, has been its high volatility 
compared to other stock markets. 
'After the 2000 and 2001 crisis In Turkey, half of this level have slid away. 
The Istanbul Stock Exchange Market became a member of the FIBV 
(Federation lnternationale Des Bourses De Valuers) in 1992. After one year of 
preparation, the market became a member of SEC (the United States Securities 
and Exchange Commission) and was confirmed as an offshore securities 
market. These developments are important in terms of the IMKB's future 
potential to develop into an international market. 
6.3.3 IMKB and Economic Growth: Empirical Findings 
There are two recent pieces of research (Durukan, 1999; and Saltoglu and 
Gunes, 1999) which analyse the general econometric relationship between 
stock market development and economic growth in Turkey. Saltoglu and Gunes' 
(1999) analysis used a Vector Autoregression methodology, which is generally 
regarded as better and far superior econometric technique than the Ordinary 
Least Squares used by Durukan. 
Saltoglu and Gunes (1999) analyzed the relationship between the IMKB and the 
money supply (M1, M2 and M2Y), the rate of inflation, the return on Treasury 
bills, lnterbank interest rates, TRL\US Dollar and TRL\ Deutsche Mark foreign 
exchange rates, the production index, GNP and total exports. 
After a detailed analysis their findings were not that surprising: except for the 
M2Y money supply, they failed to find a statistically significant relationship 
between the stock market and the other variables. In addition, there are two 
other results, which are worth mentioning. First of all, they failed to find any 
support for the argument that IMKB values, capitalization value and trading 
volume, can be used to predict future growth rates of GNP. More interestingly, 
they find that the IMKB did not have a statistically significant relationship with 
the other markets. Hence, their general conclusion was that the IMKB is not an 
integral part of the domestic economy, let alone the international one. They 
argued that this is not sui generis to the IMKB and claimed that this finding 
. explains why the Turkish financial and economic policies failed, because the 
financial system is not effectively transforming and transferring these policies. 
Secondly, regarding the level of development in the IMKB, they found that the 
market was much thinner than they had originally thought and also criticized the 
institutionalisation level of the IMKB. This was also was addressed by Durukan · 
(1999). In essence, they argue that the IMKB is a "daily trading market" with 
little or no macro or microeconomic. 
lt is also worth noting that the relationship between the monthly industrial 
production index of the State Statistical Institution and the IMKB index has been 
weak. This means that the Istanbul Stock Exchange Market does not reflect 
developments in the productive sectors. The demand for capital finance which. 
developed in Turkey has been largely directed by demand oriented incentives 
and a lack of supply oriented incentives has led to periodic surges in the IMKB. 
This has prevented the market from deepening and has led to speculative 
increases from time to time, leading to questions of efficiency and volatility of 
the IMKB. 
Another recent study is carried out by Karamustafa and Kucukkale (2002) who 
investigated whether current economic activities in Turkey have explanatory 
power over stock returns, or not. In their study, the relationships between share 
returns and selected macroeconomic variables have been examined for the 
Turkish case. Monthly data covers the period of 1990- 2001. Selected 
macroeconomic variables were Money Supply (M1), US Dollar Exchange Rate, 
Trade Balance, and Industrial Production Index. They have also used monthly 
stock price indexes of Istanbul Stock Exchange Engel- Granger and Johansen-
Juselius eo-integration tests and Granger Causality test were used in the study 
to explain the long-run relations among variables questioned. Their findings 
illustrated that stock returns is eo-integrated with a set of macroeconomic 
variables by providing a direct long-run equilibrium relation. However, the 
macroeconomic variables are not the leading indicators for the stock returns, 
because any causal relation from macroeconomic variables to the stock returns 
could not determined in sample period. Contrarily, stock returns are the leading 
indicator for the macroeconomic performance for the Turkish case by 
supporting emerging market issues (Karamustafa and Kucukkale, 2002). 
That is to say share returns can be explained by the changing macroeconomic 
performance. Obtained VAR results indicate that there are cointegration 
relations between lSE and the other economical variables. The causality test 
results, however, show that lSE is not the result variable of current economic 
activities. Controversially, lSE is cause variable for M1. While the studies made 
for developed markets [Fama (1991), Geske and Roll (1983), etc.] determine a . 
relation directed from macroeconomic performance to share returns, the same 
relation could not be determined for the Turkish case. As indicated in Kwon and 
Shin (1999), however, share returns cannot be affected by macroeconomic 
fluctuations in emerging markets of Europe and South Asia. In this respect, the 
Turkish case can be included in the second group, namely "emerging market". 
Additionally, it can be said that the shareholders in lSE have completely 
different investment patterns from the shareholders in developed markets 
(Karamustafa and Kucukkale, 2002). 
6.3.3.1 The issue of efficiency and volatilit/ 
The theory of rational or informationally efficient stock markets developed by 
neoclassical economics has been extensively tested for about a quarter 
century5. Although there has been recent increase in empirical research 
regarding informational efficiency of emerging stock markets, a quick review of 
the literature of this field shows that resources seem to be primarily devoted to 
investigate developed markets. Since emerging markets may offer valuable 
opportunities for diversification beyond national borders, it has some merit to 
undertake further research concerning developing markets. 
The empirical results of Balaban, Candemir and Kunter (1996) show for the first 
time that the Turkish stock market is not informationally efficient with respect to 
daily changes in some monetary variables. Put differently, aggregate stock 
prices in Turkey do not fully reflect publicly available information employed. In 
addition, their results are consistent with the previous research findings, which 
report inefficiency with respect to monthly data (see, for example, Muradoglu 
and Onkal (1992), and Muradoglu and Metin (1995)). 
These results have two major implications. First, investors can at least have a 
chance to develop · profitable trading strategies by using anticipated and 
unanticipated changes in the information variables as long as the reported 
inefficiencies remain in the market. In other words, under the theory of financial 
4 This section Is based on the study by Balaban, E., Candemir, B., Kunter KIn 1996 titled "Stock market efficiency in a 
developing economy: evidence from Turkey", The Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey Research department 
discussion paper no: 9612 
5 For excellent surveys of efficient markets hypothesis from different perspectives, see, among others, Summers 
(1986), Merton (1987), Ball (1989), Fama (1991) and van Hulle et al. (1993). 
interior decorator, it may be possible for investment professionals to construct 
portfolios in accordance with investors' preferences and tolerance for risk. The 
same also applies to foreign investors who have already full access to the 
Turkish stock market. Note that foreign investors hold approximately 25% of 
total tradable shares in Turkey. lt is expected that foreign portfolio holdings as 
well as direct investments in Turkey increase in the near future. Even though 
the inefficiencies may die as time passes, new ones emerge in a country with a 
highly inflationary developing economy. If potential researchers pursue 
academic success rather than financial success emphasized by Merton (1987), 
any inefficiencies can be made publicly available as soon as they are detected. 
The second implication is that resources in Turkey do not seem to be devoted 
their best alternatives available. In other words, Turkish stock market has not 
been successful enough to channel scarce funds into their best productive 
areas. Thus, allocative efficiency appears to remain unachieved. This may 
make stock market policies questionable in resource allocation in developing 
countries. The results Balaban, Candemir and Kunter (1996) can be extended 
in several ways. Within a nonexhaustive list, a fruitful area of research can be to 
test whether the reported results are valid for individual stocks and portfolios. 
Another useful investigation can be subperiod analysis of the findings of the 
present paper. Finally, different methodology can be employed to check 
whether the reported inefficiencies are valid. 
6.3.3.2 Institutional Development and integration of the IMKB6 
Istanbul stock exchange is by far the most liquid and largest stock exchange in 
the Middle East and North Africa and among the top in Eastern Europe. Besides 
its regional dominance, lSE is also quite volatile. For example, after rising by 
more than 200% in US dollar terms in 1993, it has lost almost half of its entire 
value in 1994. Indeed, this was one of the main features of lSE ever since it 
began trading in 1986. Clearly, assessing volatility of asset returns is an 
important prelude toward the proper evaluation of regulatory policy changes 
aiming at restricting and enhancing international capital flows. Volatility 
considerations also assume significance for determining the cost of capital and 
6 This section is based on a couple of articles that have Investigated this subject recently. Particularly, the study 
Benkato and Darrat (2000) Is quite comprehensive and analysed the integration of lSE with global markets (USA. Japan 
and the Europe) and existence of spillover effects of these markets on lSE. 
for implementing international diversification and hedging strategies (Bekaert 
and Harvey, 1997). Given the relative importance of the Turkish market in its 
region and in light of apparently extreme volatile behaviour of lSE, it is important 
to examine the degree of global integration of the lSE. 
The globalisation of the lSE began in August 1989 when the Turkish authorities 
issued Decree 32 that allows foreign investors to purchase and sell all types of 
securities in the lSE and repatriate the proceeds in an attempt to deregulate the 
Turkish market and encourage capital inflows. After analysing the development 
and integration of the lSE with the global (and matured) markets of the US, the 
UK, Germany and Japan, Benkato and Darrat (2000) reached several 
conclusions for lSE: 
First, they found that there exists a significant cointegrating relationship binding 
the lSE with these four markets. This is a quite important proposition to make as 
it means that although stock prices in the lSE may drift away from those in 
matured markets temporarily in the short-run, strong equilibrating forces appear 
to have existed that prevent such a divergence to take place over the long run. 
Another important conclusion of the Benkato and Darrat study is that the 
Turkish market became significantly integrated with the global markets 
particularly in the post-capital market liberalisations period. Therefore, lifting of 
the capital controls appears to have provided, perhaps as intended by the 
market regulators, an important propagation mechanism for a more visible and 
robust linkage of the lSE to more matured markets. Thus, while the lSE may 
have provided international .investors with some gains from portfolio 
diversification in the 1980s, the lifting of capital controls since the late 1989 
appears to have limited such gain. 
Thirdly, relative to the matured markets, lSE does exhibit excessive volatility, a 
characteristic that most emerging markets share. Nevertheless data suggest 
that lSE has become considerably less volatile in the post-liberalisation period. 
This conclusion of Benkato and Darrat (2000) is consistent with the Bekaert and 
Harvey (1997) in the case of emerging markets. By enhancing the linkage of the 
lSE to more matured and well-established markets, the removal of capital 
controls appears to have produced positive spillovers that have contributed to 
overall market stability. In fact, their results ascribe part of the blame for 
excessive volatility in the lSE to the East Asian financial crisis of the mid-1997. 
Finally, and more importantly, volatility in the lSE became significantly linked to 
volatilise in all matured markets only after the relaxation of capital controls. lt is 
interesting to note that they did not find volatility spillovers from matured 
markets to the lSE before the liberalisation and increased dramatically after the 
removal of capital controls in Turkey. 
6.3.4 Conclusion 
According to the available evidence, it can be claimed that the capital market of 
Turkey is comparatively thin and very sensitive to macroeconomic variables. 
Thus, due to an unstable macroeconomic environment and the comparatively 
small volume of transactions, the IMKB has not been an efficient market for 
channelling extra funds to the industrial sector compared to the banking sector. 
lt can also be claimed that although legislation on the Turkish capital market is 
similar to international standards, family oriented businesses and structures still 
dominate in the Turkish corporate sector. The Turkish capital market is also 
quite weak in managing the relationship between the real and the financial 
sector within the economy. In Turkish case, it can be argued that stock market 
development play some role in the development of the economy. However, 
none of them are essential. In particular, stock market seriously falls short of 
channelling funds effectively in allocating the capital to promote growth. lt also 
needs to be highlighted that most of the studies of the topic focus on the 
negative impact of the stock market on the overall development of the economy. 
The issue of volatility and efficiency is also important. A number of researches 
suggest that the Turkish stock markets are volatile. Interestingly enough, a 
significant portion of these studies associated this characteristic of the Turkish 
stock market with the short-term perception of the investors, in particular the 
domestic ones. The period highlighted by these studies is 3-months. In fact, 
given the fact that the inflation is persistently too high during the period 
analysed, this is not a surprise. Inflation distorts the whole economic activity 
dramatically and fuels the uncertainty surrounding the markets. Another reason 
why stock market investors have a short-term perspective is the fact that the 
government borrowing had heavily concentrated in the 3-month maturity. In 
addition, banking credits extended to the private sector have also been 
extended by 3-month periods. Financial statements in Turkey are also 
published quarterly, being another reason for a short-term sight of the investors. 
Yet, the issue of volatility has not been analysed in greater depths and the 
reasons have not been specifically chosen as the subject of studies. Such that, 
the political, ethical and anthropological reasons of volatility have not been 
addressed or even listed in a number of studies. 
Another issue to be vigorously analysed is the relation between stock market 
and foreign exchange one. The value of Turkish Lira was always at the top of 
the economic agenda, as well as at the top of the list of issues to be dealt with, 
for any government since 1983 elections. Without any exception, almost all the 
programmes implemented depended on the constant flow of foreign 
investments to Turkey. This topic has been analysed in greater depths. lt has 
been found that the increased stock market activity is accompanied with the 
appreciation of Turkish Lira. This is of no surprise. Investors, especially foreign 
investors, have to convert into Turkish Lira in order to invest in Turkish assets. 
This may lead to the thought that, by increasing the value of Turkish Lira, stock 
market development in fact can have a strong relation with the development of 
the overall economy. However, it is interesting to note that these conversations 
have little to play in the appreciation of Turkish Lira. The main driving force 
behind this is the performing government T-bill and bond markets. 
Turkish stock market has a lot way to go. However, the previous developments 
are not very encouraging. Nevertheless, when compared with other emerging 
countries, Turkey offers a much more efficient, developed and regulated market 
than any other one. The issue of contribution to the Turkish economy, however, 
remains an open subject yet to be settled among academics, policy makers and 
market professionals. 
CHAPTER VII 
RESULTS OF TURKISH FINANCIAL LIBERALISATION: 
SOME CONCLUSIONS7 
This study attempts to analyse the relation between financial development and 
economic growth in Turkey in a descriptive way. lt critically assesses the 
impact of financial liberalization program implemented in Turkey during 1980s 
and 1990s and investigates its impact on the overall development of the 
economy. This dissertation argues that while financial restructuring was clearly 
necessary in Turkey in the 1980s, a more gradualist approach, in which policy-
triggered economic changes and the structure of the Turkish economy are 
factored into policy-making, may have yielded better economic results than 
direct financial liberalization 
The general finding is that the Turkish financial liberalisation attempt did not 
reach its objectives due to a number of reasons, including political, economical 
and financial obstacles as well as market infrastructure. On the regulation side, 
'This section Is In line with the findings of Sak (1995), Gultekln at al (2000), Gunes and Saltoglu (1999) 
initial set up of the control mechanisms and the overall regulation of the industry 
was inefficient while the independent external audit institutions were not very 
effective. The lack of a compensating mechanism for investor losses made the 
cost heavy. Besides, there is still a need for ethical institutions to provide 
effective supervision in the market. 
In 1980,.faced with a severe economic crisis, the Turkish government adopted a 
comprehensive economic stabilization and structural adjustment program, a 
substantial part of which targeted financial restructuring. Based on the 
McKinnon-Shaw (1973) framework, the program initiated the, transition from a 
' regulated to a liberalized financial system. 
The premise of the program was that when interest rates are deregulated, 
deposit and loan rates would increase in a capital scarce market, and the higher 
returns to deposits would attract more savings into the formal financial sector, 
increasing the volume of loanable funds to the private sector. Higher availability 
of credit would then promote the previously quantity-constrained investment, 
leading to growth in the long-run. 
In this study, the behaviour of interest rates, saving, and investment was 
examined with descriptive analysis between 1980-1998 periods. The results 
obtained lead to the conclusion that interest rates and savings increase 
erratically with the implementation of the financial liberalization program. 
However, no evidence for positive relationships between interest rates, savings, 
and investment is found. Moreover, the ultimate goal of higher investment rates 
is not attained. New financial instruments and markets were introduced, but 
they failed to present an effective alternative to the existing oligopolistic banking 
structure. Simultaneous macroeconomic restructuring and financial liberalization 
resulted in instability and uncertainty in Turkey, while failing to realize the 
balanced growth objective set in 1980. From the observations, two policy 
implications emerged. Macroeconomic stability measures need to precede 
financial restructuring for the latter to be more effective. 
The macroeconomic problems that the Turkish economy has faced hindered the 
liberalization attempts profoundly. These macroeconomic problems include: 
1) Mismanagement and hence, great fluctuations of the (main)· price 
mechanisms (inflation, interest and exchange rates); 
2) The persistent growth of uncontrollable public finance, and thus, the 
high ratio of public debt to the GDP; 
3) A low domestic savings rate, and the underdeveloped state of 
financial markets; 
4) The low productivity in real economy, and dependency on foreign 
financing. 
lt has also faced other microeconomic problems such as: 
5) Banks' needs for liquidity; 
6) Banks' capital inadequacies; 
7) The disorganization in the structure of the banking system. 
In order to understand the very reasons behind Turkish attempt, all of the 
aforementioned topics should be analysed in greater dept with their implications 
on the overall growth performance of the economy. 
In fact, the Turkish experience of financial liberalisation has brought about some 
positive results in the financial sector as well but its impact in the real economic 
sectors do not justify the changes which have taken place over the last 20 years 
or so. Following the January 1980 programme of structural changes, Turkey 
changed its economic perspective and an outward-looking growth model was 
adopted. However, instead of making changes in the agricultural and industrial 
sectors, changes were focused on the financial and commercial ones. 
Accordingly, liberalisation of the foreign exchange market and foreign trade took 
place without increasing industrial productivity and liberalisation of the money 
and foreign exchange markets took place without providing monetary stability. 
Indirect taxation and domestic borrowing were also preferred to internal savings 
in order to balance the fiscal deficit, and the tax-spending policy failed to 
adequately distribute income (Degirmen, 2000). 
The most important measures of the success of liberalisation are those relating 
to the real side of the economy. This is reaffirmed by McKinnon and Shaw's 
concluding point that financial repression constituted an obstacle to higher 
growth rates in developing countries. Real performance criteria, such as the 
growth rate of the Turkish economy, private investments and investments in the 
manufacturing sector either do not show significant improvement or show 
negative developments. In particular, growth performance of the Turkish 
economy declined after liberalisation when compared with the rates achieved 
between 1950 and 1980. 
The behaviour of private investments, which is the primary determinant of the 
productive capacity of the economy, is not too dissimilar to what happened in 
Latin American countries, after their financial liberalisation attempts. This, 
perhaps, indicates that the Turkish experience is not so unique as argued 
earlier. 
Savings have shown some increase but they are subject to the sort of 
reservations mentioned previously in the text. However, it has been mostly the 
public sector, not the private sector, which benefited from these increases. The 
private sector has started to run a surplus of savings over investments and 
financed the public sector's growing deficit. On the other hand, this growing 
deficit has been a result of the government's high cost of borrowing, which has 
been largely due to financial liberalisation. Thus, the financial liberalisation has, 
in this respect, directly weakened the economy. 
The size of the public sector and the consequent crowding out of private 
industry and commerce prevents the "real economy" from developing to its full 
potential. The Turkish economy has shown comparatively good growth 
performance over recent years in spite of its financial problems. However, if this 
growth is to be maintained or even increased, financial liberalisation must take 
place in an atmosphere of effective economic reform. 
In addition, according to the available evidence, it can be claimed that the 
capital market of Turkey is comparatively thin and very sensitive to 
macroeconomic variables. Thus, due to an unstable macroeconomic 
environment and the comparatively small volume of transactions, the stock 
market has not been an efficient market for channelling extra funds to the 
industrial sector compared to the banking sector (Degirmen, 2000). 
The increase in financial deepening should also be considered. In particular, not 
all of the credit which was attributable to increased financial deepening 
emanated from financial liberalisation. The development of financial and real 
indicators after 1950 shows that there has been a trend not only of increasing 
financial deepening but also of increasing saving rates. While the real 
performance of the economy did not improve significantly, compared to the 
financial repression period, financial deepening did increase, new financial 
instruments were introduced and new markets were developed. Accordingly, 
total financial assets held by households and the private sector increased. 
Banks continue to dominate but their dominance was to some extent eroded by 
the new instruments and markets. However, hastily conceived financial 
liberalisation attempts caused the major economic crises of 1994, 2000 and 
2001 which adversely effected the banking and real economic sectors. Despite 
all the structural and legal measures taken, the domestic banks still dominate 
the financial system in Turkey. Big businesses and financial intermediaries 
continued to be the primary consumer of these facilities through the 1980s, as 
they provided easier access to financial information than small businesses and 
consumers, and as they are protected by deposit insurance and the lender-of-
1 ast -resort. 
Even though new financial instruments and financial institutions have been 
introduced following the financial liberalization program, the banking sector has 
not been able to provide efficient intermediation. After the liberalization, along 
with inefficient intermediation of banking sector reasons for the existence and 
emergence of the relationship between holding groups and the affiliated banks 
in Turkey were strengthened. The holding groups have financial problems due 
to high inflation, a negative real interest rate policy maintained by the State, 
undeveloped capital markets and thus, inadequate self-financing, and the 
banking sector remains the dominant source of finance. 
An important consequence of this structure was the uneven allocation of funds 
by the banking sector. lt was seen that increased financial deepening does not 
directly lead to increased funds for private investments from the banking sector. 
In particular, although total bank deposits increased considerably compared to 
the 1970s, bank credits only increased slightly. Moreover, the medium and long-
term credits extended by banks diminished considerably after liberalisation. 
Conversely, in the capital market, the public sector crowded out a substantial 
chunk of funds originating from the private sector. As explained earlier in the 
thesis, these funds were used to finance the growing public sector deficit, which 
was caused by increased borrowing costs after liberalisation. 
Why Turkish financial liberalisation attempt is not a successful one? We can 
summarize these points by noting that the reasons behind the slow 
development of capital markets in Turkey as follow: 
1) The concentration on bond and share selling 
2) The inadequacy of the secondary market 
3) Inadequate savings 
4) The inefficient allocation of institutional savings inadequate 
supervision. 
5) Persistent political and economical instability 
In fact, again, all these sub topics also beg further investigation and analysis in 
order to identify the different aspects of the Turkish attempt. In essence, the 
supervision issue as well as the subject of inefficiency is far most important that 
requires a full analysis with advance econometric techniques. In addition, the 
issue of political and financial instability has to be addressed in detail as well. 
Since, economic and political instability has taken its toll on the markets in 
terms of supervision, efficiency, returns, and overall market development. This 
instability, accompanied with weak managerial capabilities of Turkish statesmen 
also produced an unbalanced economy with high levels of borrowing 
requirement for the public sector. As discussed, this had crowded out the 
private sector investment, causing lasting damage to the economy and financial 
sector. In addition, due to the high rate of inflation, investors have shown a clear 
tendency for money market instruments rather than capital market options. This 
has resulted in a very liquid short-dated product market in the expense of long-
term financing being neglected. More importantly, in spite of various legal 
arrangements and tax incentives, the capital market in Turkey has not reached 
sufficient efficiency as well. 
The Turkish capital market is also quite weak in managing the relationship 
between the real and the financial sector within the economy. The reason being, 
these enterprises do not prefer to sell their shares to the public and also prefer 
to stay domestic. Moreover, there is little fresh money, especially foreign 
exchange, coming into market producing a relatively small system. As a 
consequence, stock market investment per capita has also remained very 
undersized in comparison with developed markets. lt can also be claimed that 
although legislation on the Turkish capital market is similar to international 
standards, family oriented businesses and structures still dominate the Turkish 
corporate sector. This resulted in capital markets not experiencing many 
companies coming in to the market. This also enabled them to stay away the 
regulatory requirements and control of third parties on their portfolio of 
companies. Although corporate tax on companies which issue securities to the 
public have been reduced to 30% from 48% in recent years, the expected 
increase in shares has not yet taken place. A further analysis of the this 
domestic topic can identify the problems in debt and may help policy makers to 
institute new regulations to encourage more involvement by the family run 
businesses. 
Domestic institutional investors traditionally do not invest in capital markets. 
These institutional investors include social security institutions (pension funds, 
social insurance institutions, etc.), special pension funds, insurance companies 
and life insurance, army mutual fund, securities investment partnerships and 
funds, compulsory savings funds. This caused these investors being less 
developed in terms of understanding the dynamics and fundamentals of the 
financial markets. Such that, company accounts and financial performance are 
less important for domestic investors who tends to make investment decisions 
by looking at a company's general image. The market is dominated by a small 
number of institutions and public interest is, therefore, limited. An analysis of the 
this subject may also identify the very reasons behind domestic savings not 
allocated among the financial instruments. This issue is also closely related with 
the risk management and risk appetite, which leads to us the questions of 
efficiency and supervision. 
There are no market-maker institutions in Turkey and this has reduced 
information efficiency and overall effectiveness. Investment funds which consist 
of large numbers of investors are not that widespread and are dominated by 
banks. This has caused a malevolent circle where banks are both investors and 
fund managers of the same fund, resulting in a thin market with fragile 
infrastructure. This issue of market making will supply transparency as well as 
liquidity. By monitoring these market makers, in fact, the law-makers can also 
control the whole system. This issue has to be tailor-made in line with the needs 
of Turkish markets. The market makers in the T-bill market, instituted very 
recently, can be a raw model to further broaden this issue. 
Additionally, the privatisation of state owned enterprises with foreign capital has 
a positive effect on the economy at the beginning of the massive privatisation 
programme. However, due to a lack of public support it is argued that this effect 
was not as positive as expected and failed to make a notable impact on the 
market environment. The inertia of the public mostly stemmed from the belief 
that a significant number of public servants may lose their jobs in the aftermath 
of privatisation. While the share among total privatised securities in the 
developed capital markets is 20% of outstanding issues of the state, the ratio in 
Turkey is 1 %. 
Another topic that needs to be explored is whether banks are still important for 
financing large and small firms listed on the lSE by examining their impact on 
the growth rate of their sales. If they are important (and if the government can 
ever have more information than an entire market when it comes to knowing 
what regulations will impose), whether financial interventions initiated by the 
government catches up to the market's needs, regarding the institutional 
economics approach. Since persistently higher inflation and interest rates have 
been part of the Turkish experience for a long time, the relationship between 
inflation and regulation is worth looking into, as is exploring the issue of whether 
regulations influence whether or not money matters to the real economy. Future 
research might also consider whether privatization of regulatory institutions can 
be effective, even though market structure may be incompatible with it given the 
political and economic instabilities of the recent past. This begs the question, is 
it necessary that after every economic downturn or crisis that the government 
should come up with new interventions or regulations, regarding the timing and 
sequencing of the financial interventions? Alternatively, should the government 
have a long-run intervention framework and should it apply decrees and 
regulatory modifications in the short run to keep its long-run target in right track? 
The problems of the Turkish financial sector in general, banking sector in 
particular have been a crucial for the Turkish economy. These problems 
prevented the economy to steam forward with its full capacity and had adverse 
affects on the whole economical, political and social chambers of Turkey. 
Turkey should find a way to provide a sustainable and stable growth in the 
economy. it should stabilize the markets and increase transparency as well as 
efficiency and effective supervision. All of these should be above the daily 
political concerns and should focus the long term outcome and benefits. This 
will in return serve to a number of different ends for the Republic, including its 
long-lasting ambition of joining the European Union. However, weak and thin 
financial and capital markets, ill- set up market infrastructure and acute and 
quaking financial crisis in every 8-10 years will prove too costly for Turkey going 
forward. 
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